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ABSTRACT 
ALI Restatements of the Law have traditionally exerted significant influence over 
court decisions and the development of the common law. During the past two decades, 
however, the ALI has seen an upsurge in interest group activity designed to shape or 
even thwart aspects of the Institute’s work. Most recently, the Restatement of the Law 
of Liability Insurance (RLLI) has been the focus of not only criticism of particular 
provisions but a concerted effort by members of the insurance industry to demonize 
the project as a whole and bar use of the document by courts.  
The vehemence of insurer opposition seems odd in that the RLLI is a mainstream 
document that leans in favor of insurers on several important issues. Why have 
insurers been so vehemently opposed to the RLLI? Have previously non-partisan law 
reform efforts now become afflicted with the same interest group muscle flexing that 
pervades modern electoral politics? And if so, what are the implications for the future 
of this aspect of American law? This Article examines not only the background of and 
debate over the RLLI but also addresses the evolution of special interest group 
interaction with law reform organizations in order to offer an explanation for the 
increasing politicization of what historically has been largely non-partisan creation of 
“soft law.”  
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I. INTRODUCTION: SOFT LAW AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
In the United States, much of law is decentralized because of the nation’s political 
federalism that gives States significant autonomy regarding their substantive law.1 In 
an effort to improve the law and provide greater consistency, the American Law 
Institute (“ALI”), a law reform group comprised of judges, professors, and practicing 
attorneys formed in 1923, published its first Restatement (of the Law of Contracts) in 
1931.2 Thereafter followed Restatements of the Law of Torts, Property, Judgments, 
Restitution, Conflict of Laws, and more. During the 1960s, the ALI began preparing 
“Second Restatements” updating the fields. The 1990s ushered in “Third 
 
1 Insurance law is more fragmented than most contract law, in part because of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §1011, which provides for state regulation of the business of insurance 
unless expressly countermanded by federal law. 
2 See infra Part I (describing origin and history of ALI and Restatements); RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS (AM. L. INST. 1932). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss3/7
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Restatements.”3 For the most part, Restatements have been influential, perhaps even 
highly influential. They have been frequently cited by courts, commentators and 
legislators as either authoritative statements of the law or correct analyses of the law. 
But in recent years, Restatements and other ALI projects have been subjected to 
criticism for allegedly departing too much from settled law or having been too shaped 
by special interest influence.  
Most recently, the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance4 (hereinafter 
“RLLI”), approved in 2018 and published in 2019, faced substantially more, ongoing, 
opposition than its predecessors.5 Despite a quiet start, the 2014–2018 period have 
witnessed a full court press of lobbying by the insurance industry designed to shape 
the RLLI in ways favorable to insurers. Notwithstanding considerable success in 
affecting the content of the RLLI, many insurers and their representatives continue to 
contend that the document unduly favors policyholders. Many insurers advocated 
terminating the entire RLLI project.6 When these efforts failed, they took the battle to 
state legislatures, where they have succeeded in obtaining passage of a good deal of 
anti-RLLI resolutions and even statutes.7 Lobbying efforts have included seeking to 
enlist the aid of state legislators, state courts, and governors, with some success. For 
example, in April 2018, the governors of six states wrote to the ALI opposing adoption 
of the RLLI unless it was revised in favor of insurers.8 The gubernatorial letter is 
stunning in two ways.  
First, it appears to represent the first time any governors – acting in their capacity 
as governors rather than attorneys or ALI members – have lobbied the ALI regarding 
a project, much less seeking to interfere with the ALI’s normally deliberative process. 
The governors sought further concessions for insurers or termination of the eight-year-
 
3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. (AM. L. INST. 1998); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (AM. L. INST. 2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM (AM. L. INST. 2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT (AM. L. INST. 2011). 
4 See RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. (AM. L. INST.) [hereinafter RLLI]. 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 See generally infra Part II. 
7 See infra notes 204–09. 
8 See Letter from Henry McMaster, Governor of South Carolina, Kim Reynolds, Governor of 
Iowa, Paul R. LePage, Governor of Maine, Pete Rickets, Governor of Nebraska, Greg Abbott, 
Governor of Texas, Gary R. Herbert, Governor of Utah, to David F. Levi, President, Am. L. 
Inst. (Apr. 6, 2018), http://ncoil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2018-04-
062520Governors2520to2520ALI2520re2520Draft2520Restatement-2-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9H34-YDPR] [hereinafter Gubernatorial Letter]. Materials submitted to ALI 
and motions made during the ALI consideration of the RLLI that are cited in this Article were 
posted on the Project website for the RLLI and available to Institute members until the Project 
was completed and the RLLI was published. Copies are on file with the author and the Cleveland 
State Law Review. The materials remain archived with ALI as well, although not currently 
posted for viewing on the ALI website, ali.org. 
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old project as well as threatening state-specific action to prohibit or reduce its use by 
courts.9  
Second, the letter largely parrots the talking points used by insurer representatives 
in their materials criticizing or opposing the RLLI without providing any support for 
assertions that the RLLI is not “offering a reliable and authoritative summary of 
existing law” but rather “proposes changes to established legal principles governing 
liability insurance contracts and disputes.”10 A dead giveaway of sorts is that the 
gubernatorial letter quotes – as does much of the insurance industry literature against 
the RLLI – the late Justice Scalia’s assertion that “[o]ver time, the Restatements’ 
authors have abandoned the mission of describing the law, and have chosen instead to 
set forth their aspirations for what law ought to be . . . . And it cannot safely be 
assumed, without further inquiry, that a Restatement provision describes rather than 




11 Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 475–76 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). The full Scalia quote – which is a rather strong assault on the Restatements 
but had no other Justices joining the concurring/dissenting opinion – reads as follows: 
Modern Restatements – such as the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment (2010), which both opinions address in their discussions of the 
discouragement remedy – are of questionable value, and must be used with caution. 
The object of the original Restatements was “to present an orderly statement of the 
general common law.” Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Introduction, p. viii (1934). 
Over time, the Restatements’ authors have abandoned the mission of describing the 
law, and have chosen instead to set forth their aspirations for what the law ought to 
be. [W. Noel] Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a 
Proposal for Its Amelioration, 13 Pepp. L. Rev. 23, 24–25 (1985). Section 39 of the 
Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment is illustrative; as Justice 
Thomas [in his partial concurrence and dissent] notes, it constitutes a “novel extension 
of the law that finds little if any support in case law. Restatement sections such as that 
should be given no weight whatever as to the current state of the law, and no more 
weight regarding what the law ought to be than the recommendations of any respected 
lawyer or scholar. And it cannot safely be assumed, without further inquiry, that a 
Restatement provision describes rather than revises current law. 
Id. Left unmentioned was that a majority of the Supreme Court was perfectly comfortable 
with Justice Elena Kagan’s majority opinion that considered the ALI Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2010). It was also discussed in the longer dissenting opinion 
of Justices Thomas (joined by Justices Scalia, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts in part). This 
opinion was critical of a particular provision of the Restatement but did not extrapolate this 
dissatisfaction to all Restatements. See infra note 47, discussing Kansas v. Nebraska. 
The Scalia attack on Restatements has been cited by insurer opponents of the RLLI in a 
number of its attacks on the RLLI. Jay M. Feinman, A User’s Guide to The Restatement of the 
Law, Liability Insurance, 26 CONN. INS. L.J. 95, 108 (2019). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss3/7
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Whatever merit there may be to Justice Scalia’s criticism regarding the Restitution 
Restatement,12 it is a vastly overblown assertion regarding Restatements generally13 
and the RLLI in particular.14 But because it was said by a Supreme Court Justice – 
albeit a Justice frequently isolated from mainstream legal opinion15 – the attack on 
 
12 The Restitution Restatement, although not firmly adopting the prevailing rule on the point 
in question, adopted a position that enjoyed significant judicial and academic support. It was 
persuasive to five Supreme Court Justices in the Kansas v. Nebraska litigation (Majority 
Opinion author Kagan and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kennedy). See Kansas v. 
Nebraska, 574 U.S. at 445. 
13 Although individual sections of particular Restatements have critics and, more importantly, 
courts that reject them, Justice Scalia appears to be the only major judicial figure who has 
asserted that the Restatements have generally departed widely from settled law. But see Kristin 
David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 
205, 222 (2007) (regarding retired Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner as a critic as well as 
prominent Stanford Law Professor Lawrence Friedman but noting criticisms quite different than 
those being advanced by insurers opposed to the RLLI). See also Kristen David Adams, The 
American Law Institute: Justice Cardozo’s Ministry of Justice?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 173, 174 
(2007); Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement 
Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 424 (2004). 
In response to the Gubernatorial Letter, supra note 8, ALI President David Levi noted that 
“[o]ur good friend, Justice Scalia, who could be critical of us, was also an admirer and frequently 
cited and relied upon our work product.” Letter from David F. Levi, President, Am. L. Inst., to 
Henry McMaster, Governor of South Carolina, Kim Reynolds, Governor of Iowa, Paul R. 
LePage, Governor of Maine, Pete Rickets, Governor of Nebraska, Greg Abbott, Governor of 
Texas, Gary R. Herbert, Governor of Utah (Apr. 26, 2018) (on file with author). Judge Levi’s 
point is well taken. Justice Scalia cited Restatements as authority in nearly 100 of the opinions 
he wrote, including three issued after his criticism made in Kansas v. Nebraska. See Omnicare, 
Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175, 197–99 (2015) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 77 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 Although an excellent writer and colorful personality, Justice Scalia is seen by many as 
someone whose combative and confrontational style diminished his ability to form majority 
coalitions. See, e.g., RICHARD HASEN, THE JUSTICE OF CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND 
THE POLITICS OF DISRUPTION (2018) (finding Scalia to be “one of the most influential justices 
ever to serve” on the Court but also “caustic and openly abrasive,” which inhibited his ability 
to form majority coalitions or be the author of majority opinions); see also Richard L. Hasen, 
Antonin Scalia’s Disruption of the Supreme Court Ways Is Here to Stay, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/02/13/antonin-scalias-
disruption-of-the-supreme-courts-ways-is-here-to-stay/ [https://perma.cc/N6Y3-SGJR] (noting 
that in King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015), the decision upholding the Affordable Care Act, 
“if it were up to Scalia, the law would have gone into a death spiral because of his interpretation 
of a single clause of a single sentence in the 2,700-page statute read out of context” yet he was 
in other cases willing to disregard plain text if he viewed its result as sufficiently “absurd”). 
Accord Miranda McGowan, Do as I Say Not as I Do: An Empirical Investigation of Justice 
Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning in Interpretating Statutes, 78 MISS. L.J. 1301 (2008) (finding 
inconsistent fidelity to text in Scalia opinions). As an empirical matter, Justice Scalia frequently 
wrote dissents or concurrences that were not joined by any other justices – as was the case in 
Kansas v. Nebraska. But to staunch conservatives in the United States, however, Scalia is 
largely considered to be the best modern Supreme Court Justice. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
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“modern” Restatements (a suggestion that in the proverbial good old days, 
Restatements stayed in their metaphorical lane and did not venture into law reform) 
garnered attention and became a useful if misleading talking point for critics of 
Restatements – who are also implicitly criticizing the ALI and the concept of a “think 
tank” or law reform organization, particularly if it, on occasion, embraces a 
jurisprudence disliked by business interests.  
Even though it is only two pages long, the gubernatorial letter found time to make 
the truly bizarre allegation that adoption of the RLLI was an impermissible intrusion 
on state law – a claim that rings particularly hollow in that the topics of many prior 
Restatements (e.g., Torts, Contracts, Real Property, Judgments) are also legal matters 
generally committed to state substantive law.16 More bizarre, is the assertion made by 
the governors that:  
[f]rom deciding where to locate to whether to hire more employees, 
businesses frequently rely upon the stability of the insurance market. Thus, 
we are concerned that the [RLLI] could negatively affect our states’ 
economic development opportunities by creating uncertainty and instability 
in the liability insurance market [and] could potentially jeopardize the 
availability and affordability of liability insurance.17 
Ominously, the gubernatorial letter ended with a threat, stating that “if the ALI 
does not significantly revise or rescind the Draft Restatement, this implicit usurpation 
of state authority may require legislative of executive action.”18 In other words, if the 
RLLI is not revised to the satisfaction of the insurance industry, politicians friendly to 
the industry will attempt to legislate or decree contrary rules rather than permitting the 
states’ own courts to determine whether the RLLI is persuasive.19 These governors 
 
16 Gubernatorial Letter, supra note 8, at 1 (suggesting that RLLI is improper because “of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act’s unambiguous commitment of insurance matters to state jurisdiction” 




19 This has already occurred regarding some past ALI provisions. For example, when 
businesses and property owners disliked a section of the ALI RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, 
INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS that they viewed as insufficiently protective of land and facility 
owners, they successfully lobbied roughly 20 state legislatures to enact a contrary rule 
essentially immunizing property owners form tort liability to trespassers.  
Much of this was spearheaded by two pro-business political organizations: the American Tort 
Reform Association (“ATRA”) and the American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”). In 
language that is strikingly similar to attacks on the RLLI, critics of the Torts Restatement 
provision argued that the provision was “radical” and “would threaten to bring about 
fundamental changes” unsupported by case law that would “result in higher insurance 
premiums.” See, e.g., Carter Wood, As Long as It’s Not ‘Flagrant,’ Trespassing Is OK? There 
Ought to Be a Law, POINT OF LAW (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2011/01/as-long-as-its-.php [https://perma.cc/33HU-
BCKZ] (noting that the ALEC – the American Legislative Exchange Council has drafted model 
legislation to prevent application of ALI Restatement (Third) of Torts provision that would 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss3/7
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who purport to be so concerned about federalism show considerably less respect for 
separation of powers.20  
As discussed below, insurer opposition to the RLLI, like other recent anti-
Restatement activity by some business entities, is something more than the type of 
vigorous debate that has often characterized the ALI drafting and decision process or 
the behind-the-scenes lobbying said to characterize some prior projects.21 In the past, 
the culmination of the disagreement was a vote on a challenged provision and 
ultimately a vote on the Restatement itself. Thereafter, those dissatisfied with the 
outcome of the debate vented their opposition through argument in litigation. They 
did not attempt to overrule or annihilate disfavored provisions or an entire Restatement 
through legislative, agency, or executive action.  
The current insurer position is akin to that of a sports team that purports to 
participate in a contest in good faith but when it appears to be losing threatens to have 
an effective opposing player ejected (for the alleged crime of being an opponent) or 
walk off the field. Having lost the contest (e.g., the wording of a particular Restatement 
provision), the participant then attacks the process externally and seeks to sideline the 
document rather than grappling with it on neutral grounds of rational argument before 
courts of law adjudicating the issue in question. Because Restatements are not binding 
law, no court is obligated to follow a Restatement provision, which of course leaves 
insurers free to argue the purported superiority of preferred alternative approaches.  
Under these circumstances, it is bizarre to see insurers attempting to ban the RLLI, 
perhaps reflecting a lack of confidence in the correctness of their preferred alternative 
approaches. 
The RLLI path to adoption demonstrates the increasing politicization of American 
law. The hardball politics that has characterized American electoral contests and 
impeachment proceedings and that also frequently appears regarding the “hard” law 
of statutes, agency regulation, and Supreme Court decisions now appears to have 
become part of the American legal landscape for soft law as well. 
By “soft” law, I mean recommended law or legal doctrine that is intended to have 
influence but is not itself enacted into positive law as is the prototypical “hard” law of 
 
require property owners to show some care in preventing dangerous conditions even for 
trespassers and citing North Dakota H.B. 1452 as an example). 
20 Reactions to the RLLI and other ALI projects do not divide on strictly partisan lines. Many 
ALI members are themselves wealthy lawyers or businesspersons with traditionally Republican 
sensibilities favoring limited government, lower taxes, less regulation, market-based economy 
and solutions to problems as well as more deference to private actors and prerogatives, including 
freedom of contract. Further, most ALI members who are practicing lawyers represent large, 
well-heeled, sophisticated clients. As discussed infra, in Part II, the ALI is an organization of 
what might be termed the civic-minded establishment – but by no means a group committed to 
radical or even substantial change. 
   Notwithstanding this, the anti-RLLI lobbying has come from politically conservative forces, 
as further discussed infra, in Part III. Regarding the April 6, 2018 gubernatorial letter, all six of 
the signing governors are Republicans from what in the U.S. are generally described as “red” 
states (those color-coded as favoring Republican presidential candidates and with Republican 
congressional delegations and state legislatures). A similar pattern is reflected in the legislators 
who have taken up the insurance industry cause opposing the RLLI. See infra Part III. 
21 See infra Part II. 
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statutes and codes. Enforceable executive orders and administrative agency 
regulations comprise a slightly less flinty version of hard law.  
The realm of soft law can be further divided into a hierarchy of (1) model statues 
or codes such as the Model Penal Code or the American Bar Association Rules of 
Professional Conduct and Code of Judicial Conduct.22 These are drafted with the intent 
that state governments (e.g., legislatures or supreme courts) will use them as a template 
for promulgating their own statutes or rules.23 Then there is (2) the soft law of “black 
letter” provisions of the Restatements, which are perhaps in a category of their own in 
that they set forth a doctrinal rule that the Institute hopes courts will follow.24 But there 
is no coercion. Courts may reject Restatement black letter as they see fit. The (3) 
Comments to a Restatement form even softer law in that the Comments, although 
approved by the Institute, are less directive or prescriptive than the black letter of 
Restatements.25 Softer still are the (4) Reporters’ Notes to the Restatement provisions. 
They receive commentary from Institute membership but are not formally voted upon 
by the members.26 At the same time, these Notes have more authority than (5) 
individual treatises, which are the work of individual authors (who may even be 
attorneys representing clients with a position on issues addressed in the treatise), 
which do not receive the scrutiny of the Reporters’ Notes.27 Items such as (6) law 
review articles are softer still, having influence if deemed persuasive by individual 
readers (including courts) but not generally subjected to close review prior to 
publication.28 
This Article addresses the important role of the ALI in U.S. law, reviewing the 
increasingly partisan environment in which the ALI has been forced to operate as the 
law itself has become more politicized (Part II). The lobbying of the ALI over the 
RLLI is detailed and assessed for the light it shines on the increasing insertion of 
special interest activity into an area that was previously treated as one of rational, 
studied, neutral deliberation (Part III). This Article also examines the degree to which 
heightened controversy over the RLLI and other Restatements is peculiar to the United 
States and charts the implications for future efforts to provide the helpful guidance of 
soft law (Part IV). 
 
22 Order of Authorities, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/order_of_authorities [https://perma.cc/9TN2-UH3L]. 
23 Deanna Barmakian, Uniform Laws and Model Acts, HARVARD L. SCH. LIBR. (Nov. 4, 
2020), https://guides.library.harvard.edu/law/unifmodelacts [https://perma.cc/Z54T-SJEP].  





27 Restatement of the Law, supra note 24. 
28 Id. 
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II. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S SURPRISING EVOLUTION TO LIGHTNING 
ROD STATUS 
A.  Institute Origins and the General Success of the Restatements in the 
Twentieth Century 
Since the ALI was formed in 1923, its leadership has been a “Who’s Who” of 
American Law.29 William Draper Lewis, Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School, was an initiating founder and the ALI’s first Executive Director, serving for 
nearly 25 years (1923–47).30 Its list of both Directors and Presidents continues the 
tradition.31 Membership is largely by election and is limited  (there were 2,802 elected 
members as of May 2020 as well as 1,630 “life members” originally elected but placed 
in this status after 25 years of membership).32 In addition to producing the 
 
29 Examples includes luminaries who are very well known to U.S. lawyers such as Columbia 
Professors Herbert Wexler and Lance Liebman, Yale and the late Yale/Penn/Hastings Law 
Professor Geoffrey Hazard, NYU Law Dean Richard Revesz, former ABA President Roberta 
Cooper Ramo, and noted Judges Louis Brandeis, Learned Hand, Henry Friendly, Lee Rosenthal 
and David Levy. About ALI, ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ [https://perma.cc/94LA-
T3MY]. 
30 The Story of ALI, ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/story-line/ [https://perma.cc/4K8B-
R2FD]. 
31 The first President was George W. Wickersham (1923–36) of Cadwalder, Wickersham & 
Taft, a large New York law firm with an extensive basis of corporate clients. He was followed 
by George Wharton Pepper (1936–1947) (of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, an elite Philadelphia 
law firm), Harrison Tween (1947–1961) (a prominent New York attorney), Norris Darrell 
(1961–76), R. Ammi Cutter (1976–80), Charles Alan Wright (1993–2000) (a Yale and Texas 
law professor, author of the definitive one-volume treatise on federal courts and co-author of a 
leading multi-volume treatise on federal procedure), Michael Traynor (2000–08) (a prominent 
attorney and son of California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor, one of America’s most 
famous judges), Roberta Cooper Ramo (2008–2017) (a partner in New Mexico’s largest and 
most prestigious law firms) and David Levi (2017–present), (former federal judge, Dean of 
Duke University Law School, and son of former U.S. Attorney General Edward Levi). Id. 
Directors following Pennsylvania Dean Lewis were Herbert Funk Goodrich (1947–62), 
Columbia Law Professor Herbert Wechsler (1963–84), Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (1984–99) (law 
professor at California-Berkeley, Chicago, Yale, Penn, and Hastings Law Schools and former 
Director of the American Bar Foundation), former Columbia Law Dean Lance Liebman (1999–
2014), and former NYU Law Dean Richard Revesz (2014-present). Id.  
32 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 2019-2020 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2020). Total membership 
of 4,680, with 2,802 elected members, 1,630 Life Members, 246 ex officio members, and 2 
honorary members. Id. (also showing 37% of members in private practice, 37% academics, 14% 
judges, and 12% government, corporate, or nonprofit organization attorneys). 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
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Restatements and Principles projects,33 the ALI promulgates model statutes34 and 
conducts continuing legal education programs.35 Restatements were among the first 
projects undertaken by the ALI, and were well-received by courts and the practicing 
bar. Principles projects are distinguished from Restatements in that Principles are 
more inclined to examine an area of law thought to be in need of change and to propose 
changes or revisions in prevailing law.36 Restatements are not restricted to merely 
summarizing prevailing existing law but make legal determinations that may not enjoy 
majority support in the courts but are viewed as the substantively superior rule of law. 
ALI Restatements function as soft law in that a Restatement position on a legal 
matter is not authoritative unless adopted by a court or legislature. But the 
Restatements – even though arguably not as influential as model codes37 – are what 
 
33 Among the Principles projects have been Corporate Governance (1994), Family 
Dissolution (2002), Transnational Insolvency: Cooperation Among the NAFTA Countries 
(2003), Intellectual Property (2008), Software Contracts (2010), and Aggregate Litigation 
(2010). PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF CORP. GOVERNANCE (AM. L. INST. 1994); PRINCIPLES OF THE L. 
OF FAM. DISSOLUTION (AM. L. INST. 2002); PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF TRANSNAT’L INSOLVENCY: 
COOP. AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES (AM. L. INST. 2003); PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF INTELL. 
PROP. (AM. L. INST. 2008); PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF SOFTWARE CONTS. (AM. L. INST. 2010); 
PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF AGGREGATE LITIG. (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
34 Examples are the Model Penal Code promulgated by ALI in 1962 and the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”), which was a joint project with the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”). The UCC has been largely adopted in 
all 50 American States, as have many of the other Uniform Laws promulgated by NCCUSL. 
Uniform Commercial Code, USLEGAL, https://uniformcommercialcode.uslegal.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/YBA8-RENC]. Because many of the Uniform Laws have been enacted as 
statutes in the states, these may be considered closer to hard law than the Restatements or 
Principles, which are seldom adopted by legislation but are intended more as guides for courts. 
35 In addition to its own CLE programs, the ALI often collaborates with the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”). ALI-ABA CLE programs are among the most prestigious and popular in 
the U.S. In addition, the ABA (like ALI and NCCUSL) promulgated model rules and codes, 
most famously the Model Rules of Professional Conduct governing attorney ethics and the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, governing judicial ethics. These are also closer to hard law 
than the Restatements in that the Models of Professional and Judicial Conduct have been largely 
adopted by the American States, albeit with some occasional distinct variations. See generally 
STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS (2019 ed.) 
(annotated version indicating state variance from basic ABA Model); JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (5th ed. 2018); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING (4th ed. Supp. 2021). 
36 See Frequently Asked Questions: How Do Principles of the Law Differ from Restatements 
of the Law?, ALI, https://www.ali.org/publications/frequently-asked-questions/#differ 
[https://perma.cc/U5SU-BLC7] (“Restatements are primarily addressed to courts. They aim at 
clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as 
it presently stands or might appropriately be stated by a court. Principles are primarily addressed 
to legislatures, administrative agencies, or private actors. They can, however, be addressed to 
courts when an area is so new that there is little established law. Principles may suggest best 
practices for these institutions. See ALI’s style manual for more information.”). 
37 As discussed previously, one might subdivide soft law into categories or along a 
continuum. Model codes are potentially the strongest soft law in that, if accepted, they become 
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might be termed “Super Soft Law” in that they have had substantial influence far larger 
than treatises or industry standards or most model laws (the exception perhaps being 
the more successful proposed Uniform State Laws promulgated by the National 
Conference of Uniform State Law Commissioners (“NCCUSL”) such as the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”) or the Model Rules promulgated by the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”). 
Courts and legal scholars have frequently cited ALI Restatements,38 with perhaps 
some growth due to the increasing number of Restatements and growth from the 
increasing number of court decisions. Restatements are historically cited in hundreds 
or thousands of cases each year, a pattern that continues in the Twenty-First Century.39 
Legal literature reflects an ongoing interest in the Restatements that increased 
substantially during the early 1980s.40 Since then, Restatements have been frequently 
cited in the legal literature at a pace that equals or exceeds citation in Reported cases.41 
 
enacted into positive law. Restatement black letter is next strongest because, although non-
binding, it is presented in “rule” form that usually represents a case law consensus and is 
designed to be followed. Restatement Comments are less formal and forceful but can be highly 
influential. Reporters Notes function as something of a “super-Treatise” in that they not only 
represent useful scholarly analysis but analysis that had been subjected to substantially more 
scrutiny during the drafting process than an ordinary treatise by a law professor.  
38 See, e.g., Wooster Floral & Giffs, L.L.C. v. Green Thumb Floral & Garden Ctr., Inc., No. 
2019-0322, 2020 Ohio LEXIS 2718 (Dec. 15, 2020) (citing with favor RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §21 in finding that defendant flower vendor’s use of domain name did not cause 
consumer confusion); Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 286 
(Pa. 2005) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §552 to permit negligent 
misrepresentation claim despite plaintiff’s lack of privity with defendant); Temple v. Wean 
United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267, 271(Ohio 1977) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
402A). But see Tincher v. Omega Flex, 104 A.3d 328, 335 (Pa. 2014) (“[W]e decline to adopt 
the Restatement (Third of Torts: Products Liability §§ 1 et sq., albeit appreciation of certain 
principles contained in that Restatement has certainly informed our consideration of the proper 
approach to strict liability in Pennsylvania . . . .”). 
39 Simply entering the word “restatement” into a LEXIS database (done on March 11, 2021) 
returns thousands of responses, although there are of course a significant number of false 
positives. A more restricted LEXIS search of “ALI or Institute w/3 Restatement” (conducted 
March 11, 2021) produces 3,820 cases in response. Depending on how one frames a search and 
the database used, one can find differing responses but it is clear that Restatements get cited 
frequently. 
40 As with court cases, a search of secondary literature reflects substantial citation to 
Restatements, more if the term is used alone (along with some false positives) and somewhat 
less for narrower searches (e.g., “ALI or Institute w/3 Restatement”) (4,465 responses if there 
is no date restrictions), the former of which has more than 2,000 responses while the latter has 
169 responses in 2019 and 153 responses for 2020. 
41 Compare number of court decisions (44), with number of law review articles or treatises 
(169) in response to the search “ALI or Institute w/3 Restatement and date is 2019” (conducted 
March 11, 2021). Some of this may be due to the expansion in the number of scholarly law 
reviews and journals during that time period. But it is unlikely that this explains all of the 
upsurge. One trial hypothesis worth exploring is that after a period of being viewed as “dry” 
doctrinal law, Restatements are now recognized as capturing important perspectives on issues 
of legal policy. Alternatively, the status of Restatements as authoritative, even when 
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Restatements are almost always cited favorably or with neutrality.42 Criticisms like 
those of Justice Scalia in Kansas v. Nebraska appear only infrequently.43 And apart 
from the sheer number of citations, the Restatements found favor with influential 
courts and judges. For example, in a leading opinion on accountant liability, Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of Appeals, favorably cited the 
Restatements of Torts, Contracts, and Agency.44 
While Scalia-like criticism in judicial opinions is comparatively rare and 
Restatements continue to exert considerable influence, they have been subject to more 
criticism and resistance – as has the ALI – during the past 30–40 years45 in spite of the 
 
controversial, may have made them a popular source of attribution for law review authors 
needing to fill footnotes. 
42 See, e.g., Olsen v. Etheridge, 686 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. 1997), excerpted in DAVID EPSTEIN ET 
AL. MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 998 (5th ed. 2018) (a leading law 
school instructional text finding RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (AM. L. INST. 
1981) persuasive regarding vesting of contract rights and reversing older caselaw to the 
contrary). 
43 A closer look at the Kansas v. Nebraska decision and the role of RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (AM. L. INST. 2010) suggests the Scalia criticism, 
shared by Justices Thomas and Alito, is not a particularly damning indictment of that 
Restatement even though they are correct that it was doing more than merely summarizing 
caselaw; see Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 475–76 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined 
by Scalia and Alito); see also id. at 475 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(agreeing that Court has equitable power to order partial disgorgement (and thus RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (AM. L. INST. 2010)) but agreeing with 
dissenters that equitable power did not permit adjustment of Compact regarding definition of 
“imported water” that would not be counted against States’ allocation of River water). In other 
words, Kansas v. Nebraska, although a 5-4 decision in part, was 6-3 decision regarding the 
Restatement, with the three dissenters generally known as the most conservative members of 
the Court. To a degree, this reflects the larger division of the legal profession over Restatements. 
The most conservative lawyers want Restatements to simply record majority rules as black 
letter. Liberals and moderates and the ALI itself regard it as legitimate for Restatements to adopt 
more persuasive minority rules as black letter and on occasion to craft hybrid black letter in 
order to meet the overall law and policy of the topic to which the Restatement speaks. 
44 See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 448 (N.Y. 1931) (finding 
that there can be liability to clients for negligently certifying statements without adequate 
investigation but that liability to third parties exists only if there is fraud but not if there is only 
negligence). Ironically, the Restatements have since moved in the direction of greater liability 
for professional negligence if a third party’s reliance on the professional’s work was reasonably 
foreseeable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. L. INST. 1979) (professional may 
be liable for negligence if third party’s reliance on professional’s work or statements was 
justifiable). 
45 See, e.g., William T. Barker, Lobbying and the American Law Institute: The Example of 
Insurance Defense, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 573, 574, 590 (1998) (noting controversy regarding 
panel counsel efforts to obtain revision of early drafts of Law Governing Lawyers Restatement, 
defending efforts as aptly within ground rules and based on law and policy arguments rather 
than political threats); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Law Governing Lawyers: 
Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGIS. ETHICS 631, 632 (1997) (taking issue 
with Lawyers Restatement for looking “backward, not forward” and providing little guidance 
for legal profession “of the twenty-first century”); Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of 
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ALI’s efforts to both portray itself as and in fact be a nonpartisan organization rather 
than an interest group for client interests. The shorthand expression of this sentiment 
frequently used by ALI members is that they “Leave Clients at the Door” when 
conducting Institute business.46 More specifically, ALI Council Rule 4.03 states: 
To maintain the Institute’s reputation for thoughtful, disinterested analysis of 
legal issues, members are expected to leave client interest at the door. In 
communications made within the framework of Institute proceedings, 
members should speak, write, and vote on the basis of their personal and 
professional convictions and experience without regard to client interests or 
self-interest.47 
Elaborating on the Rule, ALI leadership noted that “[t]his does not mean that we 
leave our views, shaped by our personal and professional experience, and our 
expertise, often gleaned from representation of clients, at the door.”48 However, “[t]he 
vision of the founders of the ALI was that members would view their participation as 
a public service, and not as in the service of the self or of clients” a concept that 
 
the American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1993) (“Few law reform efforts 
in this century have been as controversial as the often bitter fourteen-year battle within the [ALI] 
over its efforts to articulate a set of rules about American corporate law.”); Joel Seligman, Sheep 
in Wolf’s Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 
55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325, 325 (1986) (“No project of the [ALI] has ever been as harshly 
criticized as its Corporate Governance project was during the early 1980s.”) (citing Business 
Roundtable and other opposition); NEW YORK CITY BAR, REPORT BY THE COPYRIGHT & 
LITERARY PROPERTY COMMITTEE, RECOMMENDATION TO REJECT THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE’S PROPOSAL TO CREATE A RESTATEMENT OF LAW, COPYRIGHT (2018), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/files/2017309-
RestatementFormCopyright_FINAL_1.12.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/YBA8-RENC] 
(recommending rejection of Council Draft No. 1 and discontinuance of Copyright Restatement 
because law “is governed by federal statute and is inextricably intertwined with rapidly 
changing technology” and therefore “uniquely unsuitable for a Restatement project”). 
46 Stephanie A. Middleton, Leaving Clients at the Door, ALI REP., Spring 2018, at 10, 10. 
Middleton is the Deputy Director of the ALI. It is probably not accidental that the Institute 
choose to include an article on this core value of the ALI in light of the attack by insurer interests 
on the RLLI as the Annual Meeting approaches. It was also probably no coincidence that the 
Annual Meeting program reprinted Rule 4.03, which also received informal emphasis from ALI 
leadership prior to consideration of the RLLI at the May 2018 Annual Meeting. 
47 ALI Council Rule 4.03. The early years of the ALI provides considerable support for this 
view. Discussion of particular proposed provisions of a Restatement were discussed and debated 
at length by the participants. See, e.g., Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of 
§90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 116–17 (1991), reprinted in DAVID EPSTEIN ET AL., MAKING AND DOING 
DEALS: CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 365–66 (4th ed. 2014) (noting debate during 1926 ALI Annual 
Meeting between Harvard Professor Samuel Williston, Reporter of the First Restatement of 
Contracts and “famous New York lawyer” Frederic Coudert (of the then-prominent firm 
Coudert Brothers) regarding the scope of remedies available where an agreement by promissory 
estoppel is found). 
48 Middleton, supra note 46, at 10. 
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“should inform members on how we are to engage in the work of the ALI.”49 This 
tradition is amply reflected in the statements of the founders50 and appears to have 
been taken to heart by the membership.51 
Although the ALI is very much an “establishment” group drawing much economic 
support from corporate America,52 it has attempted not to serve as a vessel for the 
interests of commercial actors such as clients and contributors. While decidedly 
“insider,” and friendly to the status quo, the ALI historically has differed from 
organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or the National Association of 
 
49 Id. 
50 Middleton recorded statements of some ALI founders, including Elihu Root: 
At the first meeting of the ALI in 1923, Elihu Root recognized that the Institute’s 
work “must be so done as to carry authority, as to carry conviction of impartial 
judgment upon the most thorough scientific investigation and tested accuracy of 
statement. . . . Participation in the enterprise must be deemed highly honorable. 
Selection for participation must be deemed to confer distinction; it must be recognized 
a great and imperative public service.” 
Id. (omission in original). 
51 Commenting on conference sessions discussing the initial ALI projects on Torts, Agency, 
Contracts and Conflicts of Law, inaugural President George Wickersham he had been favorably 
impressed by 
the utter absence of any dogmatic attitude on the part of scholars of world-wide repute 
in these discussions. No attitude of resentment, or even impatience at even the most 
destructive criticism was exhibited at any time, but only the keenest desire for 
accuracy and for clarity; a welcoming of all helpful criticism and a patient weighing 
and analysis of every suggestion that any part of the draft under consideration was 
susceptible of improvement or required modification. 
Id. (quoting George Wickersham at the 1924 ALI Annual Meeting). 
52 As noted, the ALI is composed of practicing lawyers, judges, and law professors. 
Approximately two-thirds of the roughly 2,800 current members are lawyers engaged in private 
practices, with roughly two-thirds of that group working in what can fairly be described as 
reasonably large or even huge law firms largely serving business clients, often Fortune 500 or 
even Fortune 100 clients that are the largest business organizations in the world. This segment 
of ALI membership is particularly light on small firm lawyers with a predominantly plaintiff’s 
practice. Consequently, it is fair (in my view) to describe the practicing lawyer members of the 
ALI as a rather establishmentarian, even conservative group. The government lawyers may be 
less establishment but for every public defender, there is a prosecutor. Law professors are 
probably on balance a more liberal or anti-establishment component of the ALI membership, 
but the division is not lopsided, as many of the law faculty ALI members are politically or 
jurisprudentially conservative. The judicial members of ALI represent the spectrum of 
American judicial attitudes. For example, the ALI Council includes judges generally regarded 
as quite liberal (e.g., California Supreme Court Chief Justice Goodwin Liu) and quite 
conservative (e.g., Texas Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht). My point, which is worth 
remembering when assessing insurer attacks on the RLLI, is simply this: the ALI is not a 
distinctly left-leaning group in the manner of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) or 
Common Cause but something more like the Brookings Institute or the RAND Corporation, 
centrist organizations that lean toward progressive reform. 
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Manufacturers who have an avowed purpose of promoting members interests. By 
contrast, ALI’s orientation has been the greater interest of the justice system and 
society, which has tended to make it more of a “liberal establishment” or elite gripped 
with noblesse oblige rather than a group rigidly defending the status quo.53  
As a result, much of the ALI’s work in Restatements, Model Codes, and Principles 
projects could be described as restrained progressivity lying somewhere between rigid 
defense of the status quo and anti-establishment radicalism. Although some ALI 
projects have been viewed as unduly pro-business or pro-defendant, most have, at least 
as a whole, been largely in the direction of expanding rights, duties and recompense 
in a manner consistent with the dominant public policy thinking of experts in the field 
in question. But this is not necessarily consistent with dominant political currents. 
Consequently, even though the ALI is a core establishment body, much criticism of 
its efforts has come from America’s political right, which has alleged that 
Restatements are too liberal in their deviations from the majority rules of the common 
law, examples of which – including reaction against the RLLI – are discussed below.  
B. The Nature of Restatements and the Process of Restatement Creation 
To assess the ALI’s claim to neutrality, some understanding of the Restatement 
process is required. Restatements, of course, are well known to law students and 
lawyers because of the popularity of the Restatement of Contracts and the Restatement 
of Torts, both of which are frequently cited in judicial opinions and are often reprinted 
(at least in part) in materials assigned for law school classes. A Restatement is 
designed to collect and synthesize the law of a given area. The format for a 
Restatement, familiar to most lawyers, is that of “black letter” sections setting forth a 
Rule, followed by Comments and Illustrations concerning the Rule, followed by the 
Reporter’s Note, which is something of a mini-treatise collecting caselaw regarding 
the black letter law and commentary. 
A Principles project is distinguished from a Restatement in that the former is less 
tethered to existing law and has greater freedom to adopt an approach regarded as 
 
53 The term “liberal establishment” in the U.S. has a certain flexibility. It often connotes a 
socioeconomical cluster of persons, entities, or organizations, who do not use their positions to 
gain greater personal power but are instead interested in promoting the overall health of society. 
Another term popular in the U.S. – noblesse oblige (defined as “the inferred responsibility of 
privileged people to act with generosity and nobility toward those less privileged”) – captures 
this concept of the liberal establishment. See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/noblesse%20oblige [https://perma.cc/4A3X-
CXMP] (defining term as “the obligation of honorable, generous, and responsible behavior 
associated with high rank or birth”). For example, when teaching in New York, I frequently 
heard the term liberal establishment used to describe the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, an organization with strong participation from elite law firms that frequently took 
liberal/left/progressive positions on issues of law and policy.  
Alternatively, the term liberal establishment is sometimes used by conservatives as a criticism 
of wealthy persons who purportedly adopt leftish positions (e.g., lighter sentences for crimes; 
reduced police presence) that may not adversely impact the wealthy in safe neighborhoods but 
purportedly bring adverse consequences (e.g., more crime) in poorer neighborhoods. For an 
example of this type of use of the term, see generally M. STANTON EVANS, THE LIBERAL 
ESTABLISHMENT (conservative commentator claims elite business and political interests work in 
concert to further mutual interests and diminish individual rights). 
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superior even if it lacks support in existing law or has even been rejected by courts. 
However, a Restatement need not adopt as a rule only positions embraced by the 
majority of courts. Rather, as discussed quite eloquently in the ALI’s January 2015 
Revised Style Manual, excerpted at the beginning of the RLLI, the Institute notes that 
“Restatements are primarily addressed to courts. They aim at clear formulations of 
common law and its statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently 
stands or might appropriately be stated.”54 A Restatement rule should have at least 
some support in caselaw but need not be the majority rule. Rather, in examining the 
legal landscape, the ALI may embrace the judicial approach viewed as superior even 
if it is the minority rule, and even a distinct minority rule:  
A Restatement thus assumes the perspective of a common-law court, 
attentive to and respectful of precedent, but not bound by precedent that is 
inappropriate or inconsistent with the law as a whole. Faced with such 
precedent, an Institute Reporter is not compelled to adhere to what [former 
ALI Director and Columbia University law professor] Herbert Wechsler 
called “a preponderating balance of authority” but is instead expected to 
propose the better rule and provide the rationale for choosing it. A significant 
contribution of the Restatements has also been anticipation of the direction 
in which the law is tending and expression of that development in a manner 
consistent with previously established principles. 
The Restatement process contains four principal elements. The first is to 
ascertain the nature of the majority rule. If most courts faced with an issue 
have resolved it in a particular way, that is obviously important to the inquiry. 
The second step is to ascertain trends in the law. If 30 jurisdictions have gone 
one way, but the 20 jurisdictions to look at the issue most recently went the 
other way, or refined their prior adherence to the majority rule, that is 
obviously important as well. Perhaps the majority rule is now widely 
regarded as outmoded or undesirable. If Restatements were not to pay 
attention to trends, the ALI would be a roadblock to change, rather than a 
“law reform” organization. A third step is to determine what specific rule fits 
best with the broader body of law and therefore leads to more coherence in 
the law. And the fourth step is to ascertain the relative desirability of 
competing rules. Here social-science evidence and empirical analysis can be 
helpful.55 
 
54 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 4 (2015) 
[hereinafter ALI HANDBOOK]. 
55 See id. at 5. Ironically, and disturbingly, when insurers have complained about an RLLI 
draft by stating that an RLLI position will damage insurance markets, cause substantial 
increases in premiums, make insurance less available or the like, they have done so without 
marshalling empirical evidence. See infra Part II. But insurers are the entities with the greatest 
access to underwriting, claims, loss, pricing, and profitability information – much of which is 
proprietary and not available to scholars or the general public, including the ALI. Such 
deafening silence in this regard seriously undermines insurance industry claims about 
deleterious impact from the RLLI – or for that matter any legal rule insurers regard as favoring 
policyholders. If a pro-policyholder rule actually does adversely affect the insurance business 
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Where a Restatement adopts a minority rule or modified or hybrid rule or expresses 
some creativity in attempting to improve law as well as to synthesize it, this is not 
disregarding the law but simply a recognition that “what a Restatement can do that a 
busy common-law judge, however distinguished, cannot is engage the best minds in 
the profession over an extended period of time, with access to extensive research, 
testing rules against disparate fact patterns in many jurisdictions.”56  
As the name implies, a Restatement summarizes existing law. Consequently, 
Restatements read to a degree like very thorough, well-organized treatises. The 
Restatements not only summarize the law but also identify divisions in the law and 
typically endorse a “better” rule of law in cases where courts are divided. They are 
also distinguished from treatises in that Restatements represent the collaborative work 
of an organization rather than that of a single author or group of co-authors. 
Related to this, is the extensive process by which Restatements are promulgated. 
The project is led by “Reporters” who do the primary drafting of the Restatement (and 
revisions in response to commentary or objection), aided by a group of roughly 40 
Advisors who are experts in the field as well as a Members Consultative Group 
(“MCG”) that includes any ALI member sufficiently interested in the project to 
participate.57 Draft provisions are reviewed by the ALI “Council,” a leadership group 
of another 50 distinguished attorneys, judges and professors. Over the course of four 
to six years (or more), portions of a proposed Restatement are considered by the ALI 
Membership in attendance at the group’s Annual Meeting before there is a final vote 
to adopt a Restatement.58 Whether one likes or dislikes the provisions of a 
Restatement, the thorough rigor of the process seems indisputable. Then comes 
publication and use of the Restatements by the courts in making decisions. Often, draft 
provisions of Restatements are found authoritative by courts. The RLLI began in 2010 
as a Principles Project but was converted to a Restatement in 2014.  
C. Subsurface Politics and Increasingly Open Contentiousness Over 
Restatements 
Although the type of overt pressure being placed on the ALI by insurers opposed 
to the RLLI is a modern development, there have in the more distant past been efforts 
by interest groups to shape the content of Restatements. For example, tobacco industry 
representatives worked hard – and with some success – to convince the Torts 
Restatement Reporter William Prosser and others to exempt cigarettes from the strict 
liability regime that was emerging in the famous Section 402A of the Restatement 
 
or the fortunes of insurers, the insurance industry should be able to produce at least some 
evidence in support of this contention. 
56 ALI HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 6. 
57 Barker, supra note 45, at 576. 
58 Id. at 578. 
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(Second).59 Disturbingly, this included retaining prominent ALI members as 
consultants or expert witnesses.60  
In response, ALI’s President and Director argued that the investigators alleging 
impropriety, or at least weakness in the ALI conflict rules, had misunderstood the 
nature of a law reform organization. 
The article [criticizing lobbying of the ALI] errs in its assumption that finding 
correct legal rules is the same as assessing the results of medical research. It 
does not recognize that ALI’s process for considering improvements in law 
must be open to input from all sides of the relevant issues. The process which 
produces Restatements would not be credible or of practical use without 
participation by lawyers who represent clients on all sides. The article also 
incorrectly states that ALI’s process takes place in backrooms, when in fact 
our drafts are publicly available at all stages, encouraging constructive 
improvements, disagreements, amendments, and arguments.61 
This ALI rejoinder is correct insofar as it goes but does not effectively address the 
concern regarding interest groups volitionally retaining ALI Reporters, Council 
Members, potential Reporters, or persons influential in the organization in order to 
impact their assessments or enlist them in lobbying the ALI membership, perhaps 
without much in the way of disclosure to those who may be lobbied.62 It also tends to 
overlook possible erosion of the “check your clients at the door” ethos that is supposed 
to govern ALI deliberations.  
Regarding the process of Restatement creation, the ALI is essentially correct that 
much of the process is conducted in plain sight, which includes the opportunity for 
interested parties to comment on drafts throughout the process. But it is not quite as 
conveniently transparent as painted by the ALI leadership. Not all Restatement Drafts, 
much less all relevant drafting material, are available to non-members and the public, 
although this limitation is probably easily circumvented by ALI members sharing 
materials with non-members known to be interested in the process.   
The same problem arises with comments made on Drafts. They are essentially 
unavailable to non-members. The comments are available on the ALI website – to 
members who log in. Again, commentary can be shared by members with others, but 
this is something less than full transparency. In addition, the ALI website may only 
contain a limited number of comments. For example, RLLI commentary made prior 
to 2014 was not on the ALI website at the time of the May 2018 Annual Meeting at 
which the RLLI was approved. But even with this limitation, the website contained 
more than 200 comments submitted considering the RLLI. However, after formal 
 
59 See Elizabeth Laposata, Richard Barnes & Stanton Glantz, Tobacco Industry Influence on 
the American Law Institute’s Restatements of Torts and Implications for its Conflict of Interest 
Policies, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1, 27 (2012). 
60 Id. at 37–38. 
61 Roberta Cooper Ramo & Lance Liebman, The ALI’s Response to the Center for Tobacco 
Control Research & Education, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1 (2013). 
62 This Article does not take a position regarding whether RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 402A (AM. L. INST. 1979) is insufficiently protective of smokers or other users of dangerous 
products. 
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publication of the RLLI in 2019, the comment section of the project website was 
removed. 
When the compilation of comments is available, it only encompasses written 
statements submitted as comments. Things like phone calls, visits, or casual 
conversation with Reporters, Council, or others with ALI influence are not catalogued. 
Consequently, opportunities for ex parte contact abound. Further, the entire process 
can be circumvented, at least to a degree, if a person or entity seeking influence 
approaches the ALI without expressly submitting a formal comment. For example, the 
threatening letter submitted by six governors63 was sent directly to ALI President 
David Levi and not to the Director or Deputy Director for posting as a comment. It 
was only after President Levi elected to post the letter in the Comments section of the 
RLLI project page that the letter became fully available to ALI Members.64 The 
general public was and insofar as I can tell, remains unaware of the gubernatorial 
lobbying attempt made on behalf of insurers. One wonders whether voters in these 
states would share their governors’ affinity for the insurance industry. 
The ALI process is hardly one of smoke-filled back rooms. But it is sufficiently 
contained that insiders with access to ALI members – by, for example, hiring them as 
lawyers or experts – have a considerable advantage over not only non-members but 
rank-and-file members. The great bulk of ALI activity is conducted by a limited 
subgroup: Officers, Staff, Reporters, Advisors, MCG members (at least those that are 
active),65 and those that attend the Annual Meeting (usually well less than a third of 
the membership and perhaps only fifteen percent of the membership voting at any one 
time) with some seriousness. 
Consequently, the “TobaccoGate” story told by critics of Torts Restatement 
Section 402A is one that must be taken seriously and does not portray ALI in a 
particularly favorable light, even if it is not the stuff of scandal. Perhaps more 
disturbing is the possibility that this sort of quiet electioneering takes place with great 
frequency but has simply not been uncovered as was the case with tobacco and the 
Torts Restatement.66 
More publicly, overt but less well-documented electioneering appeared to take 
place in connection with the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance Project. The 
 
63 See Gubernatorial Letter, supra note 8, at 1.  
64 And although one might treat this as a “no harm/no foul” situation, this is not quite 
accurate. The gubernatorial letter is dated April 6, 2018. It was not posted to the ALI website 
until May 2, 2018. In other words, the governors and their insurer allies bought nearly a month 
of stealth by lobbying the ALI President directly rather than formally making a Comment. 
65 Participation in the Members Consultative Group varies considerably. Some MCG 
members are extremely attentive and active. Others, probably the majority, read relevant 
materials as they emerge but do not attend MCG meetings, much less participate activity or 
submit comments. To a lesser degree, this takes place even with Advisors, who are invited into 
a project and whose attendance at meetings is financially supported by ALI. Perhaps as many 
as a fourth of the Advisors are frequently absent or make no statements regarding drafts. See 
Barker, supra note 45, at 576. 
66 This is in my view a larger problem than commonly acknowledged. In a world of 
inequality, powerful interests often simply have a vast advantage over others in terms of access 
to decisionmakers and consequent greater ability to influence decisionmakers. 
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Project, as the name implied, focused on control of corporations and their decision 
making and involved issues of management prerogatives, shareholder rights, and 
government regulation.67 It appears that many corporations, concerned that the 
resulting ALI product might restrict management prerogatives, enlisted their lawyers 
who were ALI members in attending ALI Annual Meetings solely for the purpose of 
voting in favor of corporate management and against public or shareholder groups 
seeking to curb or regulate management authority.68  
The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers also saw some arguable interest group 
voting on particular sections as subgroups of attorneys apparently voted based on 
business concerns as much as the merits of the topic. A particular example was the 
proposal that would have relaxed the traditional prohibition against attorneys 
advancing funds to clients except for payment of litigation-related expenses.69 The 
proposal would have permitted attorneys to provide living expense income to clients 
for both subsistence and to prevent clients being strong-armed into settlements out of 
economic desperation.70  
 
67 Seligman, supra note 45, at 325. 
68 Id. at 343–44. 
69 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (a lawyer “shall not 
provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation” 
other than advancement of courts costs and expenses, including payment of such costs for an 
indigent client); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 36(2) (AM. L. INST. 
2000) (adopting essentially the same position as ABA Model Rule 1.8(e)). 
70 RESTATEMENT OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. §48(2)(b) (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 
4, 1991) [hereinafter LAWYERS RESTATEMENT Tentative Draft No. 4] provided that although a 
lawyer should generally not make loans to a client, it would be permissible to 
[m]ake or guaranty a loan on fair terms, the repayment of which to the lawyer may be 
contingent on the outcome of the matter, if the loan is needed to enable the client to withstand 
delay in litigation that otherwise might unjustly induce the client to settle or dismiss a case 
because of financial hardship rather than on the merits.  
 Although a clear minority approach, there was significant judicial and professional support 
for the approach. See LAWYERS RESTATEMENT Tentative Draft No. 4, supra, reporters note, 
citing inter alia, ALA. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 (2008); CAL. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 4-
210(A)(2) (1989) (current version CAL. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT r. 1.8.5 (West. Supp. 2020)); N.D. 
R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(e) (2009); MINN. R. OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(e)(3) (2005); TEX. CODE 
OF PRO. RESP. DR 5-103 (1979) (current version at TEX. DISCIPLINARY CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT 
r. 1.08) (1991)); La. State Bar Ass’n v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437 (La. 1976). 
At the 1991 Annual Meeting, a motion was made to delete this subsection on the ground that 
lawyers should never be lenders to clients and that this created the potential for unseemly 
overspending by lawyers to retain clients and to give clients the means to “pump up” damages 
claims by obtaining medical care and services (this commentator apparently never having heard 
of physicians treating a bodily injury plaintiff “on a lien”). Defenders of the subsection argued 
that after the lawyer was returned, lawyer humanitarian aid was not long a danger as a marketing 
device. The motion was to delete was defeated by a vote of 78 to 74. See AM. L. INST., 68TH 
ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 1991, at 518–21 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 ALI PROCEEDINGS]. 
During the intervening five years, the provision remained sufficiently controversial that it was 
removed from the proposed final draft of the revision by the ALI Council. See RESTATEMENT 
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In response, opponents argued that permitting such payments would lead to a 
competition among attorneys to recruit clients through promises of support. There was 
essentially no talk from opponents about whether payments of this sort were valuable 
for humanitarian reasons or to lower the metaphorical playing field between plaintiffs 
(who are often individuals) and defendants, who are often businesses with substantial 
resources (or liability insurance providing defense and funding for judgments and 
settlements).71  
More recently, property owner interests opposed a section of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm that provided trespassers 
with the possibility of recovery for injuries on property if they could prove sufficiently 
wrongful conduct by the owner.72 Restatement Section 51 provided that landowners 
owed a reasonable duty of care to persons on their land, even trespassers. It has been 
intellectually opposed during the ALI process and politically opposed through interest 
group efforts to obtain state legislative disapproval of the provision.73 
 
OF THE L. GOVERNING LAWS. §48(2) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft, 1996) (eliminating 
subsection (b) quoted above). In response, a motion was made to restored subsection (b). As 
before, a principal argument made in support of loan prohibition was that it would be used as a 
marketing device for attracting clients. The voice vote was sufficiently close that a show-of-
hands-was required. The motion to restore failed but a precise tally was not announced. See AM. 
L. INST., 73RD ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 1996, at 272–78 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 ALI 
PROCEEDINGS]; id. at 278 (in particular “[t]he noes clearly have it”). 
In addition to reflecting what I regard as an incorrect policy choice, the legal establishment’s 
tendency to undervalue the difficulties faced by plaintiffs, and inordinate fear of lawyer 
competition for clients, the episode also illustrates the degree to which the ALI Membership 
defers to the Restatement drafting process, Reporters, and the ALI Council. The loan provision 
enjoyed support of the rank-and-file when it was the position of the Reporters and Council.  
When the Council’s attitude changed in 1996 (the Reporters continued to support subsection 
(b)), the rank-and-file deferred to the Council. 
71 See discussion in preceding footnote; see, e.g., 1996 ALI PROCEEDINGS, supra note 70, at 
277 (comments of Michael H. Rubin in opposition to motion to restore subsection (b)) (“I fear 
that we are moving towards a situation where lawyers are not professional but, put on the 
adjective that you’d like, businessmen in disguise . . . .”); see also 1991 ALI PROCEEDINGS, 
supra note 70, at 518 (comments of Marjorie E. Gross) (advocating prohibition on attorney 
loans to clients because it “protects lawyers from competition by other lawyers, not on the basis 
of their skills or expertise, but on the amount of money they’re willing to pay the client up 
front,” and also stating “[w]hat I do find offensive . . . is buying clients”); id. at 519 (comments 
of Frank Tradewell Davis, Jr.) (“[In some] states . . . loans have exceeded hundreds of thousands 
of dollars for living expenses.”); id. at 519 (comments of Michael Franck) (“[S]ome lawyers 
use this opportunity in order to increase the special damages of the client by making it possible 
for the client not to return to work and therefore increasing the value of the claim.”); id. at 520 
(comments of Judge Martin Evans) (“I suspect that the number of cases in which clients will be 
bought and there will be a bidding process will be far larger than what we might expect . . . .”). 
72 David Logan, When the Restatement is not a Restatement: The Curious Case of the 
“Flagrant Trespasser,” 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1462 (2011). 
73 See id. at 1467–68; Stephen D. Sugarman, Land Possessor Liability in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Too Much and Too Little, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1079, 1081–82 (2009); 
VICTOR SCHWARTZ & CARY SILVERMAN, THE NEW RESTATEMENT: BLUNTING THIS 
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Perhaps predictably, it was opposed by property owner interests, most prominently 
the American Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”), which attempted to defeat the 
proposed standard at the 2012 ALI Annual Meeting. When efforts to provide greater 
immunity to property owners through the ALI process failed, ATRA and the owners 
took their case to state legislatures and were successful in passing what might be 
termed “Restatement Override Legislation” in several states. Typical statutes of this 
sort provided that landowners owed no duty – none whatsoever – to trespassers, even 
trespassers such as small children cutting across a yard or field on the way to school 
and falling into a hidden pit, quicksand, or off a rickety bridge.74 
In addition, business interests have expressed opposition to ALI projects on such 
as the Restatement of Consumer Contracts and the Restatement of Data Privacy. The 
consumer contracts project is opposed out of fear that it will oppose rigid enforcement 
of the “fine print” contained in many standardized contract forms. The position of 
many business leaders is that language in a consumer contract such as a credit card 
bill or mobile phone account should be given the same effect accorded to provisions 
in business-to-business contracts such as those between Ford Motor Company and its 
suppliers.75 Corporate America appears worried about the data privacy project out of 
fear it will impose greater burdens to protect privacy and may lead to more liability in 
cases where privacy is breached.76 
The evolution of efforts to impact the Restatements appears to have been one of 
increasing bare-knuckled efforts to obtain particular results for particular interests. 
The tobacco industry lobbying of Reporters is of course problematic in that much of 
it was done in low profile and involved payments that, despite funding legitimate 
work, are discomforting. But say what you will about Big Tobacco, it was largely 
playing by the rules, at least intellectually in that it was trying to persuade ALI on the 
merits regarding its position on product liability. 
By contrast, activity directed at Corporate Governance, the Third Torts 
Restatement, and occasionally even the Lawyer’s Restatement had an air of trying to 
turn out or rally the party faithful in the manner of a “get out the vote” campaign and 
intimidate or overwhelm the ALI process rather than an effort to examine an issue at 
length and debate it on the merits. As reflected in the story of insurer opposition to the 
 
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TRIAL LAWYER WEAPON 7 (2011); Chris Appel, Memorandum in 
Support of Kansas House Bill 2106 (supporting measure designed to disapprove of 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 51 (AM. L. INST. 2000) imposing duty of reasonable care on 
ordinary trespassers such as children cutting across an open field and listing state where similar 
legislation has been enacted, including North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, 
and Texas). Mark Behrens, No Trespassing: ALEC Model Legislation Would Promote 
Trespasser Responsibility and Prevent Activist Judges from Facilitating Lawsuits by Intruders, 
in INSIDE ALEC 21, 21 (Jan. 2011). 
74 See Appel, supra note 73.  
75 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, How to Make a Dead Armadillo: Consumer Contracts and the 
Perils of Compromise, 32 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 605, 606 (2020) (describing controversy and 
attacks on Consumer Contracts Restatement by both consumer advocates and business 
community). 
76 See Daniel J. Solove & Paul M. Schwartz, ALI Data Privacy: Overview and Black Letter 
Text, 68 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7–8, 27, 29 (2020) (defending project but noting opposition from 
commercial interests). 
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RLLI, interest group activity involving Restatements appears to have moved even 
further in the direction of electioneering over deliberation, as the opposition has 
involved distortion, disinformation, lobbying pressure, threats, and carrying the fight 
to other arenas having lost in the ALI and apparently lacking confidence that it could 
win in the courts, at least without first demonizing the RLLI. 
III. THE BATTLE OVER THE RLLI 
Although the first three years of the project reflected relative collaboration 
between policyholder interests and insurer interests, things changed in 2014 when it 
moved from a Principles project to a Restatement project. Since then, the RLLI has 
been significantly under attack by substantial portions of the U.S. insurance industry. 
The attacks seem misplaced in that the RLLI primarily enunciates black letter rules 
that are fairly settled and uncontroversial. Where the RLLI takes a position on a legal 
issue over which the jurisdictions are split, it has roughly an equal number of pro-
policyholder and pro-insurer positions. Arguably, on the most important issues 
implicating the largest amount of money, the RLLI has sided with insurers more than 
policyholders.77 Under these circumstances, it is quite odd to see substantial 
opposition to the RLLI from insurers. The RLLI reflects mainstream approaches to 
insurance issues.78 Several of the provisions in fact take demonstrably pro-insurer 
 
77 See RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE: 
KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE ch. 22 (4th ed. 2018) (providing section-by-section review of RLLI 
and comparison to state law concerning the topics address in the RLLI); 2 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL 
& ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE COVERAGE, § 14A-7 (4th ed. Supp. 
2019) (providing comprehensive review of RLLI and concluding that it has slightly more 
sections favorable to policyholder but that economic impact of sections favorable to insurers is 
larger). 
78  Insurance law is distinguished (or plagued, depending on one’s viewpoint) by the 
dominance of treatises written by practitioners rather than full-time law academics. To be sure, 
academics come to subject matter areas with a viewpoint, but it usually is a viewpoint taken 
after years of study and analysis rather than formed while representing paying clients to whom 
duties of loyalty are owed. Further, pursuant to MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2020), practicing attorneys must avoid conflicts of interest, including so-called 
“positional” conflicts in which the lawyer (or his law firm) says X in Case One but then says Y 
in Case Two.  
A positional conflict is presented when success by the lawyer in Case One (e.g., persuading a 
court to adopt a strict view of late notice on behalf of an insurer client) could create precedent 
that harms the lawyer’s client in Case Two (e.g., a policyholder whose notice of a claim was 
slightly late but caused no harm to the insurer). See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Legal Ethics and Law 
Reform Advocacy, 10 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRAC. & ETHICS 245, 253–55 (2020) 
(describing concept). Consequently, the world of big-time insurance coverage practice (and 
only attorneys in big time practice are likely to write treatises) is fairly starkly divided into 
treatises written by policyholder attorneys (e.g., PETER KALIS ET AL., POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE 
TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE (2000); EUGENE ANDERSON ET AL., INSURANCE 
COVERAGE LITIGATION (2d ed. & Supp. 2020)) and by insurer attorneys (BARRY R. OSTRAGER 
& THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES (20th ed. 2020); 
ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES (6th ed. 2013)). An arguable exception is 
RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY STEMPEL, supra, but different chapters had different authors and 
there may be some resulting slant. For example, Chapter 18 on “Allocation of Latent Injury and 
Damage Claims” was written by an insurer attorney who has been heavily involved (and very 
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positions and the document as a whole is not unduly slanted to either policyholders or 
insurers. 
Principles projects appear to have had less authority and been treated more like 
scholarly articles or white papers by courts while Restatements were often treated as 
the near-equivalent of authoritative case law,79 which is perhaps unfortunate. Most 
portions of a Principles document were not creative endeavors extending the law but 
Restatement-like summations of existing law and practice. Principles projects, like the 
Restatements, have also been subject to substantial vetting by not only the Reporters 
chosen for the project but also by the ALI’s quite rigorous review protocols (although 
it may be the case that ALI participants were less willing to vigorously debate 
Principles as compared to the close scrutiny given Restatements). Some of this may 
result from the very low-profile Principles projects have had with the practicing bar, 
which is the conduit through which the bench is normally appraised (through briefs 
and oral argument) in an adversary system. 
In any event, Principles projects do appear to have a lower profile and less impact 
on case law, which in turn may have accounted for the insurance industry’s relatively 
benign view of the RLLI during its first few years. As previously noted, the Project 
began in 2010. Selected to provide feedback to the Reporters was a group of 
approximately 40 Advisers composed of roughly equal numbers of judges, law 
professors, policyholder attorneys, and insurer attorneys or executives.80 In addition, 
 
successful) in pressing the insurer view of allocation before the courts. The multi-volume classic 
insurance treatises COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D (edited in part by insurer attorney Steven Plitt) and 
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE (Library ed.) (edited by law professor Jeffrey Thomas) have chapters 
initially authored by policyholder and insurer practitioners.  
Because of these factors, one need not be a cynic to conclude that on close questions, a 
policyholder treatise and an insurer treatise might present the state of the law or the conflicting 
policy arguments with different emphasis. And for the most part this is good in that different 
perspectives are brought to issues that can in turn be considered by bench and bar. But this 
situation also makes it more difficult in this area to “look up” or verify the state of the law – all 
of which is made more difficult by the state-centered nature of insurance law.  
Under these circumstances, a good case can be made that the RLLI is arguably the best source 
available for providing a neutral assessment of the law in that while the document takes 
positions on divided caselaw, the Comments provide nuanced discussion of the position and the 
Reporters Notes collect diverse caselaw on varying sides of the issue. 
79 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 38. This is not to say that the Principles projects were 
ignored or had no impact. A March 17, 2021 LexisNexis search (“ALI or American Law 
Institute w/2 Principles”) reflected 578 cases, a track record that would be the envy of most law 
professors (as well as in 3,758 secondary materials such as law review articles and treatises). 
But the same search using the word “Restatement” revealed citations in 2,351 cases – more than 
four times as many (but a lower-than-expected number of 3,165 in secondary sources). To be 
sure, there are more Restatements in print than Principles, which have been a more recent genre 
of ALI work. In addition, the Restatements of Torts and Contracts touch on much-litigated 
subjects and are unsurprisingly the most cited Restatements. But many of the Restatements (e.g., 
Foreign Relations) are hardly the stuff of everyday courtroom fare. It thus seems safe to 
conclude that the impact in the courts of Principles is consistently below that of Restatements. 
However, legal scholars appear to be equally interested in both. 
80 And it is not an overgeneralization to say the composition of the Advisers group, members 
of which are identified in the introductory pages of the Restatement, was evenly balanced. In 
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as with all ALI projects or restatements, ALI members can volunteer to be part of the 
project’s Members Consultative Group (“MCG”).81  
The Advisers and the MCG are provided with drafts and meet at intervals to 
discuss the drafts and provide criticism and commentary to the Reporters. Typically, 
a draft is discussed by the Advisers over a full day at ALI headquarters in Philadelphia, 
followed by discussion with the MCG on the ensuing day. Ten such sessions were 
held in connection with the RLLI. 
In addition to the formal process of distributing and discussing drafts within the 
Institute, the ALI maintains a record of the Restatements and Projects on its website, 
to which both ALI members and non-members may post comments. The RLLI was 
no exception and as of the May 2018 Annual Meeting had been subject to more than 
 
its final incarnation (the group expanded slightly during the years of the project), it included 
eleven (11) insurer attorneys or executives (Michael Aylward, Vanita Banks, William Barker, 
Sheila Birnbaum, Kim Brunner, Robert Cusumano, Sean Fitzpatrick, John Nada, Natasha Nye, 
Nathaniel Shapo (a former insurance commissioner) and Robert Tomlinson), eleven (11) 
policyholder attorneys or advocates (Amy Bach, David Brown, Steven Goldman (a former 
insurance commissioner), Jonathan Goodman, Barry Levin, Lorelie Masters, Meghan 
Magruder, J.W. Montgomery, David Mullikin, Henry Parr, and Larry Stewart), nine (9) 
professors in addition to the Reporters (Kenneth Abraham, Michelle Boardman, Malcolm 
Clarke, Robert Jerry, Leo Martinez, Adam Scales, Daniel Schwarcz, Jeffrey Stempel, and 
Jeffrey Thomas) and nine (9) judges or former judges (Marc Amy, the late Walter Croskey, Lee 
Edmond, Peter Flynn, William Highberger, Jack Jacobs, Randall Shepard, Sara Vance, and 
Herbert Wilkins). Somewhat difficult to characterize is Douglas Richmond, counsel and vice-
president of insurance broker Aon but who represented insurers as an attorney and is an 
accomplished legal scholar with more articles than most full-time law professors. Also difficult 
to characterize are Advisers who are not policyholder counsel and coverage specialists but 
frequently represent plaintiffs (Allen Black, Henry Parr) who of course have an interest in 
having defendants with insurance coverage. In addition, insurer attorney Laura Foggan was 
designated liaison from the American Insurance Association. See RLLI, supra note 4, at VII-
VIII (listing Advisers). Overall, it was an amazingly balanced group, which had been the goal 
of the Reporters and the ALI from the outset. In hindsight, one might be critical of the Institute 
for not adding other official liaisons to the group such as a formal representative of insurance 
brokers, corporate risk managers, third-party administrators, or government regulars as was the 
case for insurers.  
81 There are more than 100 MCG members involved with the RLLI (see RLLI, supra note 4, 
at IX-XII) and the group includes a mix of counsel, with members who were particularly 
prominent insurer attorneys or advocates (e.g., Douglas Houser, Michael Marick, Alan Rutkin, 
William Shelley) and insurer attorneys with an extensive track record of scholarly writing 
(Randy Maniloff, Thomas Newman, Steven Plitt, Victor Schwartz). The MCG also included 
notable policyholder counsel (David Goodwin, Timothy Law, Kurt Melchior, Dale Swope) and 
legal scholars (Jay Feinman, Jill Fisch, Larry Garvin, Michael Green, Richard Marcus, Peter 
Kochenburger, Ellen Pryor, Keith Rowley, Anthony Sebok, S.I. Strong) and persons with 
substantial insurance industry experience (Dennis Connolly). Professors Garvin and Rowley are 
co-authors of two different casebooks widely used in law schools – and have not objected to the 
RLLI’s provisions regarding contract construction, provisions insurer critics label as 
unrepresentative or even radical. Although silence is not necessarily acquiescence, we think it 
is odd that the contract interpretation sections of the RLLI labeled radical by insurers have not 
attracted criticism from mainstream contracts scholars. 
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250 comments82 and more than thirty-six (36) motions regarding portions of the 
drafts.83 
After meeting with Advisers and the MCG, the Reporters revised the then-current 
draft and presented a “Council Draft” to the ALI Council, which reviews, discusses, 
and then votes upon the Restatement sections before it. The RLLI was discussed at 
five different Council meetings between 2012 and 2018 prior to the May 2018 Annual 
Meeting.84  
After approval by the Council, the relevant portions of a Restatement are put before 
the ALI membership at its Annual Meeting. At the Annual Meeting, Restatement 
provisions are discussed seriatim before those on the floor, with members permitted 
to offer amendments and commentary. Votes are taken on the proposed amendments 
while commentary is generally considered by the Reporters for potential editorial 
changes after the Meeting. The proceedings are transcribed and published by the 
Institute and provide something of a legislative history regarding review of a 
restatement. The RLLI was subject to discussion at the 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 
2017 and 2018 Annual Meetings, with final approval made at the May 2018 Annual 
Meeting.85 
A. Insurance Industry Opposition to the RLLI 
In its early phases, the Principles contained some provisions that could be viewed 
as quite pronouncedly pro-policyholder86 and which were opposed by insurers and 
some advisers. These provisions were subsequently revised. After the RLLI was 
converted from a Principles project to a Restatement in 2014, insurer complaints 
increased. For example, in March 2014, on the eve of an Advisers/MCG meeting, all 
Advisers received via FedEx a letter signed by ten insurer counsel accompanied by an 
 
82 Between January 1, 2014 and July 15, 2017, there were 231 comments submitted regarding 
the RLLI. See Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance, AM. L. INST. (formerly available 
at ali.org) (on file with the author and in ALI archives). In addition, persons interested in the 
RLLI frequently make direct contact with the Reporters but do not send their comments to the 
ALI for posting. But whatever the final tally, it is clear that the RLLI has received substantial 
scrutiny and commentary. From July 15, 2017 through the time of the May 2018 Annual 
Meeting, there were another 99 comments as well as ten motions directed at the RLLI. Id. 
83 See id. 
84 See AM. L. INST., ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 2012, at 278–308 (2013); AM. L. INST., 
ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 2013, at 44–91 (2014); AM. L. INST., ANNUAL MEETING: 
PROCEEDINGS 2014, at 190–235 (2015); AM. L. INST., ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 2015, 
at 214–30 (2016); AM. L. INST., ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 2016, at 65–109 (2017); AM. 
L. INST., ANNUAL MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 2017, at 122–64 (2018); AM. L. INST., ANNUAL 
MEETING: PROCEEDINGS 2018, at 97–140 (2019). 
85 See sources cited supra note 84. 
86 For example, an early draft of the Principles would have provided that an insurer could not 
rescind a policy where a policyholder made a misrepresentation during the application process 
if any subsequent loss and claim for coverage was not related to the misrepresentation. This was 
subsequently changed to follow the prevailing rule that where a misrepresentation is material to 
the risk assumed under the policy, the insurer may rescind due a material misrepresentation 
even if the loss in question is not related to the misrepresentation.  
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approximately twelve-inch stack of hardcopy enclosures attacking the RLLI sections 
currently drafted.87  
The Insurer Counsel package was distinguished by its strong tone, opposing many 
aspects of the Restatement and suggesting that the current draft was greatly at odds 
with American law and that the RLLI was not legitimate if it varied from the majority 
rule of the insurance issues it addressed. It was the first major shot across the bow of 
the RLLI (and the Institute) and presaged greater politicization surrounding the 
project. From that date onward, the RLLI saw many more comments posted to its 
website, mostly by insurer representatives.88 The volume and intensity of criticism 
exceeded its legitimacy. 
1. The Specious “Regulatory” Criticism of the RLLI 
Insurers attacked the entire document on the ground that it constituted an 
impermissible intrusion on state regulation. A perhaps even less persuasive argument 
against the RLLI was made by some insurance regulators and legislators suggesting 
that it undermined regulatory goals. One state regulator requested that any approval of 
the RLLI be deferred because he had only recently become aware of the project and 
thought that other regulators would have similar concerns.89 In a complex legal world 
marked by division of labor within the profession, any of us can occasionally be caught 
unaware by legal developments. But it is more than a little disheartening to think than 
an insurance regulator would not in 2017 be aware of ALI activity regarding insurance 
that began in 2010. 
a. The NCOIL Attacks 
Sounding the same note in more shrill tone was commentary from the National 
Conference of Insurance Legislators (“NCOIL”) which argued that the Restatement 
Project “Violates ‘Legislative Prerogative.’”90 The NCOIL position was that the RLLI 
has in several instances made “significant changes to current law” and that “[s]uch 
matters are the primary prerogative of the legislative branch of government” 
 
87 See Letter from General Counsel and Corporate Officers of ACE, AIG, Allstate, Chub, 
Hartford, Liberty Mutual, State Farm, Travelers, USAA, and Zurich to ALI Reporters and 
Advisers (Mar. 24, 2014) (on file with author). 
88 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
89 See Letter from Dean L. Cameron, Dir., Idaho Dep’t of Ins., to Richard Revesz, Dir., Am. 
L. Inst. (April 5, 2017) (“The Idaho Department of Insurance respectfully requests that the 
finalization of the Restatement, Liability Insurance project be delayed to a date later than May 
2017, allowing state regulators the opportunity to weigh in on important issues raised by the 
proposed Restatement. This topic has just now come to the attention of our legal department 
which requires time to delve into this complicated topic in order to advise and submit an 
opinion.”) https://perma.cc/Q7PE-DUAQ.  
90 See Press Release, NCOIL Voices Concerns with the American Law Institute’s Proposed 
Liability Insurance Restatement: Violates “Legislative Prerogative” (May 8, 2017) 
(accompanying Letter from Thomas B. Considine, CEO, Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators, to 
Richard Revesz, Director, Am. L. Inst., and Stephanie Middleton, Deputy Director, Am. L. Inst. 
(May 5, 2017) [hereinafter NCOIL Letter]), http://ncoil.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ALI-
final-Press-Release-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJT9-NHDH].  
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consisting of elected officials who “must consider all relevant policy considerations 
such as the impact of proposed law changes on the availability and affordability of 
insurance.”91 The NCOIL letter implied that the RLLI provisions would undermine 
both state insurance regulation and insurance markets.92 But NCOIL specifically noted 
only four supposedly bad aspects of the then 51-section 2017 RLLI.93  
Space limitations prevent a point-by-point refutation of the NCOIL assertions but 
some ink should be spilled correcting the more egregious claims. The RLLI position 
on contract construction in the 2017 draft was not the radical departure asserted by 
NCOIL but was consistent with a substantial amount of case law, which reflects courts 
taking policy text seriously but utilizing extrinsic evidence, intent, purpose, and 
function of policies – approach to ambiguous terms set forth in RLLI Section 4.94 
Nonetheless, the ALI responded to insurer criticisms that the 2017 draft was not 
sufficiently deferential to insurance policy text and revised the portion of the RLLI.95 
The NCOIL contention that the 2017 RLLI makes insurers liable for a judgment 
in excess of policy limits if they “reasonably refuse a settlement demand” is also just 
plain wrong in that it is a gross distortion of the RLLI, which provides that insurers 
 
91 Id. at 2. 
92 NCOIL seems to suggest that the RLLI approach to many issues was so unduly unfavorable 
to insurers that it would undermine the very nature of insurance markets and the insurance 
business and would interfere with state regulatory efforts. NCOIL also suggests that legislatures 
are better able to conduct an empirical and public policy inquiry into the wisdom of proposed 
legal rules. But the NCOIL letter offers no empirical evidence or public policy information to 
support its opposition to the Restatement provisions with which it takes issue.  
93 NCOIL argued against: 
Section 3(2), which NCOIL read as providing that “[i]nsurance contracts do not need 
to be enforced as written.”  
Section 19 because it means the “[i]nsurers in breach of a defense obligation may be 
forced to pay uncovered claims”;  
Sections 24 and 27, which NCOIL asserted provides that “[i]nsurers that reasonably 
refuse a settlement demand are liable for damages in excess of limits and punitive 
damages, irrespective of law or public policy to the contrary”; and  
“Policyholders – but not insurers – can shift attorneys’ fees” in that Sections 48(3), 
49(3) and 51(1) permit fee shifting in some circumstances. 
NCOIL Letter, supra note 90, at 2. All of these assertions are ill-taken. See MANILOFF & 
STEMPEL, supra note 77.  
94 In addition to the treatises previously cited in this Section and RLLI, supra note 4, at §§ 
3–4 reporters notes; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 
95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 532 n.4 (1996) (finding contra proferentem principle to be a cornerstone 
of insurance policy construction, addressed in more than 4,000 cases between 1980 and 1995, 
with courts frequently also employing waiver, estoppel and reasonable expectations analysis).   
95 See RLLI, supra note 4, at § 3 (adopting a “plain meaning” approach with more limited 
use of extrinsic evidence than predecessor drafts). 
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are responsible only if they fail to make reasonable settlement decisions.96 By 
definition, a reasonable rejection of a settlement demand is a reasonable settlement 
decision. Contrary to NCOIL’s assertion, insurers that act reasonably have nothing to 
fear from the RLLI. 
NCOIL’s objection to 2017 RLLI § 19 is odd in that, as discussed below, the 
Section originally provided a strict rule stripping insurers of coverage defenses when 
the insurer breaches the duty to defend. Under the final version of RLLI § 19, the 
insurer may breach the duty to defend and still be permitted to contest coverage (a 
result considerably more pro-insurer than earlier drafts (pre-2017) of the Section, 
which would have completely barred insurers who breached the duty to defend from 
contesting coverage).97 NCOIL describes the 2017 version of the Section as a 
providing a “bad faith penalty” but that is a bit misleading. In many states, an insurer’s 
unreasonable conduct in failing to defend an insured is already considered bad faith.98 
One might therefore describe 2017 RLLI § 19 as providing that insurers breaching 
defense obligations lose coverage defenses only if the breach was in bad faith, which 
is hardly a pro-policyholder rule. 
But regardless of the merits of the 2017 RLLI § 19, the issue was effectively 
mooted by changes made to the Section at the behest of insurers. Current RLLI § 19 
merely states that an insurer breaching its duty to defend loses the right to control 
defense and settlement of the action, which is but a truism. The ALI has now 
completely accommodated (some would say caved in to) insurer objections to earlier 
versions of § 19. Presumably, NCOIL no longer objects to the Section. Yet the 
organization continues to lobby hard for either further pro-insurer changes to the RLLI 
or rejection of the document. 
NCOIL’s objection to the possibility of fee shifting set forth in RLLI §§ 48, 49 and 
51 also seems misplaced.99 As discussed below, the 2017 RLLI endorsed fee-shifting 
 
96 See id. § 24(1)–(2) (“[T]he insurer has a duty to the insured to make reasonable settlement 
decisions [as if it bore] the sole financial responsibility for the full amount of the potential 
judgment.”) (emphasis added). 
97 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Enhancing the Socially Instrumental Role of Insurance: The 
Opportunity and Challenge Presented by the ALI Restatement Position on Breach of the Duty 
to Defend, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 587, 591–92 (2015). 
98 See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1036–38 (Cal. 1973); Kirk v. Mt. 
Airy Ins. Co., 951 P.2d 1124, 1125 (Wash. 1998) (“In order to establish bad faith, an insured is 
required to sow the breach was unreasonable, frivolous, or unfounded . . . .”); Zoppo v. 
Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 400 (Ohio 1994) (adopting an objective “reasonable 
justification” standard for determining whether insurer acted in bad faith without need to 
consider the subjective state of mind of the insurer). Reporters’ Note b to Section 50 of the RLLI 
finds that “[t]he majority approach to determine whether an insurer acted in bad faith requires 
courts to evaluate the insurer’s conduct with both objective and subjective tests,” but notes the 
strong minority rule of a purely objective inquiry asking whether the insurer acted reasonably. 
99 RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 48(4) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 
2017) [hereinafter RLLI Proposed Final Draft No. 1] permitted fee shifting “[w]hen the insured 
substantially prevails in a declaratory-judgment action brought by an insurer seeking to 
terminate the insurer’s duty to defend under the policy, an award of a sum of money to the 
insured for the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs incurred in that action.” The March 
2017 version of § 49 permitted fee shifting to reimburse a policyholder for the reasonable fees 
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in cases where an insurer commences a declaratory judgment action against its 
policyholder, forcing the insured to fight a “two-front” war and shoulder additional 
disputing costs. Insurers, as perhaps the ultimate institutional “repeat players” in 
litigation, usually can more successfully wage wars of attrition than can their 
policyholders. The insurer (who should be held to the standards of Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure100) initiates a declaratory judgment action and 
ordinarily should fight only battles it expects to win rather than fighting simply for 
leverage against a policyholder. Where the insurer loses, the 2017 RLLI position – 
which permits, but does not require, courts to shift counsel fees – was fair and 
reasonable.101  
Notwithstanding its weakness, the NCOIL position was accommodated by the 
ALI. Current RLLI § 47(3) provides that an insurer in breach of its obligations may 
be responsible for court costs or counsel fees “when provided by state law or the 
policy.” In essence, the ALI has “punted” in the issue by deferring to atomized state 
law rather than attempting to set forth a logical common law approach to the issue of 
fee-shifting as a remedy for breach. Once again, insurers have been heard and 
accommodated by the ALI. 
As reflected in its ability to obtain the gubernatorial letter and pro-insurer changes 
that took place in the RLLI after 2017, NCOIL has proven itself to be an advocacy 
organization with more than a little clout. This makes its contention that it had in 2017 
“just recently learned of” the RLLI and its arguably problematic provisions102 difficult 
to accept at face value. On this point, as with professed state regulator ignorance, it is 
hard to imagine that a group purporting to carefully follow insurance matters could 
claim to have been unaware of the ALI Restatement project for a half-dozen years. A 
claim of being “surprised” by the RLLI rings particularly hollow when one considers 
the number of prominent insurer representatives who were involved in the projects as 
 
and costs insured to establish an insurer’s breach of the duty to defend or pay defense costs on 
an ongoing basis.” RLLI Proposed Final Draft No. 1, supra, at § 49(3). The March 2017 version 
of § 51 permitted recovery of counsel fees and costs the policyholder incurs to establish an 
insurer’s breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. RLLI Proposed Final Draft No. 
1, supra, at § 51. 
100 STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 77, at § 14A-83. 
101 Further, to response to NCOIL’s concern that victorious insures cannot recover fees, it 
should be noted that where a policyholder’s opposition violates FED. R. CIV. P. 11, R. 37, or 28 
U.S.C § 1927, or other rules or laws with the possibility of fee-shifting, the insurer may recover. 
102 See NCOIL Letter, supra note 90, at 1. 
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Advisers103 or MCG members or who had written about the RLLI in the trade press104 
or who had given presentations about the RLLI at large gatherings of insurer 
attorneys.105 Is it possible the NCOIL, which claims to be a voice of the insurance 
 
103 As discussed earlier, roughly a fourth of the Advisers were persons connected to the 
insurance industry as employees or counsel, among them Vanita Banks of Allstate, Kim 
Brunner of State Farm, Robert Cusamano of ACE and insurer lawyers Michael Alward, William 
Barker, Sheila Birnbaum, Sean Fitzpatrick, Natasha Nye, and Robert Tomlinson. In addition, 
prominent insurer attorney Laura Foggan participated in the project as a liaison representative 
of the American Insurance Association (“AIA”). (There was no liaison appointed to represent a 
policyholder or broker organization). Among the MCG were many attorneys representing 
insurers in their practices. See RLLI, supra note 4, at VII-XII (listing Advisers and Members 
Consultative Group). This is not to suggest that these persons agreed with all or even most of 
the positions taken in the RLLI. Attorneys Aylward, Barker, and Foggan were frequently 
outspoken on behalf of pro-insurer positions at meetings and in comments submitted to the 
Reporters.   
Consequently, NCOIL’s suggestion that insurers were somehow “ambushed” by the RLLI 
project is not credible in light of the very able articulation of insurer views presented throughout 
the process. Even if there had been no insurer representatives involved in the project, it was 
nonetheless hardly a furtive enterprise. During the past seven years, the RLLI has had eleven 
(11) drafts, which were discussed at five ALI Council meetings and six Annual Meetings. There 
have also be a total nearly 20 Advisers and MCG meetings. As previously noted, the balance 
among the Advisers is evenly split between policyholder counsel and insurer counsel while the 
MCG membership has a higher proportion of insurer lawyers and includes several prominent 
insurer counsel. The RLLI did not sneak up on the insurance industry and its allies in the legal 
profession.  
104 See, e.g., Randy Maniloff, ALI Principles of Insurance Should Concern Industry, LAW360 
(Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/528384/ali-principles-of-insurance-should-
concern-industry. Despite the long gestation period of the RLLI, the insurance industry did not 
mount what appears to be coordinated attack on the project until 2017. In addition to Motions 
like the AIG Omnibus Motion and adverse Comments submitted to ALI (e.g., NCOIL), insurer 
counsel took to the trade press with a vengeance to attack the RLLI. See, e.g., A. Hugh Scott, 
ALI’s Proposed Insurance Law Restatement: A Trojan Horse?, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/889483; A. Hugh Scott, Why Criticism of ALI’s Insurance 
Restatement is Valid, LAW360 (May 10, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/922277/why-
criticism-of-ali-s-insurance-restatement-is-valid. Insurers were also remarkably successful in 
getting media outlets to take their criticisms more seriously than is deserved and in portraying 
the ALI’s deferral of formal approval of the RLLI until 2018 as more of a victory than was 
actually the cases. See, e.g., Glenn G. Lammi, Heeding Criticism, American Law Institute Pulls 
Liability Insurance Restatement Before Member Vote, FORBES (May 25, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2017/05/25/heeding-criticism-american-law-institute-pulls-
liability-insurance-restatement-before-member-vote/?sh=2d063d4d3106 
[https://perma.cc/Z22S-FBH7].     
105 For example, at an April 2016 Defense Research Institute seminar I attended along with 
hundreds of attorneys representing insurers (many staff counsel) and even some insurance 
company executives (as well as one of the Treatise authors), prominent attorney Richard Mason 
(of the Cozen law firm in Philadelphia, a very well-known insurer law firm) gave a presentation 
in which he criticized aspects of the RLLI, described it as very pro-policyholder and 
advised/warned his colleagues that the RLLI was likely to be influential. 
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industry, had none of its members in any communication with any of these people for 
six years?  
b. The Dinallo/Slattery/Debevoise Attacks 
In a related vein, Attorneys Eric Dinallo (a former New York State Insurance 
Commissioner) and Keith Slattery of New York’s Devevoise & Plimpton law firm 
submitted a lengthy letter requesting that ALI postpone consideration of the 2017 
RLLI or perhaps even abandon the project on the ground that it was duplicative of or 
in conflict with state insurance regulation.106 Law professors Peter Kochenburger, 
Jeffrey Thomas and Daniel Schwarcz authored a response to the Dinallo/Slattery 
submission that carefully refuted its contentions and revealed them to be misplaced.107 
They concluded that the Dinallo/Slattery letter (which Professor Kochenburger 
discovered was funded by the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies 
(“NAMIC”)) “fundamentally mischaracterizes both the wording and effect of multiple 
sections in the Restatement and important aspects of insurance regulation.”108  
In some detail, the Kochenburger Letter pointed out that the Dinallo/Slattery 
contention that the area of insurance policy construction was already sufficiently 
regulated to protect policyholders, even individual consumers,109 was incorrect and 
that policyholder rights pursuant to an insurance policy were not adequately protected 
by rate and form regulation and other regulator activity as asserted in the 
Dinallo/Slattery Letter.110 The Kochenburger Letter also outlined why the rules set 
forth in the RLLI did not pose any threat to insurer solvency111 and refuted the 
contention that RLLI was inconsistent with model legislation such as the Unfair Claim 
 
106 See Letter from Eric J. Dinallo and Keith J. Slattery, Debevoise & Plimpton, to ALI 
Leadership and RLLI Reporters (Jan. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Dinallo/Slattery Letter], 
https://perma.cc/DAB3-HXK4. 
107 See Letter from Peter Kochenburger, Deputy Dir., Ins. L. Ctr., Daniel Schwarcz, Univ. 
of Minnesota L. Sch., and Jeffrey Thomas, Univ. of Missouri-Kansas City Sch. of L., and joined 
by Jay Feinman, Rutgers L. Sch., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Univ. of Nevada Las Vegas L. Sch. & 
Amy Bach, Exec. Dir., United Policyholders, to Richard L. Revesz, Dir. Am. L. Inst. & 
Stephanie A. Middleton, Deputy Dir., Am. L. Inst. (May 18, 2017) [hereinafter Kochenburger 
Letter], https://perma.cc/ME2E-PGS3. 
108 Id. 
109 The Dinallo/Slattery Letter argued: 
Contrary to the [RLLI] presumption regarding the vulnerability of the insurance 
consumer, comprehensive regulatory oversight, extensive insurance laws and 
regulations, well-developed case law and competitive market forces are already in 
place to protect the consumer. Therefore, the highlighted Draft rules [with which 
Dinallo and Slattery disagree] are unnecessary and overreaching. Those rules also 
depart from case law and attempt to displace the role of the regulator.  
Dinallo/Slattery Letter, supra note 106, at 38. 
110 See Kochenburger Letter, supra note 107, at 2–4. 
111 Id. at 4. 
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Settlement Practices Act.112 The Kochenburger Letter also refuted the assertions of the 
NCOIL letter.113  
2. Heavy Commentary on the RLLI, Mostly by Insurers and Allies 
Insurance defense panel counsel continued to produce anti-RLLI commentary after 
the 2017 Annual Meeting as well as producing a media spin that the ALI was in some 
retreat on the RLLI because it had postponed final approval to the 2018 Annual 
Meeting. Near-meeting or post-meeting comments included submissions from the 
American Insurance Association Liaison,114 insurer attorney and Washington Law 
 
112 Id. at 5–6. 
113 Id. at 6–8. 
114 See Memorandum from Laura A. Foggan to Tom Baker and Kyle Logue (June 11, 2017) 
(on file with author) (regarding RLLI § 45 and arguing that there should at a minimum be more 
citation to cases in which courts enforce policy terms as written and reject public policy-based 
objections to enforcement); Note from Laura Foggan to Tom Baker and Kyle Logue (not dated) 
(on file with author) (attacking RLLI § 13(3) permitting use of extrinsic evidence to supplement 
four corners of plaintiff’s complaint to create a potential for coverage and duty to defend and 
attaching case of Ciber, Inc. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 261 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Colo. 2017) to 
support the point). 
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Foundation contributor Kim Marrkand,115 ATRA activist Victor Schwartz,116 former 
law professor and insurer attorney Malcom Wheeler,117 Pennsylvania insurance 
defense attorneys,118 and other insurance industry allies.119 Some ALI Members not 
 
115 See, e.g., Letter from Kim V. Marrkand to Tom Baker and Kyle Logue (June 28, 2017) 
(on file with author) (advocating elimination of Comment d to RLLI § 27, which takes that 
position that where an insurer’s failure to make reasonable settlement decisions results in a 
judgment against the policyholder in excess of policy limits, the insurer is responsible for the 
entire judgment even if portions of the judgment include a punitive award). Insurers oppose this 
approach in states where punitive damages are uninsurable as a matter of public policy and can 
cite one particularly prominent (but in in my view very wrongly decided) case: PPG Indus., Inc. 
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 654 (Cal. 1999); see also STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra 
note 77, at § 9.05(d) criticizing PPG v. Transamerica). However, RLLI Comment d correctly 
rejects the insurer view, noting that in cases like PPG v. Transamerica, there were powerful 
dissents that the Reporters found more persuasive.  
[The RLLI] follows the approach of the dissenting judges in those cases for several 
reasons. First, this approach furthers the public policy in favor of encouraging 
reasonable settlement decisions by insurers. Second, the incentive argument in favor 
of the contrary approach . . . is implausible because insureds will not base their 
conduct on a speculative possibility their insurer might later breach the duty to make 
reasonable settlement decisions. . . . Finally, the contrary approach would create a 
conflict of interest in the defense of the claim that might increase the frequency of 
cases in which independent counsel would be required under §16, reducing liability 
insurers’ ability to manage defense costs. See § 16, Comment d. 
RLLI, supra note 4, at § 27 cmt. e; see also id. § 27 reporters note d (“The insurer should be 
liable for all damages proximately caused by its breach of duty [to make reasonable settlement 
decision].”); Jennifer A. Emmaneel, Note, Hiding Behind Policy: Confusing Compensation with 
Indemnification, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 637, 677 (2000) (concluding after extensive 
analysis of PPG v. Transamerica that the dissent position is superior); Letter from Kim V. 
Marrkand, RLLI Reporter to Tom Baker and Kyle Logue, RLLI Reporters (June 28, 2017) 
(attacking RLLI § 1(8) regarding mandatory rules) (on file with author); Letter from Kim V. 
Marrkand, RLLI Reporter, to Tom Baker and Kyle Logue, RLLI Reporters (June 14, 2017) 
(criticizing RLLI § 8 regarding misrepresentation) (on file with author). 
116 See Letter from Victor E. Schwartz and Christopher E. Appel to Tom Baker and Kyle 
Logue, RLLI Reporters (June 28, 2017) (attacking fee-shifting as a remedy and proposing 
revisions of §§ 48, 49 and 51 to defer to existing state-by-state law) (on file with author). 
117 See Letter from Malcolm E. Wheeler to Tom Baker and Kyle Logue, RLLI Reporters 
(June 19, 2017) (urging revision of RLLI §§ 24, 25, and 35 to add additional requirements 
before a policyholder may settle a matter without an insurer’s consent and urging approach 
similar to Travelers v. Stresscom, 370 P.3d 140 (Colo. 2016), on which the insurer prevailed in 
an unauthorized settlement case) (on file with author).   
118 See Letter from Louis C. Long, President, Pennsylvania Def. Inst., to Tom Baker and 
Kyle Logue, RLLI Reporters (May 24, 2017) ((criticizing §§ 3, 12, 13, 10 and “numerous other 
sections” (by which we think he means §§ 48, 49 and 51) regarding fee shifting)) (on file with 
author). 
119 See Letter from Parks T. Chastain to ALI Reporters (May 15, 2017) (urging postponement 
of vote on RLLI) (on file with author); Letter of Enrique Marinez, President, Ass’n of Def. 
Counsel of N. California & Nevada, to Richard L. Revesz, Director, ALI (May 12, 2017) 
(referencing and adopting DRI criticism) (on file with author); Letter from Swift Currie (self-
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described insurer firm writing “on behalf of several insurance company clients”) to Richard L. 
Revesz, Director, ALI, and Stephanie Middleton, Deputy Director, ALI (May 22, 2017) 
(arguing RLLI lacks caselaw support and particularly criticizing § 12(2) as imposing vicarious 
liability on insurers for conduct of defense counsel, which is an inaccurate description of the 
provision) (on file with author); Letter from David T. Moran to Richard L. Revesz, Director, 
ALI, and Stephanie Middleton, Deputy Director, ALI (May 16, 2017) (arguing that RLLI § 3 
regarding extrinsic evidence and the duty to defend is not supported by caselaw (an incorrect 
assertion in our view)) (on file with author); see also Letter from Thomas D. Hughes, Greater 
N.Y. Ins. Co., to Richard L. Revesz, Director, ALI, and Stephanie Middleton, Deputy Director, 
ALI (May 19, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from Carmello Puglisi, Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co. et al. to ALI Reporters (May 19, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from Carl Pernicone, 
Wilson Elser to Richard L. Revesz, Director, ALI, and Stephanie Middleton, Deputy Director, 
ALI (May 18, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from William T. Russell, Jr. to ALI Reporters 
(May 18, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from William A. Bossen to Richard L. Revesz, 
Director, ALI, and Stephanie Middleton, Deputy Director, ALI (May 17, 2017) (on file with 
author); Letter from R. Mark Mifflin, Ill. Ass’n of Def. Trial Counsel, to Richard L. Revesz, 
Director, ALI, and Stephanie Middleton, Deputy Director, ALI (May 12, 2017) (on file with 
author); Letter from Todd A. Strother, EMC Ins., to Richard L. Revesz, Director, ALI (May 12, 
2017) (on file with author); Letter from Ellen D. Melchionni, New York Ins. Ass’n, to Richard 
L. Revesz, Director, ALI (May 15, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from Bonnie L. Guth, 
Munich RE, to Richard L. Revesz, Director, ALI, and Stephanie Middleton, Deputy Director, 
ALI (May 16, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from A. Hugh Scott to ALI Reporters (May 
17, 2017); Letter from Am. Ins. Ass’n to ALI Reporters (May 11, 2017) (on file with author).  
In a letter to Reporters, the Illinois Department of Insurance Director criticized the RLLI as 
deviating from settled law and quoting Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Kanas v. Nebraska, 574 
U.S. 445, 475–76 (2015), in which he accuses ALI and Restatements of advocating new law 
rather than distilling existing law as well as opposing RLLI § 19(2) and § 24. Letter from 
Jennifer Hammer, Director, Illinois Dep’t of Ins., to ALI Reporters (May 19, 2017) [hereinafter 
Hammer Letter]; see also Letter from Patrick M. McPharlin, Director, Michigan Dep’t of Ins. 
& Fin. Servs., to Richard L. Revesz, Director, ALI (May 15, 2017) (incorrectly arguing that 
RLLI provisions on use of extrinsic evidence for insurance policy construction creates 
“subjective exception to the plain meaning rule” and that RLLI “could significantly alter the 
environment in which insurance contracts are interpreted in a way that would create instability 
for insurers and higher prices for consumers”).   
The Hammer Letter, supra, should be deeply troubling to anyone interested in the political 
and regulatory process. An insurance regulator in the nation’s fifth largest state writes not out 
of concern that the RLLI will hurt policyholders, consumers, or the public generally but instead 
acts to protect the interests of the insurance companies she is supposed to be regulating. The 
letter is evidence in support of the “agency capture” theory of modern regulation. See generally 
Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 
(1975) (noting and largely agreeing with critique that agencies exercise their power in favor of 
the organized and regulated interests). 
The Hammer Letter, supra, is also a bit shocking coming from an official who is supposed to 
be knowledgeable about insurance in her state. Director Hammer asserts that RLLI, supra note 
4, at § 19, which provides that an insurer who breaches the duty to defend without a reasonable 
basis loses the right to contest coverage is “a clear departure from the common law rule.” 
Hammer Letter, supra. That may be technically true (but also a tautology in that the RLLI rule 
is a hybrid rather than adoption of either the majority or minority rule of the cases). However, 
in Illinois, the state with which one would presume the Commissioner Hammer is most familiar, 
the common law rule is in fact much more favorable to policyholders than the RLLI § 19 that 
she criticizes (specifically, RLLI Proposed Final Draft No. 1, supra note 99, at § 19(2)). Illinois 
law provides that where a liability insurer breaches the duty to defend (with or without 
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021
640 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [69:605 
 
reasonable basis), the insurer is precluded from contesting coverage. See Emps. Ins. of Wassau 
v. Ehlco Liquidating Tr., 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1135 (Ill. 1999) (“Once the insurer breaches its duty 
to defend . . . the estoppel doctrine has broad application and operates to bar the insurer form 
raising policy defenses to coverage, even those defense that may have been successful had the 
insurer not breached its duty to defend.”). Ehlco Liquidating is probably the leading national 
case on the topic as well as an approach more favorable to policyholders than the RLLI approach 
criticized by Director Hammer. Illinois insurers have lived under this rule for more than 15 
years and survived, perhaps even thrived. Some of the world’s largest insurers (e.g., State Farm, 
Allstate) are Illinois companies. 
Director Hammer’s lack of knowledge about her own state’s law provides a window into the 
weakness of state insurance regulation and the pliability of regulators when lobbied by insurers. 
Her letter to the ALI must have been hurriedly written or she and her staff must be incredibly 
weak intellectually to have so clearly placed a figurative foot in the metaphorical mouth in 
decrying an RLLI rule that is weaker than the one in their own state. With even a little scrutiny 
and thought, the letter would presumably at least have acknowledged Ehlco Liquidating and, 
one would think, have criticized it if the milder RLLI § 19(2) is so bad. But this did not happen, 
either through oversight or because the Illinois Insurance Department cannot muster any 
information to suggest that Ehlco Liquidating has created problems.   
More troubling than even the apparent lack of knowledge is the Director’s willingness to ask 
“how high” when insurers say “jump.” The letter was clearly fired off in a hurry on the eve of 
the ALI Annual Meeting, most likely in response to insurer complaints and lacks any real 
reflection as to the actual state of the law or whether the insurers had legitimate beefs with the 
RLLI. The letter may even have been ghost-written in part by insurers. Does any reasonable 
reader really think that Director Hammer came up with the reference to the Scalia concurrence 
in Kansas v. Nebraska off the top of her head? Or is the more likely scenario that she was fed 
this talking point by insurers and ate it very willingly. And this is the same Insurance 
Department that testified on behalf of State Farm in the famous Campbell v. State Farm 
Litigation (questionable in itself as one would think regulators would not see their role as 
helping insurers in private civil actions) and was embarrassed on cross-examination when 
forced to admit that it performed very few market conduct examinations of even the major 
insurers in its jurisdiction. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF 
CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM 399–401 (2008) (Richard Rogers, Deputy Director of the Illinois 
Department of Insurance, testifies as a friendly witness for State Farm in its defense during the 
famous punitive damages trial that yielded a $145 million award against the insurer). 
Letters like those from the Illinois, Idaho, and Michigan insurance departments refute the 
contention of insurer allies that the RLLI should not intrude on areas of potential state regulatory 
activity or that state regulators are adequately policing insuring practices and protecting 
policyholders and the public. On the contrary, it appears that regulators in some states are as 
likely to be pliable servants of the insurance industry rather than zealous guardians of 
policyholders or the public. 
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affiliated with the insurance industry also submitted commentary,120 as did some 
policyholder counsel.121 But roughly 80% or more of the commentary was from the 
insurer side. The tone of the commentary was different as well. Policyholder counsel 
or academics targeted specific aspects of the RLLI for criticism but did not denounce 
the entire project or suggest its postponement or abandonment. In contrast, many 
insurers or their advocates appear to not only have condemned the RLLI and sought 
delay but also attacked the ALI as a whole and the long-established concept that 
Restatements do more than merely count and summarize cases but also make 
assessments as to better rules of law. 
Sometimes joining insurers were corporations. The thinking of RLLI critics from 
the non-insurer business community seems decidedly contradictory. It of course 
 
120 See Letter from Guy Miller Struve to Tom Baker and Kyle Logue, RLLI Reporters (June 
30, 2017) (titled “A New Low in the Opposition to the Liability Insurance Project,” in which he 
takes issue with an opinion piece in the WALL STREET JOURNAL: Tiger Joyce, Opinion, Tort 
Lawyers Take over the American Law Institute, WALL. ST. J., (June 29, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tort-lawyers-take-over-the-american-law-institute-1498776033) 
(on file with author). Struve succinctly makes his point: “Every ALI member owes it to the 
Institute to defend it publicly against this sort of distortion” and 
[t]his observation applies with particular force to those ALI members who are asking 
the ALI to make changes favored by the insurance industry . . . . Whether such 
members like it or not, the barrage of pressure against the American Law Institute 
inevitably creates the risk (and the perception) that any changes made [to the RLLI] 
form this point forward may be the result of pressure, not the result of changed 
convictions on the merits. This will be especially true if the members supporting such 
changes have not publicly disavowed the pressure barrage. 
Id. As Struve points out, the allegation that the Institute is particularly pro-plaintiff is belied 
by the facts. For example, while I was on the floor at the May 2017 Annual Meeting, a motion 
(made by Struve) that narrowed the scope of liability for battery in the Torts Restatement was 
adopted by the Membership over fairly uniform opposition from the law faculty members on 
the floor.  
Somewhat surprising and hard to characterize is the Letter from Robert L. Bradley et al., 
General Counsels of Companies to David Levi, Incoming President, ALI, and Richard L. 
Revesz, Director, ALI (May 19, 2017) (on file with author). The letter is signed by the general 
counsels of TAMKO Building Products, ConocoPhillips, Brunswick Corporation, Eli Lilly, 
Novartis, RPM International, Shell Oil, and GlaxoSmithKline as well as Johnson & Johnson. 
This is a group that presumably buys a lot of insurance. Presumably, it would welcome an RLLI 
that was as pro-policyholder as claimed by the insurance industry. But instead, these general 
counsels implicitly criticize RLLI §§ 3 and 4 (without being specific) on the ground that the 
RLLI gives insufficient deference to the text of contract documents. This is bad, they say 
because “all of the undersigned seek to use words in our contracts that are clear and coherent. 
We expect courts will follow the ‘plain meaning’ of these words.” Id. at 1. “The [RLLI] departs 
from this most basic ‘plain meaning rule’ to allow extrinsic evidence to be considered even 
when a contract is clear. This provision would set a troubling precedent with respect to the 
interpretation of insurance policy terms, and possibly terms in other types of contracts.” Id. 
121 See, e.g., Letter from Lorelie S. Masters to ALI Reporters (May 28, 2017) (noting 
extensive insurance industry participation in or awareness of the RLLI project for years and 
questioning attack on RLLI at such a late stage of the project) (on file with author); Letter from 
John G. Buchanan III et al. to ALI Reporters (April 11, 2016) (seeking stronger version of RLLI 
§13 more protective of policyholders) (on file with author).  
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makes sense that insurers would rather have a legal regime more favorable to insurers. 
But why would non-insurers – a/k/a policyholders – oppose the RLLI on the ground 
(erroneous in my view) that it is unduly favorable to policyholders? Insurance policies 
are contracts purchased for risk management and protection. A rule that promotes 
recovery when policyholders suffer a loss or face a claim should be welcomed by 
business advocates regardless of whether the business is an individual or a commercial 
entity.  
One possibility is that non-insurer businesses have inexplicably forgotten that they 
may someday be policyholders in coverage litigation with insurers rather than 
defendants in contract litigation brought by customers or vendors, in which case, they 
might well prefer doctrines of contract construction, duty to defend, bad faith, fee-
shifting, and remedies for breach at odds with those advocated by insurers. More 
likely, in the frontal lobes of business is concern that a less formalist or textualist 
contract construction regime in the RLLI could spill over into the pending Restatement 
of the Law of Consumer Contracts, thereby providing ALI support for contract 
construction that reduces the importance of the “fine print” of standard forms in favor 
of consumer expectations and notions of fairness. 
B. The Puzzling DRI Opposition to the RLLI 
Adding to the insurer onslaught, the Defense Research Institute (“DRI”) 
announced that it was officially “opposed to the adopting of the Proposed Final Draft” 
of the RLLI because it had “grave concerns over several portions of this body of 
work,” contending that “[m]any provisions contained therein are at odds with the 
common law of insurance, and their adoption will impede the ability of our members 
to represent policyholders.”122 The DRI also speculated that “the proposed draft may 
engender more insurance coverage controversies and litigation,”123 a perhaps self-
fulfilling prophecy in light of the insurance industry’s apparent intent to oppose the 
RLLI at every turn. 
Although many DRI members are what might be termed pure “insurer side” 
lawyers who are always representing insurers in coverage actions, business 
transactions or the like, much if not the majority of DRI attorney practice involves 
defending policyholders being sued by third parties. These lawyers are classic 
“insurance defense attorneys,” as the term has traditionally been used by layperson – 
to indicate defending policyholders who are defendants rather than insurers disputing 
coverage, although that latter group apparently had the ear of DRI leadership.  
In the defense of claims against a policyholder, insurers may look like the clients 
because they control disposition of the case and compensation of counsel and normally 
determine selection of counsel as well. But insurers are merely third-party payers or 
what might be termed “secondary” clients. Although a majority of states appear to 
adopt the “two-client model” or “tripartite relationship” view of defense counsel’s role 
when selected by an insurer to defend a policyholder facing a lawsuit, every two-client 
model state also makes clear that where there are conflicts between the insurer and the 
 
122 See Letter from John E. Cuttino, President, DRI, to Richard L. Revesz, Director, ALI 
(May 5, 2017) [hereinafter Cuttino Letter] (on file with author). 
123 Id. 
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policyholder, defense counsel’s first duty is to the policyholder.124 This, of course, is 
the only sensible means of applying a two-client model rather than the more 
analytically sound one-client model. For example, if defense counsel investigates and 
discovers information that could undermine a policyholder’s argument for coverage, 
it is not permitted to disclose this information to the insurer.125 
Under these circumstances, it is demoralizing to see an organization of lawyers 
siding so strongly with the insurers that pay their fees (albeit at comparatively low 
rates and often with annoying fee audits and delays) rather than policyholders, who 
under the law in all states are DRI’s primary or main clients, even if many also 
consider the insurer to be a “client.” In a dozen or so states that clearly embrace a one-
client model, the policyholder is the only “client” and the insurer is a third-party payer, 
albeit one with substantial contract rights. 
Although DRI can argue that portions of the RLLI will actually hurt policyholders, 
the argument is not persuasive. What has insurers upset is not the prospect that the 
RLLI will hurt policyholders. Quite the contrary. Insurers are upset that the RLLI may 
make it difficult for insurers to prevail against policyholders in coverage litigation, 
bad faith lawsuits, unfair claims practices actions, and regarding defense, settlement, 
and payment obligations. But it hardly follows that attorneys hired by insurers to 
defend policyholders should be similarly opposed to coverage. On the contrary, the 
potential for coverage is what triggers an insurer’s duty to defend and results in the 
employment of DRI members. In effect, DRI as an organization is acting against the 
interests of many of its members and the policyholders that are their clients. 
As with ATRA and any lawyers being compensated by insurers to oppose the 
RLLI (because this may create a positional conflict in violation of Rule 1.7 if other 
lawyers in the firm represent policyholders in coverage matters), DRI would appear 
to have a positional conflict of interest in supporting insurer opposition to the RLLI to 
the extent the RLLI contains provisions helpful to policyholders who are supposed to 
be the primary clients of DRI defense attorneys. Presumably, insurers have placed 
some pressure on DRI members to join their fight against the RLLI. Even though the 
policyholders are the primary clients of DRI lawyers, most DRI lawyers are chosen 
by and paid by insurers, which gives the insurers powerful leverage over the DRI and 
defense counsel generally.126 
 
124 See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 77, at § 9.03 (discussing degree to which insurers 
are “clients” of counsel representing policyholders in litigation).   
125 Id.  
126 See Cuttino Letter, supra note 122. The letter is long on general allegations that the RLLI 
is not sufficiently grounded in law but gives few examples. More specifically, it attacks RLLI 
§ 12 as “creating new direct liability on the part of the insurer to the insured for acts of defense 
counsel” without apt support in the caselaw. RLLI § 12 states that an insurer may be “subject 
to liability for the malpractice of insurer-selected counsel if the defense attorney is “an employee 
of the insurer acting within the scope of employment” or the insurer “negligently selects or 
supervises defense counsel, including by retaining counsel with inadequate liability insurance.” 
It is hard-cum-impossible to see what DRI sees as so wrong with this approach, which does not 
endorse strict or even very broad liability for insurers. Rather, the insurer is liable for counsel’s 
malpractice only if counsel is the insurer’s own employee or the insurer has engaged in what 
might be termed “active” negligence by inadequately supervising counsel or selecting an 
attorney without the means to compensate a policyholder client injured by malpractice. 
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C. The May 2017 ALI Annual Meeting and Subsequent Developments 
At the 2017 Annual Meeting (which was aware of an ALI leadership decision to 
defer final consideration and approval of the RLLI until the 2018 Annual Meeting), 
insurer motions were debated and rather strongly rejected by the membership. Motions 
by insurer counsel regarding the duty to defend were rejected by a wide margin127 as 
was a motion by insurer counsel to remove a Comment and accompanying Reporters 
argued to § 24.128 On the policyholder side, a motion was made to have 2017 RLLI 
Section 44 amended to eliminate allocation of coverage responsibility in long-tail torts 
consecutively triggering policy years to only years in which insurance was 
 
Regarding the conflict of interest point, it is hard to believe that defense attorneys who could 
perhaps be sued for malpractice would oppose having insurers available as a potential co-
defendant – in particular a co-defendant with a deep pocket better able to compensate an injured 
policyholder client and who would be perhaps even less sympathetic to a jury than the average 
lawyer. Although it is perhaps noble for the DRI president to care so much about insurers, it 
appears to run counter to the interests of the membership and to the primary clients of DRI.  
 In addition, the authority of Mr. Cuttino as president to speak so broadly for the DRI 
membership is not at all clear, even if the organization normally delegates policymaking to its 
top elected officials. The DRI has thousands of members, many of whom might appreciate not 
being sacrificial lambs when tight litigation guidelines set by insurers, who often seek to restrict 
the legal work of defense counsel, result in a bad outcome and engender a policyholder’s 
malpractice suit. For example, I am a DRI member. Had I been polled on the subject (there 
appears to have been no such effort to broadly survey the membership), I would have opposed 
the Cuttino Letter and any DRI effort to defeat or demonize the RLLI. 
For further discussion of the professional responsibility issues raised by attorney participation 
in law reform activity on behalf of clients or with compensation from clients. See generally 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Legal Ethics and Law Reform Advocacy, 10 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL 
MALPRAC. & ETHICS 244 (2020). 
127 See William T. Barker, An Insurer Need Not Defend if Undisputed Facts Note at Issue or 
Potentially at Issue in the Underlying Action Establish as a Matter of Law That the Legal Action 
is Not Covered, Proposed Amendment to Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance 
Proposed Final Draft; Anastasia Markakis Nye, Conditions Under Which the Insurer Must 
Defend, Proposed Amendment to Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance, Proposed Final 
Draft (March 27 [sic], 2017) (seeking similar changes to permit insurers to refuse to defend 
based on facts outside the complaint known to insurers).     
128 See Michael Aylward, Proposed Amendment to Restatement of the Law, Liability 
Insurance, Proposal Final Draft (March 28 [sic], 2017), Section 24 – The Insurer’s Duty to 
Make Reasonable Settlement Decisions (seeking to delete Comment e and related portions of 
Reporters’ Note). Comment e sets forth as factors that a judge or jury may consider in 
determining whether an insurer acted in a reasonable manner in addressing a claim). 
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available.129 The Reporters took this motion and others as yet undebated insurer 
motions130 under advisement. 
Thus, by the close of the discussion session at the May 2017 Annual Meeting, the 
RLLI had been reviewed and discussed for the fifth time. Membership approved the 
RLLI subject to editorial revision by the Reporters in light of commentary and review 
of the RLLI again at the May 2018 Annual Meeting.131 As a consequence, the RLLI 
could be considered as approved but not yet finalized ALI work product subject to 
change during the ensuing year or at the next meeting prior to formal final approval.  
In the wake of the 2017 Annual Meeting, the RLLI Reporters issued a subsequent 
(August 2017) draft with editorial changes discussed at a September 2017 
Advisers/MCG Meeting. There were then further revisions, resulting in a December 
2017 RLLI Draft that was also accompanied by alternative language concerning the 
contract construction provisions of the RLLI. Then came the January 2018 ALI 
Council meeting, which resulted in a directive by the Council to adopt the alternative 
language more deferential to policy text and to revise pre-2017 RLLI Section 12 to 
provide for reduced insurer liability for failings of defense counsel.132 These and other 
revisions were incorporated into the Proposed Final Draft of April 2018 submitted to 
the ALI Membership in May 2018. 
Undeterred by the lukewarm to negative reception given insurer motions at the 
Annual Meeting, NCOIL (the pro-insurer group of legislators)133 immediately issued 
 
129 See Larry Stewart, Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance, Motion to Amend §42 by 
Adopting the “Unavailability Rule,” (on file with author); Lorelie S. Masters, John G. Buchanan 
III & David Goodwin, Joinder in [Stewart] Motion to Amend 42(b) Adopting the “Unavailability 
Rule,” (on file with author) (joined by Amy Back, David H. Brown, Timothy W. Burns, Dennis 
R. Connolly, Mitchell F. Dolin, Jonathan M. Goodman, Timothy P. Law, Barry S. Levin, 
Meghan H. Magruder, Leo P. Martinez, J.W. Montgomery II, David L. Mulliken, Gita F. 
Rothschild, Jeffrey W. Stempel, and Jeffry E. Thomas).  
130 See, e.g., Michael Aylward, Notice-of-Claim Conditions, Proposed Amendment to 
RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS., (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2017) § 36 & 
cmt. a (current version at RLLI, supra note 4, at § 35 & cmt. a); Michael Aylward, Insurance 
of Known Liabilities, Proposed Amendment to RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS., (AM. L. 
INST., Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2017) § 47 (current version at RLLI, supra note 4, at § 46) 
(arguing that prospective insurers should be required to report without being asked all demands 
and claims known to them at the time of seeking insurance rather than only those claims where 
liability is certain); Anastasia Markakis Nye, Insurance of Known Liabilities, Proposed 
Amendment to RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS., (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft No. 
1, 2017) § 47 & cmt. g (current version at RLLI, supra note 4, at § 46) (seeking to delete 
Comment g to § 47, providing that known loss rules of the Section do not apply to claims-made 
policies); cf. RLLI, supra note 4, at § 46 (claims-made policy comment omitted). 
131 See STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 77, at § 14A.02. 
132 Id.  
133 Although NCOIL purports to be a “big tent” group of legislators interested in insurance 
policy, it also has elements of generally politically conservative state legislators with ties to the 
insurance industry and large corporations who have banded together to promote legislation 
favorable to insurers. See, e.g., Am. Prop. Cas. Ins. Ass’n, News Release: PCI Praises NCOIL 
Capital Standard Resolution (July 14, 2014), https://www.apci.org/media/news-
releases/release/38260/ [https://perma.cc/2KFX-94AU].  
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a press release after the Meeting taking credit for the Institute’s decision to defer a 
final vote on the RLLI to May 2018.134 Other elements of the insurance industry put 
the same spin on developments, as reflected in trade press coverage in the wake of the 
Annual Meeting.135 Like any good propaganda campaign, this public relations effort 
appeared to have considerable potential for “poisoning the well” by convincing 
insurance professionals that the RLLI is highly problematic.136 NCOIL and others 
 
134 See Press Release, Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators, NCOIL Pleased ALI Postponed 
Adoption of the Restatement (May 22, 2017) [hereinafter NCOIL Press Release], 
http://ncoil.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ali-statement-5-22-17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5UWD-EM4B] (“‘NCOIL legislators are pleased that the ALI heeded our 
advice” said [NCOIL CEO Tom] Considine. “We continue to call for an immediate dialogue 
with the ALI to ensure their restatements do not creep into the realm of legislative 
prerogative.’”).   
135 See, e.g., Andrew G. Simpson, Update: Insurers Sound Alarm Over Liability Law 
Restatement; Vote Delayed, INS. J. (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/05/22/451699.htm 
[https://perma.cc/247Q-JYFK] (quoting Tom Karol, general counsel for the National 
Association of Mutual Insurers (“NAMIC”); Tom Considine, CEO of NCOIL; and Stephen 
Zielenzienski, General Counsel and Senior Vice President of the American Insurance 
Association, all in opposition to the RLLI and pleased at the postponement but promising to 
continue to oppose the RLLI unless changed). In particular, these spokespersons continued to 
stress the insurance industry talking point that the RLLI was somehow at odds with prevailing 
contract law, statements made prior to subsequent revisions to the RLLI that resulted in current 
§ 3 stressing a “plain meaning” textual approach to insurance policy interpretation.  
136 For example, posted comments to the Simpson article suggested that readers were 
convinced that the RLLI and perhaps even the ALI were evil things. Once asked: 
Why would a committee of non elected individuals have this much power. [sic] Last 
I checked in a republic such as The USA there are 3 separate and distinct bodies who 
are to enact, enforce and adjudicate the laws. This group [ALI] is not of those 3.  
This smells like tyranny to me!!!!! 
mrbob, Comment to Simpson, supra note 135 (May 29, 2017, 10:18 AM), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/05/22/451699.htm?comments 
[https://perma.cc/2T95-8Rclear exmXY].  
Although ALI members would perhaps like to be this powerful, the statement is of course 
inaccurate but reflects the type of anti-ALI, anti-RLLI sentiment that insurers have been able to 
engender. In a similar vein, another commentator wrote: 
I’m not fond of some insurance companies and the way they pay claims, but these 
things would turn our industry on it’s head [sic]. Apparently, it would leave insurers 
with little defenses. How can you have no policy limits [sic]. What is this, 
Obamacare? How could you rate for this? Absurd! At the very least agents would 
have to become determiners of character of their clients and potential clients. Prices 
would jump through the roof. You would have far fewer insurers. Who are these guys 
[ALI] anyways? There [sic] acting like legislators. Not good. 
Lou, Comment to Simpson, supra note 135 (May 22, 2017, 4:48 PM). 
Reading these comments confirms that people believe what they hear or read from their 
business, political, social, vocational, or familial allies – and that this can give disinformation 
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affiliated with insurers took the position that they had achieved a great victory in 
avoiding final approval of the Restatement through their many attacks on it in the 
weeks and months before the May 2017 Annual Meeting.137 And there certainly were 
attacks on the RLLI both through the official channels of commentary and motions as 
well as in the trade press.  
As the May 2018 Annual Meeting approached, ALI Leadership seems solidly 
behind the project. So, too, did most ALI members without ties to the insurance 
industry. Policyholder counsel and consumer groups still appeared to support the 
RLLI, but with reduced enthusiasm in light of the most recent revisions tending to 
favor insurers. As previously discussed, the May 2017-April 2018 time period saw 
significant movement toward insurers regarding several Sections of the RLLI, which 
were revised to be more favorable to insurers. The Reporters and the Institute had 
during the June 2017-April 2018 period attempted to address insurer concerns found 
meritorious. But insurers – despite their victories of the past two years – continued to 
lobby for changes and even to scuttle the project. 
D. Continuing Assault on the RLLI by Insurer Interests Approaching the 
2018 Annual Meeting 
In the wake of the 2017 ALI Annual Meeting and approaching the May 2018 
Annual Meeting, insurers continued to flex political muscle. Perhaps the most 
dramatic example is the previously discussed gubernatorial letter described at the 
outset of this Article.138 The gubernatorial letter was part of comprehensive lobbying, 
that included letters to the Chief Justices of each U.S. state that sought their 
involvement in aiding insurers139 or opposing the RLLI as well as threats to 
legislatively “overrule” the RLLI before it could be used by courts.140 
 
or “fake news” quite a bit of power. Portions of the insurer-led public relations activity against 
the RLLI appear to be designed to have the effect of creating fear in some quarters that the RLLI 
is some sort of elitist hostile takeover of insurance law – or it at least appears to be having that 
effect on some of the insurance public. 
137 See NCOIL Press Release, supra note 134 (quoting NCOIL CEO Thomas B. Considine) 
(“NCOIL legislators are pleased that the ALI heeded our advice . . . . We continue to call for an 
immediate dialogue with the ALI to ensure their restatements to not creep into the realm of 
legislative prerogative.”). 
138 See Gubernatorial Letter, supra note 8; see also Letter from David F. Levi in Reply to the 
Governors (Apr. 26, 2018). 
139 See Press Release, NCOIL, NCOIL Writes to State Chief Judges Urging Action on ALI’s 
Proposed Liability Insurance Restatement from Thomas B. Considine, CEO, NCOIL to Thomas 
A. Balmer, Chief Justice, Or. Sup. Ct., at 1–3 (Feb. 27, 2018) (arguing that RLLI is 
impermissible intrusion on state legislative authority and urging lobbying against the RLLI). 
140 See Resolution Encouraging the American Law Institute to Materially Change the 
Proposed Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance, NCOIL (Jan. 5, 2018) [hereinafter 
Breslin & Seward Resolution], http://ncoil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ALI-Res-1-8-
18.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD8P-UCAY] (resolution sponsored by Sen. Neil Breslin (N.Y.) and 
Sen. James Seward (N.Y.)). This resolution takes the position that if the RLLI is not revised to 
accommodate NCOIL/insurance industry preferences: the RLLI 
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Second, insurers themselves weighed in, although through their attorneys in firms 
for which the insurers’ business was a significant portion of law firm revenue. Third, 
organizations that were not specifically composed of insurance companies, lobbied to 
change or block the RLLI. Perhaps the best example of this sort of anti-RLLI activist, 
which presents itself as an organization of concerned legislators but in reality operates 
much more like a front group supporting insurer interests was NCOIL, which 
consistently sided with insurers rather than policyholders, something that should seem 
odd if the organization were genuinely concerned with the public interest surrounding 
insurance rather than the fiscal health of insurance companies.141 
To be fair, in spite of NCOIL’s favoritism toward insurers regarding legal doctrine, 
it does consistently support an arguably non-partisan purpose: state regulation of 
insurance. Toward that end, NCOIL has predictably and consistently opposed 
 
should not be afforded recognition by the courts as an authoritative reference regarding 
established rules and principles of insurance law, as Restatements traditionally have been 
afforded; and 
. . . state legislators across the country [should] adopt declaring that this Restatement should 
not be afforded such recognition by courts . . . . 
Id. at 2;  accord NCOIL CEO Statement on ALI “Restatement” of Liability Insurance Law, 
NCOIL (May 25, 2018), http://ncoil.org/2018/05/25/ncoil-statement-on-ali-restatement-of-
liability-insurance-law/ [https://perma.cc/2RYR-DTDJ] (quoting NCOIL President, Sen. Jason 
Rapert (D - Ark) as stating “NCOIL will not allow the constitutionally protected legislative 
prerogatives in each state to be infringed upon by an unelected body.”); NCOIL Expresses 
Renewed Concerns About ALI Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance, NCOIL (Dec. 1, 
2017), http://ncoil.org/2017/12/12/4681/ [https://perma.cc/BX6J-MNYK] (reporting support 
for the Breslin & Seward Resolution, supra). 
141 Although NCOIL leadership is a mix of Republican and Democratic legislators, NCOIL’s 
policy slant is distinctly conservative and more in line with traditionally Republican resistance 
to regulation of business. For example, NCOIL has opposed the U.S. Department of Labor’s 
“fiduciary rule” concerning financial advisers, submitted amicus briefs advocating reduced or 
no insurer liability, exemption from state and local taxes for ride share companies such as Uber. 
Press Release, Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators, NCOIL Executive Committee Adopts Resolution 
Urging the ALI to Change Proposed Liability Insurance Restatement, 
http://ncoil.org/2018/01/10/ncoil-executive-committee-adopts-resolution-urging-the-ali-to-
change-proposed-liability-insurance-restatement/ [https://perma.cc/BQ4Y-BYZW]. 
In addition, NCOIL has not dealt with a seeming contradiction in that if one is “pro-business,” 
this does not necessarily mean favoring insurers. Frequently, the policyholders locked in 
litigation with their insurers are commercial entities, ranging from Fortune 100 corporations to 
“Mom and Pop” small businesses. 
In addition, the biographies of NCOIL activists reflect considerable political conservatism 
and ties to the insurance industry. Of the 81 NCOIL member legislators serving on Committees 
of the Organization, 62 are Republicans and 21 are Democrats. Twenty-three work in the 
insurance industry – by far the largest vocational category of the group. See Committee 
Memberships, NCOIL, http://ncoil.org/articles-of-organization-bylaws-revision/ 
[https://perma.cc/TK9S-LL3V] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021). 
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national, unitary, and federal regulation of insurance.142 But in an extension of this 
philosophy most reasonable American lawyers would regard as extreme, NCOIL 
argues that the RLLI (and by implication, any effort at national principles regarding 
insurance adjudication) constitutes an impermissible attack on state and legislative 
prerogatives.  
For example, in its communications directed at both the 2017 and 2018 ALI 
Annual Meetings, NCOIL argued that RLLI provisions regarding policy 
interpretation, consequences of breach of the duty to defend, unreasonable failure to 
settle, or fee-shifting  
represent clear examples of where the [RLLI March 2017] draft proposes 
significant changes to current law. Such matters are the primary prerogative 
of the legislative branch of government, which consists of publicly elected 
and accountable individual who must consider all relevant policy 
consideration such as the impact of proposed law changes on the availability 
and affordability of insurance.143 
Writing to Chief Justices, NCOIL stated that the RLLI “proposes to change basic 
and settled tenets of insurance law, including in ways that directly conflict with 
existing state statutory provisions.”144 Consequently, NCOIL sought “input as a State 
Judicial Presiding Jurist” in favor of restraining or revising sections of the RLLI with 
which NCOIL disagreed, specifically Sections 8, 27, 36, 48, 49(3), 51(1) as well as 
Sections 3, 13(3), and 19.145 As early as Spring 2017, NCOIL has been flexing its 
political muscle with the ALI, stating, for example, that:  
[S]hould the ALI refuse our invitation for a dialogue and proceed towards 
seeking approval of the proposed Restatement from ALI membership at its 
annual meeting, NCOIL will be forced to consider passing a Resolution that 
opposes the proposed Restatement as a misrepresentation of the law of 
liability insurance, and as a usurpation of lawmaking authority from State 
insurance legislators. NCOIL will circulate the Resolution to all State 
legislators. NCOIL will circulate the Resolution to all State legislative bodies 
and State regulators across the country to alert them of the problems 
 
142 NCOIL Ramps Up Opposition to Optional Federal Charter, NAT’L ASS’N OF PRO. INS. 
AGENTS (Jan. 18, 2006), http://m.pianet.com/issues-of-focus/modernization/2006/ncoil-ramps-
up-opposition-to-optional-federal-charter [https://perma.cc/KUL8-YN27]. 
143 See Letter from Thomas B. Considine, CEO, Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators, to Richard 
L. Revesz, Dir., ALI, and Stephanie Middleton, Deputy Dir., ALI, at 2 (May 5, 2017) 
[hereinafter Considine May 5 Letter to ALI] (on file with author). 
144 Press Release, NCOIL, NCOIL Writes to State Chief Judges Urging Action on ALI’s 
Proposed Liability Insurance Restatement (Feb. 27, 2018) [hereinafter NCOIL Press Release to 
State Chief Judges], http://ncoil.org/2018/02/28/ncoil-writes-to-state-chief-judges-urging-
action-on-alis-proposed-liability-insurance-restatement/ [https://perma.cc/7Z2L-XYEF] 
(attaching, as example of correspondence, Letter from Thomas B. Considine, CEO, NCOIL, to 
Hon. Thomas A. Balmer, C.J., Oregon Sup. Ct. (Feb. 27, 2018) as well as NCOIL Draft 
Resolution critical of RLLI). 
145 Id.  
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associated with the proposed Restatement and urge them to join in 
opposition.146 
As part of its campaign against the RLLI, NCOIL adopted a model “Resolution 
Encouraging the American Law Institute to Materially Change the Proposed 
Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance” that it has suggested be introduced in 
all state legislatures if NCOIL’s demands are not met by the ALI.147 The model 
resolution states that NCOIL urges the ALI to effect meaningful change to the 
proposed Restatement so that it is consistent with well-established insurance law and 
respectful of the role of state legislators in establishing insurance legal standards and 
practice; and: 
[S]hould such meaningful change not occur prior to its final approval, 
NCOIL urges that the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance should 
not be afforded recognition by courts as an authoritative reference regarding 
established rules and principles of insurance law, as Restatements 
traditionally have been afforded; and 
[Urging] state legislators across the country to adopt resolutions declaring 
that this Restatement should not be afforded such recognition by courts; and 
NCOIL shall develop and promulgate, as appropriate, model legislation 
intended to maintain the viability, predictability and optimal functionality of 
the insurance market and its practices.148 
The model resolution also expressed  
NCOIL’s concern that the Restatement does not afford proper respect to the 
expertise and jurisdiction of state insurance legislators and that the 
Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance should not be afforded 
recognition as an authoritative reference, shall be sent to state chief justices, 
state legislative leaders and members of the committees with jurisdiction 
over insurance public policy, as well as to all state insurance regulators.149 
An arguable fourth distinction between anti-RLLI lobbying and prior such efforts 
is that insurers appear not only to have themselves weighed in but to have leaned on 
their lawyers to oppose the RLLI or to seek pro-insurer changes.150 The large number 
 
146 See Considine May 5 Letter to ALI, supra note 143, at 4. 
147 See NCOIL Press Release to State Chief Judges, supra note 144. 
148 Id. 
149 Id.  
150 The closest parallel is attorney activity surrounding the ALI Principles of Corporate 
Governance Project. Even though that was a “Principles” project rather than a “Restatement,” 
many corporation leaders were opposed to aspects of the projects viewed as according 
shareholders and other constituencies (e.g., governments, employees) too much power relative 
to corporate management. When Corporate Governance was being debated at the several ALI 
meetings in which it was on the agenda, the number of Institute members on the floor surged. 
After the debate and voting on the Project, many of the attorneys left. It was, as one ALI insider 
put it to me at the time, as if the attorneys (many from large, prestigious law firms) “took the 
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of submissions making the same “talking points” against the same RLLI provisions – 
including the veritable “dead give-away” of so many submissions quoting Justice 
Scalia’s criticism of Restatements in a single concurring opinion151 – supports the 
inference of a coordinated lobbying effort rather than a serendipitous organic uprising 
by concerned attorneys.  
It is unlikely that attorneys became this organized due to personal ideological 
commitment. The more likely scenario is that insurers and interest groups got 
organized and brought counsel along. To the extent that this took place, it should be 
disturbing not only to the Institute but to the entire American legal profession, which 
prides itself on its commitment to independent thinking and ability to support the 
public good when not zealously advocating for clients. A core premise of 
organizations like the ALI is that decisions will be made based on independent 
collective judgment of the Institute’s membership regarding the merits of issues under 
consideration rather than based on pressure from outside interests. 
Although there is of course some room for debate, many of the arguments against 
sections of the RLLI disliked by insurers have bordered on the disingenuous, and 
sometimes crossed the line. This appears to be the opinion held by insurance experts 
in the legal academy. The nation’s insurance law professors have supported the RLLI 
project with virtual unanimity.152 Although this group may not agree regarding every 
provision of the RLLI, all appear to support the project as a whole and none have 
publicly supported insurer-led criticisms.  
With one exception, I am not aware of any full-time law professor teaching 
insurance law who opposes the RLLI or agrees with insurer critique in any significant 
way. This is a telling, perhaps even conclusive piece of evidence. If the RLLI were as 
bad as purported by insurers, one would expect a significant proportion of the 
professoriate to agree.153 But this has not occurred. Essentially, no one in the legal 
academy agrees with the broad insurer critique alleging that the RLLI is radical, 
 
shuttle down to Washington just to vote for corporate management and then took the first shuttle 
back after the vote.” This was a widespread perception of many in the ALI that reportedly led 
to the Institute being more interested in diversifying its membership so that “Wall Street 
lawyers” would have reduced power as a voting bloc. 
151 See supra note 43, discussing Scalia concurrence in Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 
475 (2015), which has been frequently cited in the submissions of RLLI opponents. 
152 In addition to top scholars at the pinnacle of the project (Virginia Law professor Kenneth 
Abraham and Reporters Tom Baker (Penn) and Kyle Logue (Michigan), several prominent U.S. 
insurance law professors (Michelle Boardman (George Mason); Robert H. Jerry, II (Florida); 
Leo Martinez (California-Hastings); Adam Scales (Rutgers); Daniel Schwarcz (Minnesota); 
Jeffrey Thomas (University of Missouri-Kansas City)) were Advisers to the project, as was 
Cambridge University Professor Malcolm Clarke, perhaps England’s most prominent authority 
on insurance contracts. In addition, the MCG included law professors Jo Carrillo (California-
Hastings), Jay Feinman (Rutgers), Jill Fisch (Penn); Larry Garvin (Ohio State), Michael Green 
(Wake Forest), Peter Kochenburger (Connecticut), Anthony Sebok (Cardozo), S.I. Strong 
(Missouri), and Jennifer Wriggins (Maine).  
153 To be sure, there is always the chance that I am unaware of some critics. But because I 
regularly review legal literature and news about insurance, I can say it is highly unlikely that 
any full-time law professor has submitted anti-RLLI comments to the ALI. 
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lawless, or lopsidedly pro-policyholder.154 To be sure, there are select aspects with 
which some full-time law professors disagree,155 but this is a far cry from the 
sweeping, overblown opposition to the RLLI express by insurers and their allies.  
The one exception is George Priest of Yale Law. Priest is a prominent figure in 
American law and has been for 40 years, beginning with an early and much cited 
article regarding the economics of litigation.156 He has taught and written about 
insurance, including a particularly good article,157 albeit one now 35 years old. He is 
primarily known as a law and economics expert but frequently appears as an expert 
witness for insurers in coverage disputes and has done so for 20 years or more. He has 
 
154 A sustained scholarly discussion of the RLLI has taken place in the context of a 
symposium devoted to the project. See generally Symposium, The Restatement of the Law of 
Liability Insurance as a Restatement: An Introduction to the Issue, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1 
(2015). The issue contained a range of articles, some critical of portions of the RLLI or arguably 
even the RLLI as a whole. But all of the anti-RLLI articles were authored not by full-time law 
professors but by lawyers who regularly represent insurers. See, e.g., Laura A. Foggan & Karen 
L. Toto, The Draft ALI Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance: Consequences of the 
Breach of the Duty to Defend Are Not and Should Not Become the Automatic Forfeiture of 
Coverage Defenses, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 65 (2015); Kim V. Marrkand, Duty to Settle: Why 
Proposed Sections 24 and 27 Have No Place in a Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance, 
68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 201 (2015); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Encouraging 
Constructive Conduct by Policyholders in the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance, 68 
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 455 (2015). 
155 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, An Analytic “Gap”: The Perils of Robotic Enforcement of 
Payment-by-Underlying-Insurer-Only Language in Excess Insurance Policies, 52 TORT, TRIAL 
& INS. L.J. 807, 807–08 (2017); Charles Silver & William T. Barker, The Treatment of Insurers’ 
Defense-Related Responsibilities in the Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance: A Critique, 
68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 83, 83–84 (2015) (full-time law professor and prominent insurer counsel 
level discrete criticisms at settlement provisions of RLLI); George M. Cohen, Liability of 
Insurers for Defense Counsel Malpractice, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 119, 119 (2015) (full-time 
law professor taking issue with some aspects of RLLI section expanding insurer responsibility 
for attorney error); Leo P. Martinez, The Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance and the 
Duty to Settle, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 155, 155 (2015) (full-time law professor questioning 
aspects of RLLI provision on insurer’s duty to make reasonable settlement decisions); Jeffrey 
E. Thomas, The Standard for Breach of a Liability Insurer’s Duty to Make Reasonable 
Settlement Decisions: Exploring the Alternatives, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 229, 229–30 (2015) 
(same); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, The Liability Insurer’s Duty to Settle Uncertain and 
Mixed Claims, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 337, 337–38 (2015) (backing the RLLI approach to 
insurer settlement duties); Mark A. Geistfield, Interpreting the Rules of Insurance Contract 
Interpretation, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 371, 371–72 (2015) (backing RLLI approach to 
insurance policy construction); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Enhancing the Socially Instrumental Role 
of Insurance: The Emerging Opportunity Presented by Treatment of Breach of the Duty to 
Defend, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 587, 587 (2015) (praising prior RLLI draft providing that insurer 
in breach of duty to defend could not contest coverage, a provision subsequently withdrawn in 
response to insurer protest). 
156 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEG. STUD. 1, 4 (1984). 
157 See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1521 (1986). 
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been highly critical of the RLLI.158 Despite Priest’s prestige and pedigree, his article 
is beyond unconvincing in its criticisms. 
The Priest article attacking the RLLI prompted a response from RLLI Reporters 
Baker and Logue that rather thoroughly eviscerates all of Priest criticisms.159 A full 
discussion of the Priest criticisms and the Baker/Logue response, like a full analysis 
of the substance of the RLLI, is beyond the scope of this Article. But to my reading, 
the Baker/Logue response is devastating to Priest’s anti-RLLI arguments. As Baker 
and Logue summarize, Priest  
claims that the Restatement will undermine the stability of insurance markets. 
The basic structure of his argument can be summarized as follows: 
(1) In drafting the Restatement, Baker and Logue have chosen many new 
rules that radically depart from existing case law. 
(2) These radical new rules have a clear “pro-policyholder” bias, a bias that 
is misguided because it is premised on mistaken assumptions about how 
insurance markets work and fails to take into account well-known principles 
of the “economics of insurance.” 
(3) The radical pro-policyholder rules that Baker and Logue have proposed 
will harm policyholders by causing liability insurance premiums to skyrocket 
and the availability of coverage to evaporate, harming all policyholders but 
especially the poor.160 
Baker and Logue then summarize their seriatim responses to Priest as follows: 
(1) All of the rules adopted by the Restatement are grounded in existing case 
law. In that sense, none of them are new, and certainly none are radical. Most 
of the rules in the Restatement have in fact been adopted by a majority of the 
U.S. jurisdictions that have considered them. The Restatement follows a 
minority rule in only a few instances and only when the minority rule is better 
reasoned and will likely lead to better consequences than the alternatives. 
This is a common practice among ALI Restatement projects. 
(2) Like the law on which it is based, the Restatement is not premised on 
mistaken assumptions about how insurance markets work; nor does it fail to 
take account of basic principles of insurance economics. Instead, it is Priest 
who either misunderstands or intentionally ignores basic facts about 
insurance markets. Specifically, Priest ignores the insights, accumulated over 
many decades now by psychologists and empirical economists, regarding 
 
158 See George L. Priest, A Principled Approach Toward Insurance Law: The Economics of 
Insurance and the Current Restatement Project, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 635, 636–37 (2017). 
159 See Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue, In Defense of the Restatement of Liability Insurance 
Law, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767, 768 (2017) (responding to Priest’s “aggressive and 
somewhat meandering attack” on the RLLI; finding many of Priest’s assertions to be 
“groundless and unsubstantiated”). 
160 Id. at 768. 
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how people actually behave, facts that are contrary to the largely discredited 
perfectly-rational-actor model on which Priest’s arguments are premised. 
(3) Therefore, expanding the geographical application of the rules that the 
Restatement follows, thereby creates greater national uniformity in liability 
insurance law, and supports, not disrupts, insurance markets. 
(4) Finally, Priest provides no evidence to the contrary. Because all these 
rules, or some variant of them (in some cases, a more pro-policyholder 
alternative rule), have been adopted in some jurisdiction in this country, if 
those rules were disruptive to the market, there should be evidence of that 
fact in those jurisdictions. So far as we know, there is no such evidence.161 
 
161 Id. at 768–69. Baker and Logue then support their critique in the remainder of the article 
by citing to case law in many jurisdictions following the RLLI approach, demonstrating both 
that the RLLI for the most part follows majority rules and that in cases where the more pro-
policyholder approaches disliked by Priest hold sway, insurance markets appear to continue to 
function well. See id. at 778–96. This latter fact demonstrates the ridiculousness of the “sky is 
falling” arguments made by critics of the RLLI, an argument made particularly aggressively by 
insurers regarding the pre-2018 RLLI draft regarding contract construction, a draft that 
essentially adopted California law, the law of a state that has a thriving insurance market. See 
2019 CA Property & Casualty Market Share, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., 
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/120-company/04-mrktshare/2019/ 
[https://perma.cc/78YD-SFTJ] (reflecting more than $78 billion in written premium 2019 for 
six lines of insurance and $75 billion in 2018 with respective loss ratios of 71.5 percent and 
52.73 percent. These are excellent loss ratios indicating substantial profitability in that any loss 
ratio of less than one reflects underwriting profit without consideration of investment income 
(albeit without consideration of administrative overhead as well. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, ERIK 
S. KNUTSEN & PETER N. SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 88–90 (5th ed. 2020) 
(explaining loss ratio and insurer business operations). 
This is not to say that insurers, like many businesses, would not rather be subject to the more 
company-friendly law of New York. See Geoffrey Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on 
Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1478 (2010) (arguing that greater prevalence of 
New York choice of law clause demonstrates businesses regard it as superior body of law). But 
despite greater policyholder/consumer protections in California law and its greater receptivity 
to extrinsic and contextual evidence, California remains a state where insurers want to do 
business, profit, and win more than a few coverage disputes. See Jeffrey W. Stempel & Erik S. 
Knutsen, Rejecting Word Worship: The Integrative Approach to Insurance Policy Construction 
(May 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing California approach to 
contract construction and finding it not to be adverse to enforcement of bargains and efficient 
operation of insurance and other commercial markets). 
Baker and Logue’s point No. (3) above is particularly well taken and refutes not only Priest 
but also groups like NCOIL that essentially are arguing that it would be a bad thing to have a 
Restatement that attempts to collect and synthesize the nation’s law of insurance or that this 
would be an undue attempt to impose national legislation on a traditionally state-centered area 
of law. As discussed supra, the argument is weak to the point of being frivolous. See supra 
notes 8–20, 89–105 and accompanying text. Restatements have addressed traditionally state-
centered bodies of law such as Contracts, Torts, and Property for decades and this has hardly 
displaced state lawmaking prerogative, by both common law courts and state legislatures.  
To the contrary, the Restatements, even when not adopted by courts, appear without question 
to have improved the analysis and jurisprudence surrounding these areas of law. The RLLI is 
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Even if a neutral reader is not fully convinced by every aspect of the Baker/Logue 
article, it nonetheless demonstrates (at least to the fair-minded) that the RLLI cannot 
be as bad as Priest – and his insurance industry funders – contend. Add to this that 
Priest appears to stand alone among the professoriate and it becomes hard to regard 
the insurer attack – particularly its ferocity – as well-grounded in case law or the actual 
operation of insurance litigation.162 
The insurer attacks on the RLLI also reflect an ongoing hypocrisy in much of the 
insurer opposition: insurers complain that select pro-policyholder portions of the RLLI 
are illegitimated because they do not follow the majority of judicial decisions; but 
insurers simultaneously attempt to achieve pro-insurer provisions that are not the 
majority rule. 
An example is RLLI Section 24, which essentially says that if an insurer rejects a 
reasonable settlement offer and the policyholder is then hit with a judgment in excess 
of policy limits, the insurer is liable to the policyholder for the entire judgment because 
its failure to settle caused the policyholder to become subject to this excess liability. 
The Section, entitled (one would think non-controversially) “The Insurer’s Duty to 
Make Reasonable Settlement Decisions” provides: 
(1) When an insurer has the authority to settle a legal action brought against 
the insured, or the insurer’s prior consent is required for any settlement by 
the insured to be payable by the insurer, and there is a potential for a judgment 
in excess of the applicable policy limit, the insurer has a duty to the insured 
to make reasonable settlement decisions. 
 
likely to have that effect as well. In addition, its extensive Reporters’ Notes to the 50-section, 
464-page document not only serves as a valuable research resource for attorneys and judges but 
also collects case law refuting the Priest/insurance industry contention that the RLLI provisions 
are new, “radical,” unduly pro-policyholder, out of the mainstream, or lacking in judicial 
support. See generally RLLI, supra note 4. 
162 See Baker & Logue, supra note 159, at 768 (Priest’s attack “goes on at length about basic 
principles of insurance economics that anyone who took microeconomics in college will 
remember, thereby not-so-subtly seeking to create the (erroneous) impression that the 
Restatement is somehow inconsistent with, and written in ignorance of, those economic 
principles”). 
Regarding case law and the Restatement, treatises appear to be in accord with the 
Baker/Logue contention that the RLLI largely follow the majority rule. For example, MANILOFF 
& STEMPEL, supra note 77, contains 10 chapters surveying state-to-state law on issues addressed 
the RLLI and finds the RLLI in accord with the majority rule on all of them: Late Notice 
(Chapter 3); Duty to Defend (Chapter 5); Policyholder Right to Independent Counsel (Chapter 
6); Insurer Right to Reimbursement of Defense Costs for defending uncovered claims (Chapter 
7); Policyholder Right to Counsel Fees (Chapter 8) (at least in the April 2017 Proposed Final 
Draft; earlier versions of the RLLI provided policyholders with additional opportunity for fee 
shifting); Number of Occurrences (Chapter 9); Trigger-of-Coverage for Latent Injury and 
Damage Claims (Chapter 16); Allocation of Latent Injury and Damage Claims (Chapter 18); 
Insurability of Punitive Damages (Chapter 20); Bad Faith Standards (Chapter 21) and 
consideration of policyholder Reasonable Expectations (Chapter 22). See also id. at ch. 22 
(providing general overview of RLLI). 
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(2) A reasonable settlement decision is one that would be made by a 
reasonable insurer that bears the sole financial responsibility for the full 
amount of the potential judgment. 
(3) An insurer’s duty to make reasonable settlement decisions includes the 
duty to make its policy limits available to the insured for the settlement of a 
covered legal action that exceeds those policy limits if a reasonable insurer 
would do so in the circumstances.163 
Insurers have complained that § 24(2) is unfair to insurers and argue that insurers 
should be liable for the excess judgment only if the decision to reject the offer was 
unreasonable – and then argue that such rejection can be reasonable, even when a 
claimant’s damages dwarf policy limits, if there was a nontrivial chance of avoiding 
liability for those policy-dwarfing damages.164 This insurer argument is staggering in 
its bold incorrectness. 
First, underscoring the hypocrisy of the insurers, § 24(2) states the majority rule. 
Nearly every state applies the “excess judgment” measure of damages,165 and the 
approach has been widely (really universally) supported by commentators. One might 
rhetorically ask how insurers can argue that the RLLI must follow the majority judicial 
 
163 See RLLI, supra note 4. 
164 See, e.g., Letter from Laura A. Foggan to ALI Reporters (Mar. 24, 2018) (concerning § 
24) (on file with author).  
Typical of attacks, which display both a misunderstanding of the insurer’s duties and hysteria 
about the potential impact of the section is A. Hugh Scott, Why Criticisms of ALI’s Insurance 
Restatement is Valid, supra note 104: 
The policy limits are one of the fundamental elements of the insurance bargain. A 
policyholder pays a set premium for the insurer to assume a specified amount of risk 
– defined as the policy limits. [The RLLI] would strip the insurer of its policy limits 
if a jury, after the fact, were to decide that the insurer had unreasonably rejected a 
settlement offer. . . . 
[The RLLI will likely] increase as insurers either pay inflated settlement demands or 
settle cases where they perceive any risk that a jury might second-guess them about 
the reasonableness of the demand. 
This insurer argument – that it leaves the “poor” insurer vulnerable to 20-20 hindsight – has 
been made for decades. And courts have for the most part rejected it for decades in adopting a 
view in accord with the RLLI. The insurer argument falters on a key point in that it seeks to 
place all risk of an erroneous failure to settle on the policyholder and none on the insurer by 
limiting insurer liability for insurer errors but not policyholder liability for insurer errors. 
165 See, e.g., McNally v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying 
Delaware law and finding insurer’s failure to accept a settlement offer at or below policy limits 
makes insurer responsible for paying full amount of judgment, including that exceeding policy 
limits, so that policyholder will not be injured by insurer’s failure to accept reasonable 
settlement demands); Whitney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 258 P.3d 113, 117 (Alaska 
2011) (finding the same); Hamilton v. Md. Cas. Co., 41 P.3d 128, 132 (Cal. 2002) (finding the 
same); Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. 1994) (finding the 
same). 
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rule on pro-insurer issues but then be free to reject it in areas where the caselaw clearly 
favors policyholders. 
Second, the rule sought by insurers would unreasonably encourage insurers to 
gamble with the fate of their policyholders. Consider an automobile accident where 
there is some question as to fault of the defendant driver, but the plaintiff teenager hit 
by the defendant driver has been rendered quadriplegic and suffers catastrophic brain 
injury as well. If prevailing on the liability question, plaintiff’s damages will be 
millions of dollars. The automobile liability policy limit is $100,000 and plaintiff 
demands that amount, reasoning that the defendant has few assets. The insurer refuses 
to settle, wanting to test its view that the severely injured plaintiff was more at fault 
and that a defense verdict can be obtained from the jury, which will be viewing a 
severely injured plaintiff in the courtroom for the entire week of trial. Unsurprisingly, 
the jury renders a plaintiff’s verdict and finds damages of $10 million, perhaps more. 
Pursuant to the approach of RLLI § 24(2), the insurer is responsible for this entire 
verdict because the insurer failed to accept a reasonable settlement offer. A defendant 
bearing full financial responsibility in a multi-million-dollar case if found liable would 
never, even if convinced of lack of fault, flatly turn down a $100,000 settlement 
opportunity with no counter-offer simply to test its view that it was not sufficiently at 
fault. An uninsured defendant, even one with considerable wealth, might grumble but 
would never take the risk.  
The reasoning underlying many of the pro-insurer comments has also been weak, 
perhaps surprisingly so in view of the quality of counsel making submissions, perhaps 
proving that even good lawyers are limited by bad facts and circumstances. In 
opposing portions of the RLLI, critics have been more than a little shrill. Examples 
include: suggesting that adoption of the RLLI would destroy the predictability of 
contract law (e.g., various attorney, corporate, and trade group submissions); cause 
economic harm (e.g., the Governors’ Letter, NCOIL, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce); routinely impose extra-contractual liability on insurers (e.g., various 
attorney submissions); improperly invade state prerogatives in a federal system (e.g., 
NCOIL; Dinallo/Slattery/Debevoise submission), and invade the legislative function 
(e.g., NCOIL). A full analysis of all of these sky-is-falling arguments cannot be 
contained in a single law review article. But the examples noted above are enough to 
give the reader a flavor of the insurer criticism out of all proportion to the actual 
content of the RLLI.  
A striking aspect of much of the RLLI criticism is the relative disregard for 
separation of powers and the judicial function shown by critics. Critics naturally fear 
that provisions with which they disagree in a Restatement could become influential. 
But RLLI critics talk as though the RLLI would rigidly govern judicial decisions or 
that judges would blindly defer to the RLLI. In reality, although Restatements have 
been influential, they have often not been adopted by courts. As is noted in the RLLI 
itself, the “contextual” approach to document interpretation favored by the ALI’s 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts has been embraced by less than half the states. 
Judges have a rather consistent habit of making up their own minds and are unlikely 
to follow a RLLI provision unless persuaded by it. 
In that sense, critics of the RLLI tend to misstate the nature of soft law. By its very 
essence, soft law attempts to provide a guiding code or model or doctrine, something 
that will be seen as useful and therefore adopted (e.g., in choice of law clauses) or 
applied (as a source of analysis for disputes before a tribunal). But as the name implies 
“soft” law is not coercive. Individual courts or judicial systems follow soft law only if 
persuaded.  
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For that reason, critiques like that of NCOIL are overstated to the point of 
absurdity. What is coercive, however, is the type of response advocated by NCOIL – 
a law or legislative resolution forbidding or discouraging use of Restatements. If the 
RLLI is as bad as asserted by critics, one would expect the RLLI to have only minimal 
following. Why then, one may ask, are groups like NCOIL entertaining coercive 
action against soft law that is supposedly so bad that no one would follow it? 
Answering the question requires one to at least consider the depressing possibility that 
NCOIL – a supposedly neutral organization that operates more in the nature of a 
mouthpiece for the insurance industry – recognizes that the RLLI is persuasive and 
therefore must be throttled by insurers seeking to profit from the application of inferior 
insurance doctrine. 
During the 2017–2018 review and revision period, insurer advocates were not 
quiet. In addition to comments directly from the industry or trade groups166 and 
 
166 See, e.g., Letter from Harold Kim, Exec. Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Com. Inst. for 
Legal Reform, to ALI Council (Apr. 6, 2018) (on file with author) (criticizing Sections 3, 4, and 
12); Letters from Thomas B. Considine, CEO, NCOIL, to David F. Levi & Robert Cooper 
Ramo, ALI (Dec. 12 & Nov. 28, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from J. Stephen 
Zielenzienski, Am. Ins. Ass’n, and Tom Karol, Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., to David F. Levi, 
ALI (Sept. 2017) (on file with author) (criticizing August 2017 RLLI Draft as not having moved 
sufficiently in the direction of insurers in the wake of May 2017 Annual Meeting; accusing 
RLLI Section 12 of “eviscerating” attorney rules of professional conduct, creating a “judicial 
watchdog” over the insurance industry, and creating new remedies for breach of contract); see 
also Letter from Carmelo A. Puglisi, Assoc. Gen. Couns., Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. to Richard 
Revesz, Dir., ALI, and Stephanie Middleton, Deputy Dir., ALI (May 20, 2017) (on file with 
author); Letter from Thomas D. Hughes, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Couns., Greater New 
York Mut. Ins. Co., to Richard Revesz, Dir., ALI (May 19, 2017) (on file with author); Letter 
from J. Stephen Zielezienski, Senior Vice President & Gen. Couns., Am. Ins. Assoc., and 
Thomas Karol, Gen. Couns., Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., to Richard Revesz, Dir., ALI (Jan. 
31, 2014) (on file with author) (attacking RLLI generally, contending that it adopts position 
without case law support and that Reporters have been dismissive of insurer criticisms); Letter 
from John E. Cuttino, President, Def. Res. Inst., to Richard Revesz, Dir., ALI (May 5, 2017) 
(on file with author) (attacking RLLI provisions on insurer liability for negligence of insurer-
selected and directed counsel and fee-shifting as well as arguing ALI unsupported by existing 
law); Letter from Randy Cigelnik, Senior Vice President, Corp. Sec’y & Gen. Couns., Prop. 
Cas. Ins., Ass’n of Am., to Richard Revesz, Dir., ALI (May 1, 2017) (on file with author) 
(criticizing RLLI and concurring in commentary of AIA Attorney and Representative Laura 
Foggan (“The Reporter’s opinion of ‘better’ outcomes does not necessarily result in rules that 
align with the risks that insurers have agreed to undertake based on actuarially sound 
underwriting.”). 
Also on the eve of the 2017 Annual Meeting there was a comment by a broker (Guy Carpenter, 
Senior Vice-President Malcolm Rowland) criticizing the RLLI for containing “material 
deficiencies and adoptions of minority positions that will cause confusion in the courts and 
increase uncertainty and litigation, in contravention of the goals and purpose of the ALI” but 
containing no specifics. See Letter from Malcolm Rowland to ALI (undated) (received May 
2017) (on file with author). Mr. Rowland also suggests (quite amazingly in light of the then 
seven-year history of the project) that the RLLI was being “brought hurriedly” before the ALI 
and that “opinions of all experts in this field need to be heard and considered prior to adoption.”  
Id. at 1.  
The Rowland submission is more than a little surprising. First, the conventional wisdom is 
that brokers align with policyholders on insurance matters. Apparently not. And that 
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corporate America,167 there was a continued stream of commentary criticizing aspects 
of the RLLI deemed too favorable to policyholders to come from insurer attorneys168 
 
conventional wisdom was probably always overstated in view of the fact that many brokers 
receive a substantial amount of their income in the form of commissions from insurers as a 
reward for placing their policies with the brokers’ clients (or supposed clients). Second, the 
Rowland submission ignores that that the RLLI emerged from a process in which drafts were 
reviewed by a balanced group of Advisers and an Members Consultative Group (“MCG”) that 
was if anything weighted toward insurers. 
167 See, e.g., Letter from Harold Kim, Exec. Vice President, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal 
Reform, to ALI (Jan. 5, 2018) (on file with author) (criticizing Sections 3, 12, 18, 47, 48, and 
50 of December 2017 RLLI Draft); Letter from General Counsel, TAMKO Building Products, 
Inc., ConocoPhillips, Brunswick Corp., Eli Lilly & Co., Novartis Corp., RMP Int’l Inc., Shell 
Oil Co., GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, to David F. Levi, President-Designate, ALI 
(May 19, 2017) (on file with author) (attacking RLLI as excessively pro-consumer and 
insufficiently supported in case law but not citing cases; also opposing fee-shifting to 
policyholders “[a]lthough we . . . might benefit from such a provision in our capacity as 
corporate policyholders” as it is not “inherently an insurance law issue.”). 
168 See, e.g., Letter from Laura A. Foggan, Crowell & Moring, to Thomas E. Baker and Kyle 
D. Logue, ALI, (Apr. 25, 2018) (on file with author) (listing complaints about sections or 
subsections of the Proposed Final Draft RLLI); Letter from David W. Rivkin, Debevoise, to 
Richard Revesz, Dir., ALI, and Stephanie Middleton, Deputy Dir., ALI (Apr. 9, 2018) (on file 
with author) (seeking further narrowing of potential insurer liability for attorney error in Section 
12 and noting that only one state requires attorneys to carry professional liability insurance; 
arguing from this that insurer selection of counsel without adequate such insurance should not 
result in insurer liability if counsel is negligent); Letter from Peter Solmssen to Tom Baker and 
Kyle Logue, Reporters, ALI (Apr. 7, 2018) (on file with author); Letter from Jackson & 
Campbell (multiple signatories) to Tom Baker & Kyle Logue, Reporters, ALI (Apr. 6, 2018) 
(on file with author); Letter from Laura A. Foggan, Crowell & Moring, to Tom Baker & Kyle 
Logue, Reporters, ALI (Apr. 4, 2018) (on file with author) (proposing revisions of RLLI 
Sections 3, 4, & 12); Letter from Michael Alyward & Morrison Mahoney to Tom Baker & Kyle 
Logue, Reporters, ALI (Apr. 6, 2018) (on file with author) (suggesting revision of commentary 
regarding RLLI contract construction); Memorandum from William T. Barker, Dentons, to Tom 
Baker & Kyle Logue, Reporters, ALI; Letter from Thomas F. Segall to Tom Baker & Kyle 
Logue, Reporters, ALI (Jan 13, 2018) (on file with author) (criticizing December 2017 Council 
Draft provisions on fee shifting); Letter from Malcolm E. Wheeler, Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell, 
to Tom Baker & Kyle Logue, Reporters, ALI (Jan. 6, 2018) (on file with author) (criticizing 
settlement provisions of December 2017 RLLI); Letter from Peter Solmssen to ALI Council 
(Jan. 4, 2018) (on file with author) (co-signed by 20 lawyers form firms generally representing 
insurers and in-house counsel for State Farm Insurance and Liberty Mutual Insurance); Letter 
from Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher Appel, Shook Hardy, to Tom Baker & Kyle Logue, 
Reporters, ALI (Dec. 29, 2017) (on file with author) (taking issue with RLLI position on fee 
shifting); Letter from John E. Cuttino, President, Def. Res. Inst., to Richard Revesz, ALI (Oct. 
6, 2017) (on file with author) (attacking August 20917 RLLI Draft provisions regarding contract 
construction, insurer liability for errors of counsel); Letter from Malcolm E. Wheeler, Wheeler 
Trigg O’Donnell, to Tom Baker & Kyle Logue, Reporters, ALI (Sept. 11, 2017) (on file with 
author) (urging revisions of §§ 25 & 35 regarding settlement to strengthen insurer prerogatives); 
Letter from Jackson & Campbell Law Firm to Tom Baker & Kyle Logue, Reporters, ALI (Aug. 
31, 2017) (on file with author) (criticizing RLLI settlement provisions); Letter from Laura 
Foggan, Alliance of Am. Insurers, to Tom Baker & Kyle Logue, Reporters, ALI (July 11, 2017) 
(on file with author) (criticizing RLLI); Letter from Malcolm E. Wheeler, Wheeler Trigg 
O’Donnell, LLP., to Tom Baker & Kyle Logue, Reporters, ALI (June 19, 2017) (on file with 
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(and one letter submitted on behalf of the plaintiff/policyholder aligned America 
Association for Justice (“AAJ”).169 To the extent this represented the actual personal 
views of the commentators, this is advocacy consistent with the ALI’s “check your 
clients at the door” ethical standard.170 But the frequency with which some insurer 
 
author) (criticizing RLLI provisions regarding settlement without insurer consent); Letter from 
Kim V. Marrkand, Mintz Levin, to Tom Baker & Kyle Logue, Reporters, ALI (June 14, 2017 
(on file with author) (criticizing RLLI sections regarding misrepresentation); see also A. Hugh 
Scott, Why Criticisms of ALI’s Insurance Restatement is Valid, supra note 104 (insurer attorney 
from prominent Boston firm attacking what is now Section 24 (and other provisions of the 
RLLI) on the eve of the 2017 Annual Meeting); Letters from Kim V. Marrkand, Mintz Levin, 
to ALI (June 28, July 14, Aug. 4, Oct. 16, Oct. 20, Dec. 27, 2017) (all on file with author); 
Letters of Memoranda from Laura Foggan, All. of Am. Insurers, to ALI (July 19, Aug. 28, Sept. 
26, Nov. 12, Nov. 13, Dec. 21, Dec. 28, Dec. 29, 2017) (all on file with author); Letters from 
Jackson & Campbell Law Firm to ALI (Aug. 31, Sept. 1, Sept. 6, Dec. 29, 2017) (all on file 
with author); Memoranda from William Barker to ALI (Fall 2017, Dec. 22, 2017, Apr. 14, 2018) 
(all on file with author); Chart of State Law Regarding Attorney Fee Shifting from Victor Swartz 
& Christopher Appel to ALI (2018) (on file with author). 
I am not quite sure how to characterize the Letter from Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. 
Appel, Shook Hardy & Bacon, to Reporters Baker and Logue, ALI (June 28, 2017) (on file with 
author) (criticizing fee shifting provisions, since modified, in RLLI). The letter is offered in 
their capacity as attorney ALI members. But Mr. Schwartz is well known as a long-time 
representative of the American Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”) and the letter may have 
been the result of his retention by ATRA or another interest group.  
Another comment resisting characterization is that of California Superior Court Judge (and 
ALI Council Member) Carolyn Kuhl (Memorandum of January 9, 2018 to Reporters Baker & 
Logue) proposing changes to RLLI Section 12 regarding insurer liability for errors of defense 
counsel. It is not clear whether these comments – ultimately acted upon by the Council and 
incorporated into the April 2018 Proposed Final Draft – were made in her capacity as a Council 
Member, judge, or based on experience as an attorney (Munger Tolles & Olsen). 
169 See Letter from Jacob R. Cox, Chair, Am. Ass’n for Justice Ins. L. Section, to Tom Baker 
& Kyle Logue, RLLI Reporters, ALI (Mar. 14, 2018) (on file with author) (supporting RLLI 
provisions requiring insurers to make reasonable settlement decisions but criticizing RLLI for 
moving away from earlier rule stripping insurers of coverage defenses for breach of the duty to 
defend and failing to routinely require losing insurers to pay policyholder counsel fees). 
170 As examples, insurer attorneys William Barker (Denton’s) and Michael Aylward 
(Morrison Mahoney) frequently submitted comments. But both are also frequent contributors 
to the legal literature, with much of their writing predating the RLLI project. See, e.g., William 
Barker et al., Is an Insurer a Fiduciary to its Insureds?, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 1 (1982); Michael 
Aylward at al., Extra-Contractual Liability and the Restatement on Liability Insurance Law, 
AM. COLL. OF COVERAGE & EXTRACONTRACTUAL COUNS. 101–04 (on file with author). 
Consequently, I regard the Barker and Alyward submissions as falling within the ALI’s tradition 
of member commentary, although one could characterize their efforts as marketing even if they 
were unpaid. See also Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not Fiduciaries to Their 
Insureds, 88 KY. L.J. 1, 5 (1999) (adviser on RLLI project who represents brokers essentially 
agrees with Barker position on the issue). 
In addition, one cannot help but notice a difference in the thrust of attorney comments versus 
those of corporations and interest groups. Attorneys, for the most part, address their criticisms 
of the RLLI to the Reporters, which is the preferred process in that it provides the Reporters 
with the opportunity to consider making revisions in response to the comments (all written 
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counsel submitted comments suggests either that they were being compensated to 
lobby the Institute or that their law firms had made an institutional commitment to 
seeking revisions of the RLLI as part of law firm “client development” – attempting 
to win the favor of insurers in hopes that they would send more business to the firm 
or become clients of the firm.171  
To some extent, the aggressiveness of some insurer counsel or groups could be 
described as merely an extension of traditional advocacy by attorneys who cared 
deeply about jurisprudential issues. But even if this is assumed and attorney advocates 
were not billing insurer clients or marketing their services, the lobbying approaching 
the 2018 Annual Meeting was different in quality and kind from traditional ALI 
advocacy. 
The campaign against the RLLI involved considerable trade association advocacy 
that was different in kind and magnitude from the sort of doctrinal discussion that 
accompanies most Restatements. Organizations specifically of insurers or aligned 
with insurers as well as lawyers for these groups registered their objections to RLLI 
drafts and sought pro-insurer changes.172 This is different than hearing from members 
of the Institute who, through representation of insurers, were aware of industry 
concerns. Rather, it was industry trade organizations themselves that weighed in on 
the RLLI.  
In addition, commentary was directed not solely to the Reporters or to the ALI as 
a deliberative body but to ALI leadership in an attempt to induce the leadership to 
adopt positions that had been rejected by the Reporters after – and I cannot stress this 
enough – years of ongoing consultation with a balanced group of Advisers, a largely 
pro-insurer Members Consultative Group, the ALI Council, and the insurance and 
 
comments to the Reporters are also archived on the ALI website and are available for review 
by ALI leadership and members). Corporations and interest groups by contrast address their 
comments to the ALI leadership, particularly the President and Director. While this may reflect 
misunderstanding of the ALI process and a corporate penchant for top-down decision making, 
it in my view also reflects that these entities are less committed to the deliberative process and 
seek to bypass the expertise of the Reporters and Advisers in an effort to influence top 
management, perhaps coercively with threats regarding the influence of the ALI. It looks more 
like bare knuckles lobbying and less like a conversation on the merits regarding legal principles 
and doctrine. 
171 For example, American Insurance Association (“AIA”) liaison Laura Foggan, who 
frequently represented insurers in coverage disputes as well as before the ALI, submitted 
comments with such frequency and length that it seems impossible that she would have invested 
this amount of time in the absence of payment. Somewhat less active as a commentator was 
Boston attorney Kim Marrkand (Mintz, Cohen). Both submitted not only many comments but 
also comments of length and scope suggesting the help of associates, law clerks or legal 
assistants at their respective firms. At the very least, this seems like intensive marketing for 
insurer clients, which is something other than mere personal expression of views. And if they 
were billing insurer clients for their time, this is clearly inconsistent with the “leave your clients 
at the door” standard of independent deliberation. Regarding the propriety of counsel engaging 
in law reform activity on behalf of clients or for purposes of marketing and business 
development, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Legal Ethics and Law Reform Advocacy, 10 ST. MARY’S 
J. ON LEG. MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 244, 251 (2020).  
172 See, e.g., supra notes 127–34, describing comments submitted by insurer organizations. 
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legal community in general. In effect, the pro-insurer interest groups sought to defeat 
the RLLI as it would defeat legislation in the political arena – not only in committee 
and on the floor of the legislative body, even with floor amendments or riders to 
appropriates bills as well as seeking an executive veto – rather than being confined to 
making arguments on the merits in the normal course of the deliberative process. 
Also notable in addition to NCOIL’s clout (how many organizations can get six 
governors to sign a letter at their behest?) is NCOIL’s sense of entitlement. It expected 
the ALI to accord it the deference it apparently gets from state legislators and some 
governors. When the RLLI was not changed to its liking, NCOIL expressed pique that 
its concerns “have gone largely ignored”173 and stated:  
Should there not be meaningful change in the Proposed Restatement, NCOIL 
will be forced to oppose the proposed Restatement project as a 
misrepresentation of the law of liability insurance and as a usurpation of 
lawmaking authority form State insurance legislators.174 
E. The “Final” RLLI Emerging From the 2018 Annual Meeting 
In spite of the sustained criticism from insurers and allies, the RLLI was adopted 
by the ALI at its 2018 Annual Meeting by an overwhelmingly positive vote.175 Given 
that the Institute was concerned enough in May 2017 to postpone final adoption of the 
RLLI, the ease of adoption in May 2018 came as a surprise to many. It was almost 
eerily without bellicosity in light of the strong lobbying that preceded the Meeting.  
As was the case with earlier meetings, insurers or insurer counsel brought the bulk 
of the written motions submitted. Only one motion was submitted by policyholder 
counsel seeking a clarification of the circumstances in which an insurer might rescind 
a policy due to failure to disclose a known loss.176 It passed by a roughly 9:1 ratio. 
In response to one of the motions made by prominent insurer counsel, the 
Reporters were persuaded to increase the requirements of disclosure to insurers if a 
 
173 See Letter from Thomas B. Considine, CEO, NCOIL, to David F. Levi, President, ALI 
(Dec. 12, 2017) (on file with author). 
174 See Letter from Thomas B. Considine, CEO, NCOIL, to David F. Levi & Roberta Cooper 
Ramo, Presidents, ALI (Nov. 28, 2017), at 4 (on file with author). 
175 The ALI parliamentary tradition is to use voice votes on matters that are expected to pass 
easily (e.g., a motion to call the question) or fail easily (a motion made at the first session to 
cancel the rest of the Annual Meeting).  
  For most issues of consequence at the 2018 Annual Meeting, the ALI took votes by show of 
hands. Where the winner of the vote was obvious, a final tally was not taken, as was the case 
will all of the 2018 votes surrounding the RLLI.  
Based on my observation while attending the meeting, I have estimated the rough ratio of the 
votes. In all cases surrounding the RLLI, votes were very one-sided – roughly 9:1 in favor of 
the winning position. I did not see any votes that could credibly be characterized as less than 80 
percent support for the winning position. 
176 See David Goodwin et al., Motion to Amend § 46 by Deleting Subsection 46(2)(a) 
(submitted on May 17, 2018) (on file with author). I was one of the five signers of the Goodwin 
Motion. 
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policyholder was to settle a claim without insurer consent.177 This friendly or hybrid 
motion passed by a similar 9:1 vote. 
Motions favored by insurers lost by similar lopsided votes, including two motions 
designed to bar courts from considering industry custom and practice in construing 
policy language unless the policy text was facially ambiguous.178 Comment c to RLLI 
§3 provides that courts may consider such evidence as part of the background or 
context used to understand the words in the policy – and that this does not count as 
permitting extrinsic evidence to countermand clear policy text.179 These motions lost, 
again by a very lopsided, 9:1 vote. 
One significant insurer motion sought to strike the word “substantial” from the 
portion of the RLLI dealing with rescission of an insurance policy due to material 
misrepresentation. The Section provided that a “material” misrepresentation of fact 
was one that, if known, would have caused the insurer not to have issued the policy in 
question or to have issued it on “substantially” different terms or for a “substantially” 
higher premium. The motion argued that this was too demanding a definition of 
materiality that would unduly hinder insurers in rescinding policies in cases where 
they had been given incorrect information. The motion failed by a 9:1 ratio. 
Another significant motion involved an effort to delete commentary in §27, 
Comment e, which dealt with the issue of whether an insurer that had unreasonably 
failed to settle a case that then resulted in both compensatory and punitive damages 
against the policyholder could limit its liability to the policyholder to only the 
compensatory damages liability in states where public policy prohibits insurance for 
punitive damages.180 Although case law, in the form of decisions in California, 
Colorado, and California was to the contrary, the RLLI Reporters noted that two of 
these cases were decided on 4-3 votes,181 with strong dissents that the Reporters (and 
the bulk of the Advisers) found persuasive.182 The ALI membership rejected the 
 
177 See Tom Baker & Kyle Logue, Comments and Motions on RLLI Settlement Sections 
(24, 25, 27) (submitted May 18, 2018)) (on file with author); see also Malcom E. Wheeler, 
Revised Proposed Amendment to RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. (AM. L. INST., Proposed 
Final Draft No. 2, 2017) § 27 (received May 17, 2018) (on file with author) (member motion 
on which the Reporters’ Motion was based in part). 
178 See Vanita M. Banks, Proposal to Amend Section 3 to delete Comment c, Custom, 
Practices and Usage, and Illustrations 1 and 2 (received May 17, 2018) (on file with author); 
Michael Aylward, Proposed Amendment to Restatement, Section 3 – The Plain-Meaning Rule 
(submitted May 17, 2018) (on file with author). 
179 See RLLI, supra note 4, at § 3 & cmt. c. 
180 See Victor E. Schwartz, Proposed Amendment to § 27 & cmt. c (submitted May 17, 2018) 
(on file with author). 
181 See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transam. Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 654, 658–60 (Cal. 1999); Lira 
v. Shelter Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 514, 517, 521, 522–23 (Colo. 1996); see also Soto v. State Farm 
Ins. Co., 635 N.E.2d 1222, 1223–24 (N.Y. 1994) (finding no insurer responsibility for punitive 
damages component of excess judgment; no dissents). 
182 See RLLI, supra note 4, at § 27 cmt. e & reporters note e. In addition, as an Adviser to 
the RLLI project, I was present for discussion of this Section and comment and recall 
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insurer argument that a Restatement should not be adopting a dissenting, the 
amendment was defeated – also by the 9:1 ratio – implicitly concluding that the better 
rule of law can in some circumstances be contained in a dissent.  
The nature of insurer complaints against the RLLI may have explained some of 
the Institute’s support for the Reporters and the project. As one cerebral insurer-side 
attorney put it, the ALI “responds to light, not heat.”183 Many of the insurer attacks on 
the RLLI had been long on heat (rather than light)184 – e.g., claims that the RLLI was 
unsupported in law, announced many new rules of law, was lopsidedly pro-
policyholder, violated states’ rights or separation of powers, would endanger the 
financial health of the insurance industry, and would result in a large increase in 
premiums. These criticisms were so outlandishly wrong that they may have operated 
as the thirteenth chime of the metaphorical clock, making it hard to credit the better 
arguments made by insurers. 
In addition, the manner in which some insurer advocates pressed their case ran 
more toward the heat side of the light-heat continuum. Rather than having sustained, 
reflective discussion over segments of the project with which they disagreed, insurers 
campaigned against the RLLI as if they were trying to capture a contested state senate 
or congressional seat. Insurer materials reflected a political script of talking points 
more in keeping with door-to-door campaigning or a town meeting of low information 
voters rather than the more academic analysis characteristic of the ALI. For example, 
multiple submissions contained the Justice Scalia quote critical of Restatements 
(discussed at the outset of this Article) even though it was clear that the commentators 
using the quotation almost certainly did not stumble upon this quotation themselves 
but merely parroted it based on an insurer form letter. It was reminiscent of an “attack 
ad” electoral campaign more than deliberation among lawyers.  
It also displayed a tin ear for the audience. When lobbying Republican-dominated 
state legislatures such as those of South Carolina, Iowa, Nebraska, Texas or Utah 
(whose governors signed the anti RLLI letter discussed at the beginning of this 
Article), invoking Antonin Scalia may operate as an effective signaling device because 
it has become an article of faith on the American Right that Scalia was the best modern 
Supreme Court Justice.185 Mere incantation of his name may be all that is needed to 
persuade the average Republican politician.  
 
comparatively little controversy regarding Comment e. While not all Advisers supported the 
Reporters, the clear bulk did and those in disagreement did not debate the issue at any length. 
183 Attributed to William Barker (Denton’s USA) by Douglas Richmond, counsel to 
insurance broker Aon. Conversation of May 22, 2018 at ALI Annual Meeting. 
184 The term is “used to say that something or someone causes anger without making 
something (such as an issue under discussion) better understood.” More Heat Than Light, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/more%20heat%20than%20light [https://perma.cc/979K-7FME]. 
185 For example, when asked during the 2016 presidential campaign who he would nominate 
to the Supreme Court, then-candidate Donald Trump repeatedly used Justice Scalia as a model. 
In ultimately appointing Tenth Circuit Judge Neil Gorsuch, Trump largely followed through in 
that Gorsuch, like Scalia, is highly credentialed and very conservative. 
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The ALI, by contrast, although a mostly judge-friendly organization, has avoided 
having favorite or outcast judges. It respects Supreme Court Justices of all ideological 
stripes (for example, conservative Chief Justice John Roberts was warmly received at 
the May 2018 Annual Meeting just as were liberal Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena 
Kagan). But it does not reflectively idolize them or embrace them as heroes over a 
single issue such as abortion or school prayer. ALI Members undoubtedly respect 
Justice Scalia – but that did not automatically translate into deference or the reflexive 
view that his criticism was well-taken. Politically liberal ALI members will not agree 
to something merely because it was said by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, 
or Elana Kagan. Conservative ALI members will not agree to something simply 
because it was said by John Roberts, Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, 
Brett Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett – or Antonin Scalia. But elements of the 
insurance industry appear to have wrongly assumed that the same sort of litmus tests, 
dog whistles, and signaling devices that work among the state officials or the electorate 
at large would work with the ALI membership and leadership. Hence, the continued 
references to the Scalia criticism of Restatements, relentless to the point of comedy or 
boredom. 
Irrespective of the substantive positions espoused in its black letter, the RLLI 
contains extensive scholarship about insurance reflected not only in the comments but 
also in the Reporters’ Notes. The Notes in particular collect cases and commentary 
both supporting and opposing the RLLI black letter. As a consequence, the RLLI can 
serve as a valuable legal research tool for lawyers and courts, even those who disagree 
with some of its black letter provisions or commentary or illustrations. For the most 
part, the 50-section RLLI (totaling almost 500 pages with Comments and Reporters’ 
Notes) adopts uncontroversial prevailing insurance doctrine. The RLLI at times adopts 
what might be termed “minority” rule positions that are held by less than a majority 
of American courts. But it does not appear that the RLLI in any instance adopts a 
position that has no supporting legal authority. Where the RLLI departs from a 
majority rule in favor of a minority rule or different, hybrid, or customized rule, it does 
so with at least some support in the case law and scholarly analysis.  
That said, does the RLLI lean in the policyholder’s direction? On some issues. The 
duty to defend provisions186 and attitude toward contract construction and the role of 
extrinsic evidence and reasonable expectations analysis187 can be described as more 
favorable to policyholders than the approaches of many courts. But on other issues – 
some of them affecting billions of dollars in coverage liability, the RLLI takes a 
decidedly pro-insurer tilt. Most prominently, it adopts pro-rata allocation of insurer 
 
186 See RLLI, supra note 4, at §§ 12–23. For example, RLLI § 12 can be regarded as perhaps 
a modest expansion of insurer liability for negligence in selecting or supervising defense 
counsel. RLLI § 13 takes a fairly strong “four corners” approach supplemented by an insurer’s 
responsibility to defend if it knows of facts outside the complaint that create a potential for 
coverage, which is an approach more favorable to policyholders than some jurisdictions but is 
followed in many states and is hardly a new or novel approach. Also, § 13 does not require the 
insurer to dig for facts that might create a potential for coverage. RLLI § 21 disfavors 
recoupment of defense costs spent on uncovered claims and is thus predictably disliked by 
insurers but this is a mainstream and perhaps even the majority view of the courts. 
187 See id. §§ 2–4. But recall that RLLI § 3 creates a presumption in favor of the “plain 
meaning” of policy text. 
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responsibility in the case of long-tail mass torts rather than the “all sums” approach.188 
RLLI § 39 regarding attachment of excess insurance permits insurers to avoid 
coverage even for claims reaching the excess layer and even if the full amount of an 
underlying limit has been paid simply because the payment was by the policyholder 
rather than an underlying insurer, a development that in many cases does not increase 
the excess insurer’s risk and does not justify the windfall of letting the excess insurer 
walk away without payment. 
In sum, the RLLI is a document that largely tracks existing law, which prompts 
two questions: (1) Is it worthwhile? (2) Why is the insurance industry so upset about 
it? As to the first question, there is no doubt that the RLLI is a valuable addition to 
insurance scholarship. It operates as something of a “super treatise” in that it provides 
– in the familiar ALI Restatement format that has proven useful for decades – rather 
clear black letter rules, followed by explanatory Comments and helpful illustrations 
as well as Reporters’ Notes that provide further explanation and ample citation to case 
law and secondary authority. It collects in one place an awful lot of good information 
about liability insurance.  
It also carries with it the authority of a document years in the making that has 
benefitted from the involvement of not only the Reporters (two standout academics) 
but also from collaboration with a group of Advisers that included other law 
professors, judges, policyholder counsel, and insurer counsel and even insurer 
executives as well as review by a Members Consultative Group that included both 
policyholder and insurer counsel, more heavily the latter. Just as important, the RLLI 
has been repeatedly reviewed by the ALI Council and then by the Membership at five 
Annual Meetings. No treatise receives this sort of scrutiny from such a wide audience, 
either before or after its publication. 
As a result, the RLLI provides authoritative guidance that an ordinary treatise 
could not hope to match. What might be termed “individual” treatises still have a vital 
role to play, as do multi-volume treatises such as Appleman and Couch that now are 
written by a variety of authors differing per chapter rather than a single author as was 
the case with their original editions. But the ALI process provides a type of validation 
for the document as a whole that no individual treatise can match. It will provide 
judges and lawyers with a handy and authoritative reference, which may be 
particularly valuable for counsel and courts that are not particularly familiar with 
insurance issues. It is perhaps a truism that soft law is not controlling. Courts will 
apply portions of the RLLI only if they agree with a given position and its rationale. 
But the document is sure to aid and inform even those who disagree with its positions. 
F. Attempting to Understand Insurer Opposition to the RLLI 
The vehemence with which insurers have opposed the RLLI may appear 
perplexing to a neutral observer. The RLLI largely reflects well-settled insurance 
doctrine, occasionally embracing minority rules where it finds the minority analysis 
sounder. It certainly is not a radical document. So why are insurers (who are ordinarily 
reasonable on most issues, most of the time), so upset about what is not a particularly 
pro-policyholder or trailblazing document? One trial hypothesis posits that insurers 
oppose the RLLI not so much for its content but because they wish there were no 
 
188 See id. § 42. 
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Restatement at all regarding liability insurance – or any type of insurance, regardless 
of the content of the Restatement.189  
Insurance in the United States has long been state-centered not only in regulation 
but also regarding adjudication, a practice enshrined in the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
and reflected in resistance by insurers and state regulators to efforts to nationalize 
insurance regulation or law. The current state-centered regime, whatever its other 
pluses and minuses, coupled with the dispersion of cases and adjudicatory authority 
throughout the justice system provides substantial advantage for insurers relative to 
policyholders, particularly consumers or less sophisticated small business or 
government policyholders.  
Insurers – who are the ultimate well-organized, sophisticated, “repeat players” of 
litigation – can engage in a good deal of forum shopping and “pick their battles” in 
litigation. In addition to state-to-state variance, there are many courts within a state 
and non-resident insurers can readily remove to federal court when sued by 
policyholders in state court. Insurers can either wait to see if they are sued or take the 
initiative of a declaratory judgment action. Insurers thus have an inventory of cases 
that can be settled or litigated in their discretion and a variety of forums that they may 
select. 
 Any greater centralization of insurance law – which would likely be encouraged 
by a Restatement – is likely to reduce that of the traditional insurer advantage in 
shaping law irrespective of the content of the Restatement itself. Consequently, some 
insurers and counsel may oppose the RLLI simply to preserve their current case and 
forum selection advantages. This theory may seem a bit counter-intuitive in that 
insurers are often defendants, which means that policyholders or their assignees are 
often commencing litigation and thus selecting the litigation forum. But the 
opportunity for forum shopping by policyholders, particularly individuals and small 
businesses firmly located in one home state, is limited. And insurers in most states 
often have at their disposal an avenue of partial forum shopping in that they can 
frequently remove a case filed in state court to federal court, which is generally seen 
as a more favorable situation for insurers.190 
Even when defendants, insurers have a good deal of discretion in seeking to obtain 
favorable precedents. When a given lawsuit involves bad facts (e.g., an internal memo 
or email showing disrespect for the policyholder or self-serving behavior by an 
adjuster hoping to get a promotion by being tough on claims) or the policyholder has 
strong counsel or the case has been assigned to a judge seen as favoring policyholders 
or will have an urban jury more likely to provide a large bad faith award, the insurer 
can settle such cases, perhaps even “overpaying” as necessary to avoid risking 
unfavorable precedent or generating adverse publicity. 
By contrast, when a case involves favorable facts, less competent or effective 
counsel, or a sympathetic judge or jury, insurers can make their stand on this ground, 
hoping to generate favorable precedent. For example, before a favorable judge 
opposed by weak counsel, an insurer may be able to prevail through a Rule 12(b)(6) 
 
189 See generally STEMPEL & KNUTSEN, supra note 77, at § 14A. 
190 Regarding the strategy and tactics of forum selection, personal jurisdiction, venue and 
civil procedure generally, see generally STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: RULES AND COMMENTARY (2018); ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
PRETRIAL LITIGATION (11th ed. 2020). 
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or summary judgment motion and obtain a ruling that “as a matter of law” it owed no 
duty to defend or to provide coverage or that there was no bad faith, that its 
construction of the policy, even if incorrect, was “fairly debatable” and so on. 
Because of the availability of a declaratory judgment action regarding duty to 
defend and coverage, insurers can also of course take an even more proactive approach 
and do affirmative forum shopping by filing suit in the court viewed as most favorable 
for their positions. This will be limited to a degree by requirements of personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction but is nonetheless a powerful tool for insurers. 
And as part of forum selection and strategic case resolution, insurers are able to 
avoid decisions by judges they do not like (e.g., the former policyholder counsel) and 
seek decisions by judges they do like (the former panel counsel or insurer-side 
coverage counsel). Alternatively, an insurer seeking a favorable opinion may be happy 
to litigate before a judge with little insurance background such as a former prosecutor 
or criminal defense attorney. Judges with little insurance background from practice 
(and who probably did not take Insurance Law in law school) no matter how bright, 
will need to learn insurance on the fly in the context of the particular case. This in turn 
makes the court vulnerable to being led astray if the quality of advocacy is uneven or 
a law clerk’s research incomplete or substandard. 
Faced with a neutral but relatively uninformed-about-insurance judge and 
lackluster policyholder counsel, insurers have an advocacy advantage that can be used 
to obtain more favorable precedent. And because insurance is state-centered, there 
may often be a lack of authoritative precedent within the state in question. Or the 
precedent from a state high court or appeals court that has been affected by previous 
insurer efforts may be in error because it stemmed from a trial court decision that was 
affected by the asymmetries discussed above. Appellate courts tend to defer to trial 
court decisions, which can give an erroneous trial court analysis more influence than 
it deserves.  
Thus, under the current system of fragmented insurance law, insurers have a 
significant relative advantage over policyholders. Although there are treatises 
attempting to harmonize the law, many are written by policyholder or insurer counsel, 
which gives them less authoritative stature than would be accorded a Restatement. 
Treatises by full-time academics, as discussed above, are not afflicted with the same 
sorts of conflicts but reflect the particular perspective of their authors191 and also lack 
the authority of a document promulgated by the ALI. 
For these reasons, a substantial portion of the insurer resistance to the RLLI may 
be taking place not because of the substantive content of the document itself, but 
because a Restatement on this topic will limit the strategic and tactical advantages 
traditionally enjoyed by insurers. There may also be a bit of “turf battling” behind the 
opposition in that some of the most shrill criticisms of the RLLI have come from state 
regulators or legislators (or those purporting to represent their perspectives). They may 
fear losing influence once a national compendium of the common law has been 
promulgated by an influential national group. There is, in other words, profit to be 
 
191 For example, this Treatise sees some issues differently than does the Jerry & Richmond 
treatise, even though both aspire to be accurately reporting the state of insurance law, policy, 
and operation as well as fair in assessing disputes. Both also differ to some degree from similar 
treatises such as MANILOFF & STEMPEL, supra note 77, and the multi-volume APPLEMAN and 
COUCH treatises, supra note 78. The differences are exacerbated because different portions of 
the treatises have different primary authors. 
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made in the chaos. After all, is that not what is at the heart of the very business of 
insurance? 
G. Judicial Reaction to the RLLI 
Although the RLLI passed with ease, it remains to be seen whether it will be well 
received by courts. Even prior to formal approval, different draft versions of the RLLI 
had been cited with approval in several courts. Ordinarily, adoption of the final draft 
of a Restatement increases reference to a Restatement by advocates, law clerks, and 
ultimately courts – resulting in more citations and influence. But if the insurer 
campaign to discredit the RLLI succeeds more in litigation than it did before the 
Institute’s membership, insurers may have the ultimate victory. 
To date, the evidence is mixed. The RLLI has been cited roughly 30 times in 
judicial decisions, including citations to drafts.192 It is too early to engage in precise 
empiricism regarding the impact of the RLLI. Early returns suggest relatively low 
visibility in that scores of insurance cases are decided each day so the potential for use 
of the RLLI is potentially vast but as of yet unrealized. But neither has the RLLI been 
met with strong judicial opposition. In many or perhaps even most of these cases, the 
RLLI was not a determinative factor or even influential in the court’s decision but was 
cited only in passing for a proposition of law or as part of a supporting citation for a 
 
192 The earliest citation appears to be Wis. Pharm. Co. v. Neb. Cultures of Cal., Inc., 876 
N.W.2d 72, 88 (Wis. 2016) (applying Wisconsin and California law), in which the Court found 
that incorporation of a defective ingredients into probiotic supplement tablets manufactured by 
the policyholder did not constitute covered “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.” In a 
scorching dissent, Chief Justice Shirley Abramson attacked the majority’s conflation of the 
economic loss doctrine of tort law with insurance coverage issues of property damage and noted 
in passing that the RLLI “discussion drafts on this project do not address the economic loss 
doctrine” but implicitly hoped that “other drafts might.” See id at 95 n.21 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting). The most recent as of March 12, 2021 is Inn-One Home v. Colony Specialty Ins. 
Co., No. 19-CV-00141, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33451 (D. Vt. Feb. 23, 2021) (agreeing with 
RLLI §35(2) that prejudice from late notice reporting a claim not required for claims-made 
policy as would be the case with an occurrence policy). 
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decision already made by the court.193 But in several decisions, the RLLI received 
serious focus, with courts adopting an RLLI position194 or rejecting it.195  
 
193 See, e.g., Otra, LLC v. Am. Safety Indem. Co., No. 20-CV-01063, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
217933, at *1 n. 1 (D. Ore. Nov. 20, 2020) (noting that RLLI §13 follows widely accepted “four 
corners” rule of determining insurer’s duty to defend according to face of complaint); Evanston 
Ins. Co. v. Desert State Life Mgmt., 434 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (D.N.M. 2020) (citing RLLI treatment 
of exclusion as in accord with case law); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Darke, 424 F. Supp. 3d 638, 
642–43 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing RLLI provisions on duty to defend in addition to consistent 
state law precedent); Conway v. Northfield Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 3d 950, 959 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 
(same); Mesa Underwriters Specialty Ins. Co. v. Blackboard Ins. Specialty Co., 400 F. Supp. 
3d 928, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (same); Marcus v. Allied World Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp. 3d 115, 
122–23 (D. Me. 2019) (citing RLLL as additional authority along with state precedent that 
exclusions from coverage are interpreted narrowly, with insurer holding burden of persuasion); 
Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martinez, No. CV-17-02974, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69283, at *41 
n.15 (D. Ariz. April 24, 2019) (citing RLLI draft in footnote along with controlling state law 
for proposition that insurer is not liable for errors of panel counsel absent negligence in selection 
or active responsibility for counsel’s error); Webcor Constr., LP v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 372 F. 
Supp. 3d 1061, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing RLLI draft in addition to controlling state law 
regarding duty to defend); National Cas. Co. v. W. Express, 356 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 1299 (W.D. 
Okla. 2018) (referring to RLLI draft discussion of history of the “effects” test for determining 
number of occurrences and its fall from favor); Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-
0300, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *137 n.619 (Oct. 1, 2018) (citing RLLI section on trigger 
of coverage in passing); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Petrol. Sols., Inc., No. 09-422, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 182174, at *11 n.28 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2016) (citing RLLI draft for 
uncontroversial description of duty to cooperate); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. D.R. Horton, 
Inc., No. 15-351, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160148, at *20 n.6 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 18, 2016) (RLLI 
draft cited in passing case where insurer breached its duty to defend a party but the court focused 
on procedural issues); Morden v. XL Specialty Ins., 177 F Supp. 3d 1320, 1340 (D. Utah 2016) 
(citing RLLI discussion draft for proposition regarding existence of defense cost indemnity 
policies in addition to more common duty to defend policies); Nadkos, Inc. v. Preferred 
Contractors Ins. Co., 132 N.E.3d 568, 580 (N.Y. 2019) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (citing RLLI 
sections on waiver and estoppel in passing); W. Hills Dev. Co. v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 385 P.3d 
1053, 1055 (Or. 2016) (citing RLLI draft for uncontroversial position that most courts determine 
duty to defend by comparing “four corners” of complaint and face of insurance policy); Cannon 
Elec. v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Co., No. BC 290354, 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 8, at *23 (Jan. 9, 2019) 
(RLLI as “see also” citation after Court makes decision as to amount of information independent 
counsel must provide to insurer). 
194 See, e.g., Burka v. Garrison Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 20-CV-172, 2021 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 32447, at *19 (D. Me. Feb. 22, 2021) (following RLLI §18 regarding termination of 
insurer’s duty to defend, remanding to magistrate judge for further fact finding); Hayes v. Wis. 
& S.R.R., LLC, No. 18-CV-923, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10175 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 20, 2021) 
(following RLLI §21 in rejecting insurer claim of right to recoupment of counsel fees); GGA, 
Inc. v. Kiewit Infrastructure W. Co., No. 18-00110, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10151, at *70 (D. 
Haw. Jan. 22, 2020) (reflecting influence of RLLI bar to insurer recoupment of defense costs 
absent specific policy language granting right to insurer); Sapienza v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d 648, 655–56 (D.S.D. 2019) (citing RLLI and relying in part on RLLI 
provisions regarding limited circumstances where insurer may be liable for errors of counsel to 
dismiss claim against insurer); Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Smiley Body Shop, Inc., 260 F. 
Supp. 3d. 1023, 1033 (7th Cir. 2017) (relying in part on RLLI draft in concluding that insurer 
not entitled to recoupment of portion of defense expenditures related to claims outside potential 
coverage); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartman, No. 13-CV-1608, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
227524, at *16 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2017) (relying in part on RLLI draft to conclude that insurer 
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At this juncture, it seems safe to say that the RLLI has not been the sweeping anti-
insurer force alleged by the insurance industry nor has it been a boon to policyholders. 
Rather, as one might expect, the RLLI has had impact akin to a well-regarded treatise 
or the guidelines issued by a respected bar association. It remains possible that the 
RLLI will gather momentum that may place it in the more influential category of the 
Contract and Tort Restatements but early signs are not that encouraging even if the 
RLLI appears safe from judicial rejection notwithstanding the torrent of insurer 
criticism.  
IV. CONTINUED INSURER OPPOSITION TO THE RLLI AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
It may be that citation to the RLLI in 2019 and 2020 has been suppressed by insurer 
success in enacting anti-RLLI legislation in several states. Insurers have – as 
threatened during the RLLI drafting process – taken their fight against the RLLI to 
state legislatures, introducing anti-RLLI resolutions or bills in roughly a dozen states 
(among them Arizona Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
North Dakota, Ohio, and Texas).196 These efforts have succeeded in producing not 
 
not entitled to recoupment of portion of settlement purportedly outside coverage); Century 
Surety Co. v. Andrew, 432 P.3d 180, 186 (Nev. 2018) (adopting RLLI view that insurer in 
breach of duty to defend is responsible for resulting judgment, including amount in excess of 
policy limits, as a consequential damage flowing from the breach; bad faith not necessary); Port 
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Brickman Grp. Ltd., 115 N.Y.S.3d 246, 261 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) 
(citing RLLI and other authority in support of using duty to defend principles to assess 
responsibilities of insurer with policy providing for payment of defense costs); see also 
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mitchell, 925 F.3d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing RLLI regarding use 
of “deemer clause[s]” by insurers and ruling against two insurers where policies lacked such 
language and insurers were arguing that date of injury should be regarded as taking place 
immediately upon liability-creating event). 
195 See, e.g., Outdoor Venture Corp. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., No. 16-CV-182, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 167986, at *55–56 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 27, 2018) (rejecting RLLI position on when 
independent defense counsel required rather than insurer-selected panel counsel but largely on 
basis of existing Kentucky law rather than criticism of RLLI); Nooter Corp. v. Allianz 
Underwriters Ins. Co., 536 S.W.3d 251, 271–72 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (adopting all sum 
approach to insurer coverage responsibility rather than pro-rata allocation by time on risk 
advocated by insurers; noting RLLI draft favors pro-ration); Catlin Specialty Ins. Co. v. CBL 
& Assocs. Props., No. N16C-07-166, 2018 Del. Super. LEXIS 342, at *7 nn.23–24 (Aug. 9, 
2018) (disagreeing with RLLI position on recoupment of defense costs and favoring recoupment 
by insurer); see also Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Gant, 957 F.3d 1144 (10th Cir. 2020); 
Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Gant, No. 15-926, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163624, at *16 (D. Kan. 
Sept. 25, 2018) (finding RLLI position on insurer liability for conduct of defense counsel 
inapplicable because insurer not negligent in retaining attorney and did not direct conduct of 
counsel in manner that created violation of professional standards). 
196 See, e.g., H.B. 2644, 54th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2020) (passed Arizona House Feb. 27, 
2020; consideration pending in Arizona Senate); S.B. 565, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 
2019) (codified as ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-60-112 (2019)); S.B. 1176, 65th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 
2019); H. Con. Res. 62, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2019); H. Res. 86, 121st Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2019); H. Res. 222, Gen. Sess. (Ky. 2018); S. Res. 149, Reg. Sess. (La. 
2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3032 (2020); H.B. 1142, 66th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2019) 
(codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-02-34 (2019)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.82 
(LexisNexis 2018) (amended via language inserted in appropriations bill July 30, 2018); H.B. 
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only resolutions expressing disapproval of the RLLI but also in actual laws purporting 
to restrict judicial consideration of the RLLI. For example, in Michigan state courts 
“shall not apply a principle from the American Law Institute’s ‘Restatement of the 
Law of Liability Insurance’ in ruling on an issue in the case unless the principle is 
clearly expressed in a statute of this state, the common law, or case law precedent in 
this state.”197 In North Dakota, no “person” can “apply, give weight to, or afford 
recognition to, the American Law Institute’s ‘Restatement of the Law, Liability 
Insurance’ as an authoritative reference regarding interpretation of North Dakota laws, 
rules, and principles of insurance law.”198 Ohio’s legislature declared that the RLLI 
“does not constitute the public policy of this state and is not an appropriate subject of 
notice.”199 A typical resolution states that the RLLI is “inconsistent” with the law of 
the state in question and admonishes courts not to rely on the RLLI an “authoritative 
reference regarding established rules and principles of law.”200 
The level of “scrutiny” applied to anti-RLLI legislation is something less than brief 
in favor of state legislatures. Anti-RLLI legislation, when successful, is often enacted 
with minimal examination, which become all the more troubling in light of the 
language of the resolutions and bills, which makes broad statements about the content 
of a 50-section, 400-page document that the legislators, including sponsors, have 
obviously never read. Ohio, for example, enacted its anti-RLLI law as a floor 
amendment to a highway naming and appropriations bill. There were no analyses by 
legislative staff, no committee hearings and apparently no floor discussions of the 
proposal. Where hearings have been held, they have been limited in time and scope 
and appear to lack professional staff input. Although witnesses are heard, the process 
has a rushed feel and the votes appear to be along straight party lines. Republicans 
appear uniformly in favor of anti-RLLI legislation and Democrats push back, at least 
to the point of questioning the wisdom of an edict purporting to control judicial 
decision making even if not taking a pro-RLLI position.201  
 
2757, Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 5.001 (West 
2019)); H. Con. Res. 58, Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (committee report distributed May 2, 2019); 
see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-102 (2019) (codifying traditional state rules regarding 
insurance policy status as contract, traditional rules of construction and four corners rule on duty 
to defend, legislation that appears to have been prompted by RLLI in spite of not directly 
attacking RLLI).  
197 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3032 (2020). 
198 N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-02-34 (2019). 
199 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.82 (LexisNexis 2018). 
200 See, e.g., H. Con. Res. 58, Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019); S.B. 1176, 65th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 
2019); H. Res. 222, Gen. Sess. (Ky. 2018); H. Con. Res. 62, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 
2019). The basic language and contention of these resolutions is similar to the model resolution 
threatened by NCOIL in its attacks on the RLLI prior to its approval by the ALI. See supra 
notes 89–105 and accompanying text. 
201 Hearings in Arizona and Florida are illustrative. See, e.g., House Floor Session, ARIZ. 
LEGISLATURE, at 6:18–37:50 (Feb. 27, 2020), 
http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=13&clip_id=24038 
[https://perma.cc/6HJW-KR5P]; Insurance and Banking Subcommittee, FLORIDA HOUSE OF 
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Insurers may be opposing the RLLI in spite of its moderate content because the 
presence of nationally recognized soft law for insurance will make it more difficult for 
insurers to continue to succeed with a litigation strategy that historically has sought to 
establish favorable precedent by shrewd selection of cases for litigation and the ability 
to use informational advantage over policyholders and their attorneys in the early 
stages of litigation over a disputed policy term or concept, thus establishing 
precedential momentum. 
But my thesis as to the vehemence of insurer opposition, even if correct, does not 
explain (at least not as well or particularly well) political opposition to modern 
Restatements addressing Torts, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Corporate 
Governance, Consumer Contracts, or other topics. The overall resistance to 
Restatements appears to reflect a growing politicization or even partisanship regarding 
Restatements, the ALI, and law in general. 
Current journalism is awash in discussion of a “post-truth” world in which the 
public has difficulty agreeing on basic facts and in which a winner-take-all tribalism 
increasingly dominates U.S. politics and world events.202 One need not agree entirely 
with the most negative assessments of this trend but there seems no doubt as to the 
trend. Civility has declined dramatically in the behavior of public officials, candidates 
and commentators. Organized political parties and their most active supporters have 
become increasingly extreme in their views, to the point that moderates of either left 
or right have difficulty obtaining party nominations in primary elections. 
With this greater division of extremes, the ability to compromise or conduct debate 
with restraint has ebbed. In its place has come a modern creed that values winning 
above all else without regard to the means and whether those means undermine the 
institutions in question. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that legal doctrine 
itself has become more overtly politicized and partisan. Overt political resistance to 
ALI Restatements is arguably but another extension of the heightened politics law 
during the past 50 years.  
In addition, some of the seeming backlash against the Restatements may be a 
reflection of America’s revolt against expertise and reasoned deliberation during the 
past two decades. This may also have been exacerbated and heightened by social and 
political tribalism in American politics and government. Law reform activity that was 
traditionally the domain of calm, civil rationality marked by fair play and compromise 
has begun to more closely resemble raw politics.   
Whether the trend continues hinges both on the success of interest group lobbying 
and whether groups like the ALI will continue to be willing to embark on potentially 
controversial projects that may foment lobbying attacks on the organization. This 
makes the stakes significant regarding the RLLI. Although insurers have not dealt a 
death blow to the RLLI, the ALI, or the concept of neutral soft law developed by 
experts, it is not for lack of effort. Unless attaining total victory in the more 
 
REPRESENTATIVES, at 7:30–45:30 (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://myfloridahouse.gov/VideoPlayer.aspx?eventID=2443575804_2020011093.  
202 RICHARD SAMBROOK, DELIVERING TRUST: IMPARTIALITY AND OBJECTIVITY IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 3 (2012), https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2017-
11/Delivering%20Trust%20Impartiality%20and%20Objectivity%20in%20a%20Digital%20A
ge.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHY9-UG42]. 
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deliberative realm of scholarship, adjudication, or policymaking, insurers appear to be 
seeking victory via the brute force of legislative clout. In the past, disagreements over 
Restatement provisions have largely been fought out in the courts or academic 
literature, both of which constitute better forums for deliberate, reflective, less partisan 
assessment than harried legislative sessions lacking sufficient time for education of 
voting members and reflection on the policy choices at issue.  
Contrast this with an effort to legislatively contradict or bar the use of a 
Restatement. The typical state legislature has only a few attorneys in the body, most 
of whom will have relatively little expertise in a particular area of law such as 
insurance. The overworked legislative staff will be approached by lobbyists well-
armed with “facts” spun in the manner most favorable to the self-interested, interest 
group. The interest group will often have provided campaign contributions or other 
support to members in the past and increase or decrease that support in the future based 
on the member’s support for the group’s anti-ALI efforts. The interest group may have 
the support of a powerful political organization, perhaps even the member’s own 
political party.203 Because of the press of legislative business and longstanding 
structural defects of the legislative process in many states, those who disagree with 
the interest groups are unlikely to be heard, even if they have obviously greater 
expertise and neutrality than the interest group.204  
Legislative efforts to bar or overrule Restatements or particular Restatement 
provisions are a bad way to conduct legal policymaking. Far better to follow the 
traditional approach of allowing courts on a case-by-case basis to determine the fate 
of Restatement provisions. Those that make rational sense and good legal policy will 
 
203 For example, it is probably no accident that the six governors signing the April 6, 2018 
Letter attacking the RLLI are all Republicans. In the U.S., the Republican Party has generally 
enjoyed substantial support from insurers and has been identified as the friendlier of the two 
major parties toward big business. And insurance is very big business. See generally RICHARD 
ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003); ANDREW TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS 
(1982). 
204 This is a structural and institutional shortcoming well beyond the scope of this Article but 
bears mentioning. In the typical legislative session, interest group lobbyists come with an 
agenda for legislation favoring the interest group. Although their proposed legislation may be 
vetted by legislative staff, these staffers are typically overworked and overwhelmed by many 
demands on their time during the legislative session.  
In addition to normally lacking time to conduct a thorough vetting of interest group 
contentions and proposals, these staffer and the members typically do not draw upon potentially 
available expertise on the issues before the legislature unless the issues are very high profile 
(e.g., a ban on abortion; school vouchers), the high profile typically being the result of interest 
group activity and media interest rather than the importance of the issue per se. Seldom are 
professors or accomplished professionals sought for comments and testimony unless already 
affiliated with an interest group or suggested by an interest group. Although legislators 
themselves often have expertise, term limits and the press of other business make it unlikely 
that legislator competence can correct the problems of information asymmetry and insufficient 
scrutiny of interest group attacks on the RLLI and other Restatements. 
As a result, the factual and analytic inputs received by a state legislature are almost guaranteed 
to be inferior to that received by the ALI during the Restatement process. See supra notes 80–
81, 103 (describing the process and the particular composition of the RLLI Reporters, Advisers, 
and MCG). 
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enjoy judicial favor. Those that do not will wither in application, be revised, or both. 
But current attacks on the RLLI suggest that insurers will continue to wage war via 
brute force when they cannot prevail in a more cerebral and reflective analytical 
environment.  
The ALI process has traditionally been one of assembling expertise directed 
toward a non-partisan analysis of legal issues. Although buffeted by criticisms in the 
past, the Restatement process and its products has largely remained intact. However, 
increased interest group activity in both attacking Restatements and seeking to 
“overrule” them legislatively poses a grave danger to the process of dispassionate, 
merits-based law reform activity. Years of careful analysis and deliberation by very 
talented experts may be wiped out in a single afternoon of voting effectively controlled 
by the interest group with the most electoral muscle.  
There is more than a little about which to be distressed when viewing the insurance 
industry attack on the RLLI. First, it was a blatant effort to politicize a process that 
historically was marked by deliberation relatively unmoored from special interests. 
Second, by attempting to circumvent the traditional common law methodology that 
absorbs, rejects or modifies soft law, insurers attempted to supplant a process that has 
worked well with one that surely will provide for less reflection about law and policy 
as well as greater dominance by the nation’s most powerful socioeconomic interest 
groups – regardless of the correctness of their position. Third, the insurer attack sowed 
the legal wind with disinformation that will impede careful analysis of the RLLI 
positions (and perhaps those of other Restatements) by courts, commentators and 
policy makers. Fourth, by inducing some attorneys to depart from the “check your 
clients at the door” traditional ethos of the ALI, insurer allies (at least those being 
compensated for their work opposing the RLLI or using it as a means of business 
development or feel compelled by law firm client relations politics to join the attack), 
the insurer assault has eroded the foundation of what has for nearly a century been a 
most useful American legal institution. Fifth, in advancing insurer client interests in 
partisan fashion, some insurer advocates have in (at least in my view) violated rules 
and norms of conflict of interest by seeking Restatement provisions favorable to 
insurers that will, if adopted, hurt policyholder clients of the same law firms. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In short, the hard insurer attacks on the soft law of the RLLI are troubling. Where 
a powerful interest group such as the insurance industry loses intellectual battles over 
legal content, it may be able to reverse those losses on the less reflective field of raw 
politics. Despite the attacks, Restatements continue to exert substantial influence on 
courts. What is unclear is the magnitude of reduction in Restatement influence and the 
likely future trend. Current attacks have probably taken a toll but it is unclear whether 
this will be a temporary phenomenon or whether Restatements and the ALI can be 
sufficiently de-legitimized by special interests to lose their traditional role of providing 
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